Three essays in agricultural economics : international trade, development and commodity promotion by Cardwell, Ryan Tyler
  
 
 
THREE ESSAYS IN AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS: INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 
DEVELOPMENT AND COMMODITY PROMOTION 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the College of 
Graduate Studies and Research 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
In the Department of Agricultural Economics 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon 
 
By 
 
RYAN TYLER CARDWELL 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright Ryan Tyler Cardwell, July, 2005. All rights reserved 
PERMISSION TO USE 
 
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a Postgraduate 
degree from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this University 
may make it freely available for inspection.  I further agree that permission for copying 
of this thesis in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted 
by the professor or professors who supervised my thesis work or, in their absence, by 
the Head of the Department or the Dean of the College in which my thesis work was 
done.  It is understood that any copying or publication or use of this thesis or parts 
thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  It is also 
understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of 
Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis. 
 
Requests for permission to copy or to make other use of material in this thesis in whole 
or part should be addressed to: 
 
 
Head of the Department of Agricultural Economics 
University of Saskatchewan 
51 Campus Drive 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan 
S7N 5A8 
 i
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis contains three essays on topics in agricultural economics.  Essays one and 
two share a focus on international trade and economic development, and essays two and 
three apply dynamic tools to agricultural economic policy issues. 
 
Essay one analyses trade-related implications of a developing country’s decision to 
adopt genetically-modified crop technology.  A fixed-proportions model is constructed 
that evaluates the welfare implications of a range of adoption policies and export market 
responses.  The model in this essay illustrates the importance of the prospective adopter 
formulating a projection of probable export market effects before making an adoption 
decision and of the role that high transaction costs may play in a developing country’s 
adoption decision.  The model also considers the effects of a new policy tool; a check-
off style levy on genetically-modified technology in place of a technology-use 
agreement.  A levy could be useful tool in developing countries, which are characterised 
by high transaction costs. 
 
Essay two models the effects of emergency food aid on a recipient country’s 
agricultural industry.  This essay formulates a definition of “needed” aid in the context 
of a food emergency and constructs an optimal control model that solves a path of aid 
shipments that best meets that need.  The effects of a range of food aid paths on 
recipient-country agricultural production are illustrated through numerical simulations.  
There are two key results.  First, a non-optimal amount of aid can hinder a recipient-
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country’s recovery from an exogenous food shock.  Second, an exogenous shock can 
affect farmer revenue and therefore impact planting decisions.  This effect must be 
considered in aid allocation policies. 
 
Essay three uses time-series econometric techniques to develop a demand model that 
assesses the effectiveness of commodity advertising.  This essay describes the 
importance of considering long-run and dynamic effects in demand systems, especially 
in the case of closely substitutable commodities.  A demand system that tests for and 
accommodates dynamic and time-series properties is developed and applied to US meat 
data.  The results of this model are compared to a traditional static demand system.  The 
dynamic model produces econometrically and theoretically sound results and generates 
some more intuitively appealing estimates. 
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ESSAY 1: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ DECISION TO ADOPT GENETICALLY-
MODIFIED CROP TECHNOLOGY: FRAMING THE INTERNATIONAL  
TRADE POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Developing countries may have the most to gain and the most to lose from adoption of 
genetically-modified crop technology.  Genetically-modified crops that increase 
agricultural productivity have the potential to enhance developing countries’ 
agricultural comparative advantages and reduce staple food prices.  Genetically-
modified technologies that contain enhanced nutritional characteristics have the 
potential to improve diets, and create crops that are hardier in the face of weather and 
pest shocks, thereby stabilizing food security.  Some developing countries are quickly 
adopting genetically-modified crop technology and it appears as though consumers in 
developing countries are amenable to consuming foods that are produced from 
genetically-modified crops.1   
 
                                                 
1 Some exceptions include Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Haggui). 
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There exist, however, several significant downside risks to the adoption of genetically-
modified crop technology in developing countries.2  These risks involve potential 
international trade effects that should be in the forefront of the minds of developing 
country policy makers when deciding on genetically-modified crop adoption.  
Prospective adopters must consider the effects of two types of international trade issues.  
First, the method of adopting intellectual property that is embodied in genetically-
modified crops will affect trade relations with the host country of the intellectual 
property innovator.  Second, the adoption of genetically-modified crop technology may 
affect international trade relations with consumer nations.  Policy-makers are faced with 
deciding whether the potential benefits of adoption outweigh potential costs.3
 
This essay develops a framework in which to analyse the international trade effects of 
adopting genetically-modified crop technology.  An economic surplus model is 
constructed that can account for various methods of adoption and a range of export 
market responses.  The model provides a simple and comprehensive method for 
developing countries to frame the policy decision of adopting genetically-modified crop 
technology.  Every country’s decision is different - there exists no absolute ranking of 
policies.  Each country’s decision depends on its specific market conditions and 
probable export market effects.   
 
                                                 
2 This essay focuses on the economics of genetically-modified technology, not the science.  Chapter 1.2 
provides some background on some of the important scientific concerns about genetically-modified 
technology. 
3 Another consideration is that a developing country that bans GM crop technology may offend the GM 
innovating country and risk trade action through the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  This 
hypothetical case is not considered in this essay. 
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The results of this essay’s analysis emphasise the importance of three factors.  First, a 
developing country’s ability to enforce intellectual property rights is central issue in 
determining the method of adoption.  Second, a levy on genetically modified 
technology may be a transaction-cost efficient method of avoiding trade actions from 
innovating countries.  Third, prospective genetically-modified crop adopting countries 
must have an expectation of the response of its export markets to genetically-modified 
foods.  The first and third results are worrisome for developing countries.  The 
institutions that facilitate capacity in each of these factors are lacking in many, if not 
most, developing countries. 
 
 
1.2. Developing Countries and Trade in Genetically-Modified Products 
This chapter contains two sections.  The first section discusses the relevance of 
genetically-modified (GM) crops to the economic growth of developing countries.  This 
section also includes an overview of the extent of GM crop adoption in developing 
countries.  Section two provides some background on the international trade rules that 
may be relevant to trade in GM goods (GMGs). 
 
1.2.1. Developing Countries and GMGs 
Biotechnology has the potential to provide considerable benefits for developing 
countries.  As with the Green Revolution of the past several decades, the “gene 
revolution” shows great promise to initiate and speed economic growth and increase 
welfare in developing countries.  There are two primary channels through which GM 
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crop technology can improve welfare.  The first is by increasing food security in 
developing countries by creating crops that are more nutritious, more resistant to 
weather and pest shocks and less costly to produce (Haggui).  There also exists the 
potential for dynamic benefits as GM technologies are used to initiate Green 
Revolution-style breeding programs that produce varietal improvements best suited to 
local agronomic conditions (Evenson). 
 
GM technology may also improve welfare by enhancing what might be an underlying 
comparative advantage in developing countries.  Many developing countries have 
natural comparative advantages in the production of some agricultural crops because of 
endowments and low labour costs (Dahlsten).  GM crops that increase the sector’s 
productivity deepen developing countries’ natural cost advantages and render their 
exports more competitive.  Agricultural exports from developing countries may grow 
and increase welfare in developing countries. 
 
GM technology can also benefit developing countries by increasing productivity growth 
where intensive agriculture is practiced.  Productivity growth on land that is already 
under cultivation reduces pressure to expand the quantity of land under cultivation 
(extensive growth).  More food can be grown on the same quantity of land, thus 
preserving biodiversity (James, 2003).  There are also substantial environmental 
benefits that can arise from the introduction of GM crop technology.  Qaim and 
Zilberman estimate that bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) cotton crops in India require 70% 
less chemical pesticide than non-GM (NGM) crops in the same region.  A reduction in 
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pesticide requirements is particularly beneficial in developing countries where farmers 
face credit shortfalls that prevent the purchase of chemical pesticides.  
 
The GM technology considered in this essay is of the variety that reduces production 
costs, not the variety that improves the quality of the food products.  Also, the GM 
adoption decision is considered in an international setting, so that there exists a world 
food price.  For these reasons, the GM technology under consideration in this essay is 
most likely to increase the adopting country’s welfare by enhancing a comparative 
advantage and increasing exports.  Chapter 1.3 explains the manner in which the 
technological advancement affects production costs. 
 
GM crops are being adopted quickly in developing countries.  Developing countries 
currently account for an estimated 30 percent of global GM hectarage (James, 2003), 
which is up from below 5 percent just six years ago.  It should be noted that the 30 
percent estimate is conservative because it includes only a modest approximation of 
GM soybean crops in Brazil; the true figure is likely higher (James, 2004).  Though the 
level of GM planting in the US (accounting for nearly two-thirds of global hectarage) 
dwarfs that of all other countries, several developing countries figure prominently in the 
list of the world’s largest GM crop producers.  Argentina, Brazil and China account for 
nearly 20 percent of global GM crop hectarage.   
 
Several developing countries, particularly in Asia, allocate a large sum of public funds 
to research in GM crop technology.  In particular, China, India, Philippines and 
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Thailand fund public research into technology such as virus-resistant crops (Skerritt).  
Gray, McNaughton and Stovin estimate that more than 90 percent of GM research is 
publicly funded in developing countries.  Despite this evidence of public research, the 
vast majority of global GM adoption consists of GM technology that has been created 
by private firms in the US.  The model in this essay illustrates how the developing 
country’s adoption of foreign-owned intellectual property affects welfare. 
 
1.2.2. Trade Rules and Genetically-Modified Goods 
There are three sources of potential trade conflict for a country that adopts and trades 
GMGs.  The first is the WTO agreement that governs international protection of 
intellectual property (IP) rights, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) agreement.  The TRIPS agreement can impact the method by which a 
country decides to adopt GM technology.  The second and third sources of potential 
conflict are the WTO’s rules that govern trade in plants and animals, and rules 
governing labelling requirements.  These two agreements, the Agreement of the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) impact the export markets of a country that has 
adopted GM crop technology.  The relevant aspects of these three agreements are 
discussed below. 
 
The TRIPS agreement is a mandatory component of the WTO; all member countries 
must be signatories to the agreement.  Developed member countries of the WTO pushed 
hard for the TRIPS agreement to be part of the Uruguay round of trade negotiations as a 
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method of enforcing their domestic IP rights outside their domestic borders.  The key to 
the TRIPS agreement is cross-retaliation with other WTO agreements.  If the WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) determines that a member country is not protecting 
another member’s IP rights (which are enforced for twenty years in the case of patents 
and fifty years in the case of copyrights), then retaliatory trade measures are allowed 
under one of the WTO’s other agreements.  The host country of the IP innovator can 
impose, on the offending country, trade sanctions that would otherwise be in violation 
of its General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) obligations.  Such sanctions 
would presumably take the form of (often prohibitive) tariffs on imports from the 
offending nation.   
 
Developed member countries supported cross-retaliation because it was believed to be 
one of the only methods of enforcing IP rights extraterritorially.  Developing countries 
rarely have IP to protect, so the threat of a developed country retaliating against a pirate 
industry in a developing country by not protecting developing country IP rights is rarely 
credible.  Developed countries hoped that the imposition of tariffs would coerce 
developing countries into enforcing foreign IP rights.   
 
The TRIPS agreement is relevant to the GM adoption decision because GM traits that 
are engineered into GM crops are considered private IP that is owned by innovating 
firms.  Roundup Ready® soybeans that are produced by Monsanto and Bt maize 
produced by Monsanto, Novartis and Pioneer Hybrid International are patented 
products whose IP is protected, at least in theory, by the TRIPS agreement.  The nature 
 7
of agricultural crops, however, makes pirating this IP simple from a practical 
perspective.  Farmers or seed breeders can save GM seeds and initiate their own 
breeding programs that provide a stream of GM seeds in the future.4  GM seed 
companies circumvent this problem in developed countries by enforcing contracts with 
farmers, many of which forbid saving seeds; farmers are legally compelled to 
repurchase new seeds every year.  In developing countries where transaction and 
monitoring costs are high, IP innovating firms may find it difficult to enforce such 
contracts5.  Developed countries therefore hope to use the threat of trade sanctions 
under the TRIPS to coerce developing countries into enforcing IP rights.6   
 
Once an exporting country has adopted GM crop technology, it may face adverse 
consumer responses from importing nations.  Importing nations with consumer 
concerns about GMGs may seek to restrict imports from GMG-producing countries or 
impose mandatory labelling requirements on imported GMGs.  The WTO’s SPS and 
TBT agreements house the rules that apply to such trade actions.   
 
Before explaining how the SPS and TBT agreements apply to trade in GMGs, it is 
worth noting that the WTO is ill-equipped to deal with trade disputes about GMGs.  The 
WTO was set up to address protectionism from producers, and as such was initially 
concerned with the reduction of border measures (Gaisford, et al.).  However, it is not 
                                                 
4 Genetic Use Restricting Technologies, or “terminator genes” that render GM seeds sterile have been 
abandoned by seed companies in response to public pressure (Wright) and the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research has officially rejected the use of terminator genes (Pinstrup-Anderson 
and Cohen). 
5 This point is discussed further in chapter 1.4. 
6 The probable success of cross retaliation as a means of protecting IP rights is discussed in chapter 1.4. 
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traditional producer protectionism that fuels most calls for import restrictions on 
GMGs; rather it is consumers and environmentalists that sustain efforts to curb trade in 
GMGs (Gaisford, et al.).  The WTO does not contain a forum for dealing with consumer 
requests for trade protection, so such requests are handled by WTO constituent 
agreements that are best (or perhaps the least bad) suited to address the issues presented 
by GMGs.   
 
The SPS agreement contains rules that pertain to food safety; specifically, rules that 
attempt to prevent overly strict health and safety regulations from being used as an 
excuse for domestic protection.  It is the SPS agreement that will be asked to decide on 
the legitimacy of trade actions against imported GMGs that are imposed in the name of 
food safety.  The key to the SPS agreement is that it only allows trade actions that have 
scientific justification.7  Trade measures are allowable under the SPS, but such 
measures must be based on a scientific consensus and must minimise trade disruptions.  
The scientific consensus must include agreement on the need for a restriction, 
agreement on the risk associated with not imposing a restriction and agreement on the 
point at which enough science has been conducted to reach a conclusion on the safety of 
the GMG in question (Kerr).  The requirement of a consensus on “enough science” 
having been done is troublesome for a rules-based agreement, however (Kerr).  A 
concerned importing nation can always make the claim that not enough science has 
been done to reach a reliable scientific conclusion.  No consensus will exist and trade 
restrictions on GMGs are justified.   
                                                 
7 Article 5.7 of the SPS also allows provisional trade measures if there exists insufficient scientific 
evidence to form a conclusion.  Such measures could be consistent with the “precautionary principle”. 
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 The TBT agreement seeks to ensure that “regulations, standards, testing and 
certification procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles” to trade (WTO).  In the 
context of GMGs, the TBT agreement contains rules that govern labelling requirements 
on food.  Like the SPS, the TBT demands that labelling requirements be based on 
scientific evidence of risk.  If a food product poses a safety concern (allergies, for 
example), then labelling requirements are allowed under the TBT or the SPS.  However, 
it is what the TBT agreement does not allow that is likely to lead to disputes between 
WTO member countries.  The TBT agreement does not allow labelling requirements 
based on consumers’ right to know (Isaac, Phillipson and Kerr).  Labelling requirements 
that are based on consumers’ right to know may violate one of the WTO’s fundamental 
tenets; “like” products.  Specifically, an importing country cannot impose labelling 
requirements on GM imports just because they have been produced using GM 
technology.  If there is no difference between the final product, regardless of the 
production method, then the TBT agreement does not permit violation of the “like” 
products tenet.  Such measures are only allowed if it can be demonstrated that the GM 
production technique produces a different product which presents a risk to the importing 
country.   
 
The SPS and TBT agreements are intended to provide regulatory predictability to 
exporters.  WTO member countries that fulfill their WTO obligations should not impose 
unwarranted trade restrictions on GMGs.  However, the political reality is that the WTO 
is a voluntary agreement entered into by member countries and many importing 
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countries appear willing to ignore their obligations in response to domestic political 
pressure (Kerr and Hobbs).  Those countries considering GM adoption must therefore 
be prepared to encounter trade measures that are not WTO-compliant.  The 
consequences of this are discussed in chapter 1.4. 
  
Another issue complicating the international trade of GMGs is the presence of 
overlapping jurisdiction between WTO agreements and various multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs).  Situations may arise wherein one side of a trade 
dispute is a member of an MEA that outlines rules for trade in GMGs and the other side 
is not.  If both sides are member countries of the WTO, then it is unclear whether the 
MEA’s or the WTO’s rules take precedence.  This issue is beyond the scope of this 
essay - see Isaac and Kerr or Issac, Phillipson and Kerr for more information on such 
conflicts. 
 
1.3. Model 
This section introduces the analytical framework in which GM adoption policies can be 
analysed.  The model provides a framework in which to measure welfare effects of the 
GM adoption decision in the adopting country.  The model is a partial equilibrium 
economic surplus model and considers only the welfare effects in the industry that 
adopts GM technology.  A basic methodology for analysing welfare effects along a 
supply chain is presented, and this methodology is then extended to allow for 
international trade and various adoption policies.   
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There exist several valid criticisms of economic surplus methods.  Alston, et al. provide 
a comprehensive overview of the primary drawbacks of such methods, and it is worth 
emphasizing those which are particularly germane to this essay.  First, a net welfare 
gain that is observed in an economic surplus model is no guarantee that everybody is 
better off.  If welfare increases in a comparative static analysis, then the change is 
Kaldor-Hicks superior; that is, there exists enough new welfare that the winners could 
compensate the losers so that everybody is better off.  The reallocation that is necessary 
for Pareto superiority may not occur, and presents a particularly large obstacle in 
developing countries.  The institutions that would facilitate such reallocation are 
“conspicuous by their absence” and transaction costs are very high in developing 
countries (Hobbs and Kerr). 
 
Another relevant concern is the type of supply shift that is initiated by new technology.  
Such a shift could be parallel, divergent or convergent.  Each of these shifts applies to 
different types of technological advances and has different implications for changes in 
welfare.  This essay considers a parallel supply shift in the forthcoming model, and the 
justification for a parallel shift is provided in section 1.3.3.   
 
Despite the shortcomings of economic surplus methods, welfare analysis remains one of 
the most useful pieces of an economist’s toolkit, and is likely the best method for 
analysis of this kind (Alston, et al.).   
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This essay does not analyse possible health or environmental aspects of GMGs.  
Accordingly, the following preliminary assumptions are made: 1) GMGs increase 
productivity (by reducing costs for the same amount of output) and 2) there are no 
negative externalities (health or environmental) associated with the use of GM crops.  
While the first assumption is not overly strong, the second assumption may be 
contestable.  The concerns about the safety of GM products are well documented (see 
MacFarlane for a discussion).  Though GM crops have yet to be proven unsafe for 
human health or the environment, the technology is new enough that possible negative 
complications have not yet had time to present themselves.  A specific concern about 
GM crops is that herbicide tolerant and pesticide resistant seeds will enable the 
evolution of “super weeds” and “super bugs” that are resistant to all herbicides and 
pesticides.   
 
Food safety is another concern.  Diseases that lie dormant for long periods and cancers 
that take years or decades to develop might not appear for several years after ingesting 
GM foods.  The technology is too new to form a definitive conclusion about these 
possible effects.  There is no evidence linking GM crops to such health risks, however 
many scientists encourage a precautionary approach. 
 
This analysis does not evaluate the science of these concerns or the rationality of 
consumer concerns given the scientific evidence.  Such concerns are assumed to be 
reflected in exogenous consumer preferences.  Assuming no externalities allows the 
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focus to be placed on the primary economic concern - the potential international trade 
implications of adopting GM technology.   
 
The forthcoming model develops policy tools that can be used for an adoption decision 
in most any country, developed or developing.  However, a few key assumptions are 
made that render the policy analysis particularly relevant to developing countries.  First, 
the considered GM technology is assumed to be developed in a foreign country.  Since 
the innovator (most often a biotechnology firm in the US) of the IP is not located in the 
developing country, the adoption decision involves either pirating the technology or 
importing and buying the technology from the IP innovator abroad.  Any proceeds 
accruing to the foreign IP innovator must be considered in the welfare analysis.  
Second, the adopting nation is modelled as a small country, so that its production and 
exports do not affect the world price.8
 
The analysis is conducted from the adopting-country’s perspective.  This country is 
referred to as DC (a generic method of referring to “developing country”), and it is 
DC’s economic welfare that forms the basis of policy decisions.  The forthcoming 
analysis could be applied to any number of different crops, but reference is made to 
adoption of GM soybeans, for the sake of convenience.  DC produces and exports NGM 
soybeans, and the policy question surrounds the adoption of GM soybean seeds.  The 
example of soybeans is used because of its relevance to current developing country 
situations.  Several South American nations have recently approved domestic use of 
                                                 
8 The case where the adopting developing country affects the world price for GM products is considered 
in a later section. 
 14
GM soybeans and other nations are in the decision stage of approving GM technology 
(James, 2004).  Rice is another topical example.  China is currently in the stages of 
developing and approving GM rice for domestic production (James, 2004).  The 
analysis is presented in an order that follows the soybean supply chain in chronological 
order - that is, the welfare effects of importing/buying GM seeds and growing GM 
soybeans are derived first, followed by the welfare effects of exporting GM soybeans.  
However DC’s policy analysis should begin at the other end of the supply chain, with 
DC determining the probable effects on its export market before moving to the decision 
of whether (and in what manner) to adopt GM technology.  This point is addressed 
further in chapter 1.4. 
 
1.3.1. A Simple Fixed Proportions Model 
The policy decision under consideration in this essay affects several related input 
markets.  The production and exportation of GM soybeans involves seeds, land, 
chemicals, elevator and transport services.  The following analysis presents the policy 
decision in a multi-input, single-output fixed proportions model.  The primary benefit of 
a fixed-proportions model is that it allows a close analysis of how policies and 
technological factors in one stage of the supply chain affect other stages through 
vertical linkages.   
 
We assume that three inputs are required in the production and exportation of beans.  
Seeds (S) are the primary input and are planted on farm land (L).  The third input is an 
aggregate input that includes the cost of herbicides and other inputs per hectare of land 
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(C).  The other input costs per hectare include elevator and transportation services.  
These inputs are used in a fixed proportion to produce an equivalent quantity of beans 
(B).  That is, .  This states that, for example, a fixed quantity of seeds 
(measured in tonnes), one hectare of land and one hectare’s worth of other inputs are 
required to produce one tonne of beans.  The fixed-proportions framework does not 
allow for input substitutability - inputs must be applied in the same quantity to produce 
a fixed amount of beans.  This assumption is reasonable for the purposes of this model.  
The GM technology considered in the forthcoming analysis reduces the marginal cost of 
certain inputs, but does not change the quantity of inputs required to produce a fixed 
level of output. 
BCLS =++
 
The units of each input can be adjusted so that BCLS === .  Scaling factors that 
could be attached to each input (so that, for example, 0.001 tonnes of seed are required 
to produce one tonne of beans) are omitted for notational convenience.  The 
forthcoming analytical welfare derivations are not affected by this omission, but if 
empirical estimates of demand and supply parameters were available, then scaling 
factors would be required to calculate cardinal welfare values.  The markets for all 
inputs are assumed to be perfectly competitive9 so that the supply price of the final good 
(beans) is equal to the sum of the costs of each input.  That is, .  The 
supply curve for beans can then be derived as the vertical summation of all input supply 
curves.  Consider the following inverse supply curves for seed, land and other input 
costs per hectare of land, respectively.   
CLSB PPPP ++=
                                                 
9 This restriction is relaxed in a later part of the analysis. 
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  µ=SP  (1.1) 
 LPL λγ +=  (1.2) 
 χ=CP   (1.3) 
 
The inverse supply curves in equations (1.1) to (1.3) represent aggregate supply curves 
for each input in DC.  Seeds are assumed to be supplied at a constant marginal cost of 
µ , land supply is upward sloping, representing it as a Ricardian input (fixed in 
quantity), and the marginal cost of other inputs per hectare of planted land is assumed to 
be constant across output levels.  Adding equations (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3) yields DC’s 
inverse bean supply curve: 
 
 LPB λµγχ +++= , (1.4) 
 
and because input units can be adjusted so that BL = , we have 
 
 ( ) BPB λµγχ +++= . (1.5) 
 
Supply of beans in DC is determined according to equation (1.5).  A bean demand 
function is now required to establish equilibrium in these related markets10.  Consider 
DC’s inverse bean demand as 
                                                 
10 Price is determined locally in the introductory model, indicating a closed economy.  The model 
introduces international trade in the next section. 
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  BPB φω −= . (1.6) 
 
The DC bean market is in equilibrium where bean supply is equal to bean demand: 
 
 ( ) BB φωλµγχ −=+++ ,  (1.7) 
 
or  
 
 φλ
µγχω
+
−−−=*B . (1.8) 
 
DC equilibrium bean output equals equation (1.8), which is a function of the slope and 
intercept parameters of the related industries’ supply functions and of the bean demand 
function.  The equilibrium price in this market is solved as 
 
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−−−−=∗ φλ
µγχωφωBP . (1.9) 
 
Derived demand curves for each input market can now be found using the equilibrium 
bean price and the knowledge that each input is supplied competitively.  Producers are 
willing to pay for each input unit an amount equal to the final price of beans minus the 
price he must pay for each of the other two inputs required in production.  For example 
the derived demand for seed inputs is equal to the bean price minus the supply price of 
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other inputs per hectare minus the supply price of land.  As such, inverse derived 
demand functions are equal to the vertical difference between the equilibrium price for 
beans and the supply functions of the two other inputs.   
 
 χλγφλ
µγχωφω −−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−−−−= LPS . (1.10) 
 
Equation (1.10) represents the inverse demand function for seeds.  Since  in the 
fixed proportions model, and substituting equation (1.8) into equation (1.10), the 
inverse derived demand function for seeds is 
SL =
 
 ( ) SBPS λχγφω −−−−= * . (1.11) 
 
Inverse derived demand functions for land and for other inputs per hectare can be 
constructed in a similar fashion: 
 
 ( )χµφω −−−= *BPL  (1.12) 
 ( ) CBPC λχµφω −−−−= * . (1.13) 
 
Equilibrium prices in each market can be determined by recalling that, after adjusting 
units,  so that .  Equilibrium output levels in each 
market can be inserted into the relevant inverse demand or supply curves to obtain 
equilibrium prices in each market.   
BCLS === ∗∗∗∗ === BCLS
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 The related markets that are outlined in equations (1.1) through (1.13) can be illustrated 
graphically.  Figure 1.1 presents the markets for DC’s beans and bean inputs.  Each 
panel represents a different stage in the vertically linked supply chain for beans.  The 
exogenous portions of the model are seed supply, land supply, other inputs per hectare 
supply and bean demand.  The bean supply function and demand functions for all inputs 
are derived using the aforementioned methodology.  The equilibrium price for beans is 
equal to the sum of the equilibrium cost for seeds, land and other inputs per hectare.   
 
Though each market is competitive, there exist rents to each segment in the form of 
consumer and producer surpluses.  However, one of the chief benefits of a fixed 
proportions model is that the entire industry’s rents can be derived from analysis of the 
end market.  Since the supply and demand curves in the bean market represent the totals 
of each supply-chain segment below, consumer and producer surplus measures taken 
from the bean market provide a measure of total welfare11.  Total welfare in the DC 
bean industry is measured by the sum of consumer surplus (area ) and producer 
surplus (area ) in panel 1 of Figure 1.1. 
W
BabP
bcPWB
 
1.3.2. International Trade in a Fixed-Proportions Model 
The simple model outlined above can be adapted to allow for international trade by 
introducing world bean supply and demand functions.  Only the world final-product 
market functions (rather than all constituent input supply and derived input demand 
                                                 
11 Benefits to each segment of the supply chain can be deduced from welfare measures in each panel of 
Figure 1.1. 
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curves) are presented for reasons of brevity.  World bean inverse demand is represented 
as 
 
 BPB α−Ω=  (1.14) 
 
and world bean inverse supply as 
 
 BPB βθ += . (1.15) 
 
Equation (1.14) reflects global demand for beans, and is necessarily flatter than DC’s 
demand for beans; that is, φα < .  Global bean supply is the horizontal sum of all 
nations’ bean supply curves and is necessarily larger than DC bean supply, so that 
λβ < .  A preliminary assumption is made that the intercept of the world bean inverse 
supply curve is equal to the intercept of DC’s inverse supply curve.  That is, 
µγχθ ++= .  Setting world supply equal to world demand yields the world bean 
price: 
 
 
( )
( )βα
θα
+
−Ω−Ω=WBP  (1.16) 
 
and world bean consumption 
 
 
( )
( )βα
θ
+
−Ω=∗WB . (1.17) 
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 The model assumes that only the final product in the bean industry is traded 
internationally.  Inputs, including other services (pesticide, fertiliser, elevator and 
transportation), land and seeds, are supplied and used domestically so that prices are 
determined locally in the DC market12.   
 
The world bean price is used to derive the input demand curves for DC’s bean industry 
instead of equation (1.9).  Subtracting the relevant supply functions in equations (1.1) 
through (1.3) from the world bean price in equation (1.16) yields derived inverse 
demand functions for seeds, land and other inputs per hectare, respectively: 
 
 ( )( ) SPDCS λβα
θαθ −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
−Ω−=  (1.18) 
 
 
( )
( ) µχβα
θα −−+
−Ω−Ω=DCLP  (1.19) 
 
 ( )( ) CPDCC λβα
θαµγ −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
−Ω−−−Ω= .  (1.20) 
 
At a price of beans given by equation (1.16), DC produces beans according to its supply 
function given in equation (1.5).  DC bean output is 
 
                                                 
12 The case where GM seeds are imported is considered at a later stage. 
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 ( )
( )
λ
θ
λ
µλχβα
θα
−=
−−−+
−Ω−Ω
=∗
W
B
DC
P
B
. (1.21) 
 
The fixed proportions model in Figure 1.1 is adapted to allow for international trade in 
Figure 1.2.  represents global bean supply, and is necessarily flatter than DC bean 
supply because world supply is equal to the horizontal summation of all constituent 
nations’ supply.  Global bean supply intersects global bean demand, , to establish 
the equilibrium price of equation (1.16).  DC’s derived input demand curves are 
determined by subtracting the relevant input supply functions from the world bean 
price. 
W
BS
W
BD
 
DC’s domestic welfare can be measured by the sum of consumer surplus (area ) 
and producer surplus (area ) in the top panel of figure 1.2.  These two areas 
account for all rents accruing down the vertically linked supply chain in DC’s bean 
industry. 
W
BacP
bdPWB
 
1.3.3. Technological Change in a Fixed Proportions Model 
We now consider the effects of a technological advancement in the form of a GM seed 
trait.  There are several types of genetic modifications that would be considered a 
technological improvement from an economist’s perspective.  GM traits can produce 
foods with longer shelf lives, higher nutritional value or appealing aesthetic 
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characteristics.  Such traits are product-quality based and affect market demand, not 
supply.  This essay, however, focuses on GM traits that impact bean supply conditions.  
Specifically, GM traits that reduce input costs along the bean supply chain are 
considered.   
 
Two such traits are most prevalent.  The use of a herbicide tolerant gene in soy, maize, 
cotton and canola crops has created Roundup Ready® crops that are tolerant to post-
emergence application of glysophate herbicides.  Resistance to glysophate allows 
farmers to reduce their herbicide costs by applying one broad-spectrum chemical to 
their crops.  Application of a broad-spectrum herbicide also reduces tillage 
requirements.  The result is decreased production costs per hectare of planted crop.  The 
second most common GM characteristic in agriculture is the Bt trait that attributes 
modified crops with deterrence against insect pests.  The Bt trait is commonly found in 
maize and cotton crops, and reduces production costs per hectare by decreasing reliance 
on chemical pesticides.   
 
This essay focuses on cost-reducing GM traits for two reasons.  The first is that such 
traits account for the vast majority of global GM hectarage.  Herbicide tolerant crops 
account for 72 percent of global GM crops and Bt for 19 percent (James, 2004).  The 
second reason is that the adoption of herbicide tolerant and insect resistant crops are 
germane to current policy decisions in developing countries.  Several South American 
nations (including Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay) have recently adopted and approved 
GM crops, or are considering doing so in the near future.  China is likely to approve and 
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adopt Bt rice over the next year (James, 2004).  The potential welfare effects of such 
policy decisions should be of great interest to decision-making authorities in these 
countries. 
 
To analyse the effects of GM adoption in DC, we assume that farmers are faced with 
the initial option to adopt GM seeds.  Farmers decide on the quantity of GM seeds to 
purchase according to their derived GM seed demand curve, and allocate an equivalent 
amount of land and other services per hectare to the production of GM beans.  This 
decision is based on the price received for GM beans and on the input costs along the 
GM bean supply chain.  The bean price received and the incurred production costs 
change in the forthcoming scenarios and results in different adoption decisions. 
 
The introduction of a GM herbicide tolerant or insect-resistant trait into bean seed 
reduces the quantity of chemical herbicides or pesticides that are required on a given 
hectare to achieve an equivalent yield.  Put another way, the GM trait lowers the cost of 
other inputs per hectare of planted land.  Such a trait can be modelled as a parallel 
downward shift of the inverse supply curve for other services per hectare13.  The 
marginal cost of other inputs is assumed to be constant across output levels.  The GM 
trait maintains constant marginal costs, but at a lower level.  Equation (1.3) then 
becomes 
 
                                                 
13 Two initial assumptions are made at this stage.  First, producers do not pay a royalty or monopoly price 
(a technology use fee) for GM seeds.  The effects of royalties and higher GM seed prices are taken up in 
section 1.3.4.  Second, there is no adverse consumer reaction to GM beans.  The effects of various 
consumer responses are examined in section 1.3.5. 
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 10, <<= εεχCP , (1.22) 
 
where ε  represents the downward shift of the inverse supply curve for other inputs per 
hectare.  Equation (1.22) is now used to generate the inverse bean supply curve, which 
can be represented as 
 
 ( ) BPB λµγεχ +++= . (1.23) 
 
Notice that the inverse supply curve in equation (1.23) is necessarily lower, or further 
out, than the pre-GM inverse supply curve in equation (1.5) because 1<ε .  DC can now 
produce beans at a lower cost than in the pre-GM situation.14  It is assumed that GM 
seeds can be supplied at the same marginal cost as NMG beans, so that equation (1.1) 
remains relevant.  Likewise, the marginal cost of land remains the same as in equation 
(1.2).   
 
DC is considered a small country in the global economy, so its output of beans does not 
affect world supply conditions, and therefore does not change the world price.  We 
therefore determine DC’s GM bean output using equation (1.16) according to the 
inverse supply function in equation (1.23).  DC’s equilibrium GM bean output is 
 
                                                 
14 From this point on, we will consider the international framework of equations (1.1) through (1.3), 
(1.5),(1.6) and (1.14) though (1.21) as the pre-GM baseline.  This baseline is used for comparing welfare 
effects of policy decisions regarding GM adoption and possible trade effects. 
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 ( )
( )
λ
µγεχ
λ
µγεχβα
θα
−−−=
−−−+
−Ω−Ω
=∗
W
B
DC
GM
P
B
 (1.24) 
 
which is necessarily larger than pre-GM bean output because 1<ε . 
 
It is intuitive that DC completely adopts GM seeds and there is no NGM bean 
production in this scenario.  The world price is the same for both products and the cost 
of producing GM beans is lower; there is no incentive to produce NGM beans.   
 
Figure 1.3 illustrates a graphical representation of GM seed adoption as described 
above.  The introduction of GM seeds reduces the marginal cost of other inputs per 
hectare, pushing  down to .  The supply of beans in the GM market (the 
vertical sum of all input supply curves) then shifts out to .  DC now produces 
more beans (all of them GM) than in the pre-GM situation.  DC’s NGM bean 
production falls to zero.  
CS GMCS ,
DC
GMBS ,
 
The change in DC’s domestic welfare that results from GM adoption can be measured 
as the difference between total welfare in the top panel of figure 1.3 and total welfare in 
the top panel of figure 1.2.  Consumer surplus remains unchanged after the introduction 
of GM technology - DC consumes the same quantity of beans at the same world price.15  
                                                 
15 DC consumers are assumed to be indifferent between GM and NGM beans. 
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Producer surplus unambiguously rises, however, since DC produces and exports more 
beans.  DC unambiguously gains from the adoption of GM seed technology in this case. 
 
This situation represents the best-case scenario for DC.  DC benefits from the cost-
reducing technology without facing trade actions on either end of its bean supply chain 
(purchasing seeds or exporting beans).  GM beans can be exported alongside NGM 
beans at the same price to the same foreign consumers.  This result is dependent on 
there being no consumer preference for NGM beans over GM beans and on none of 
DC’s export markets imposing trade restrictions or labelling requirements.  The benefits 
also depend on DC pirating the GM technology from the foreign innovator and 
producing GM seeds for the same marginal cost as is required to produce NGM seeds.  
Subsequent cases examine the effects on DC welfare of actions by the innovating firm 
and of export restrictions. 
 
Now that the basics of the fixed proportions model have been established to 
accommodate international trade and technological change, we turn to modeling policy 
options that determine the welfare implications of DC’s decision to adopt GM seeds.   
 
1.3.4. GM Adoption Scenarios 
We now consider three scenarios under which GM technology can be adopted in DC.  
The policy options include pirating GM technology, paying the IP innovator the 
monopoly price, and negotiating a levy on production of beans while maintaining a 
black market for GM seeds.  Each option is described in detail below and the welfare 
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gains from each option are derived and compared.  If empirical estimates of the relevant 
supply and demand functions were available, then welfare values could be calculated to 
assist in policy decisions.   
 
Case 1 - Pirate GM Seeds
Case 1 considers the scenario outlined above in which DC adopts GM technology, faces 
no constraints on its export market and the marginal cost of seeds does not rise above 
the marginal cost of NGM seeds.  The results are identical to the baseline case of 
technological change in section 1.3.3.  Such a scenario may seem unrealistic and “too 
good to be true”.  However, it is just such a situation in which countries such as Brazil 
have found themselves in recent years.  Brazil had not yet authorised the use of GM 
soybeans, and therefore maintained unfettered access to EU markets.  However James 
(2004) estimates that almost one-quarter of Brazil’s soybean crop is GM - an estimate 
that James acknowledges is almost certainly low.  Furthermore, Brazil’s GM soybean 
crops are not grown from seeds purchased from Monsanto, the patent-holder for 
herbicide tolerant soybean seeds.  Rather, Brazilian seeds are purchased on the local 
market from black market dealers who are believed to have smuggled GM soybean 
seeds from Argentina a decade ago (The Western Producer).  Brazilian farmers need not 
pay a higher price for the technologically advanced seeds - a situation that is considered 
at a later stage of this analysis. 
 
DC’s welfare can be deduced from the top panel of figure 1.3.  Consumer welfare 
remains equal to area  and producer surplus grows to area .  There is no WBacP bdP
W
B
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economic surplus in the NGM market since production has fallen to zero.16  Welfare in 
the post-GM scenario is higher than in the pre-GM scenario because producer surplus is 
unambiguously larger. 
 
The result that GM adoption is complete warrants some discussion.  GM adoption is 
estimated to be incomplete in several developing countries, including Brazil (James, 
2004).  The model’s result of complete GM adoption is, however, a function of the 
comparative static nature of the welfare model.  The model illustrates two equilibriums, 
pre-GM and post-GM.  There is no accounting for a lag in adoption that would explain 
an intermediate stage wherein adoption is not complete.  Argentina, where GM 
soybeans were adopted earlier than in Brazil, is estimated to be very near 100 percent 
GM and Brazil’s GM area is growing quickly (James, 2004).  This lends credence to the 
suggestion that the adoption process is dynamic and does not occur instantaneously.  A 
lag in adoption could be due to a several factors including shortage of seeds, slow 
transmission of information to farmers or precautionary decision making by farmers 
(farmers do not adopt until they evaluate the success of neighbouring farms that have 
adopted).  The key result from the model is that there exist economic incentives for 
farmers to adopt GM seeds.  Comparative statics suggest that the new equilibrium 
(complete GM adoption) is attained once obstacles are overcome.   
 
Case 2 - DC Pays the Monopoly Price for GM Seeds
                                                 
16 There is an underlying assumption that all farms are equally agronomically suited to GM seeds.  The 
GM trait under consideration in this essay is assumed to reduce production costs for all farms by the same 
amount - a reduction in herbicide or pesticide cost per hectare.   
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If the GM innovator can successfully protect his IP rights in DC, then DC’s farmers are 
forced to purchase GM seeds directly from the innovating firm (or one of its agents).  
Presuming that the GM technology is patented and that the innovator is the only firm 
selling such seeds, the innovator holds monopoly power over the GM seed market and 
sells seeds at a price and quantity so as to maximise profits.  The monopolist’s profit-
maxinising price depends, however, on the level of cost savings that the GM technology 
introduces to the supply chain.  That is, the monopolist’s ability to earn profits by 
constraining seed output and raising seed price depends on the amount that the supply 
curve for other inputs per hectare shifts down (i.e. the size of ε ).  If the innovation 
reduces costs by a large enough amount to be considered drastic, then the monopolist 
can capture the entire seed market by selling a larger quantity of GM seeds at a lower 
price than in the pre-GM equilibrium (Moschini and Lapan).  The price at which the 
downward sloping portion of the monopolist’s marginal revenue is equal to marginal 
cost, once adjusted for the increased efficiency of the new technology, is below the pre-
innovation price for NGM seeds.  The monopolist therefore faces no effective 
competition from NGM seeds and captures the entire market. 
 
If GM technology does not reduce the cost of other inputs per hectare enough to allow 
the monopolist to charge a price where marginal cost equals the downward sloping 
portion of marginal revenue, then the innovation is nondrastic (Moschini and Lapan).  
In the case of a nondrastic innovation, the monopolist must consider competition from 
the existing NGM technology when setting price.  No farmer will adopt the GM 
technology as long as the price for the GM seeds is higher than the price of the NGM 
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seeds plus the cost saving arising from adopting the new technology (i.e. the efficiency 
adjustment).  The world price for both GM and NGM beans is the same so there is no 
economic incentive for farmers to adopt GM seeds unless it affords them a cost saving.  
The monopolist’s ability to constrain output and increase price relative to the 
competitive equilibrium is therefore constrained in the case of a nondrastic innovation.  
The profit-maximising solution is no longer to set price where marginal cost is equal to 
the downward sloping portion of marginal revenue, because no farmer will pay that 
price for GM seeds; NGM seeds sell for less (adjusted for efficiency).  The monopolist 
must therefore charge a price below the (efficiency-adjusted) competitive NGM seed 
price to sell any seeds.  This becomes the monopolist’s profit-maximising strategy in 
the case of a nondrastic innovation and results in his capturing the entire market.  An 
analytical and graphical explanation the monopolist’s pricing decision follows. 
 
The world bean price remains as in equation (1.16), and the derived demand for GM 
beans is calculated by subtracting the supply functions for land and for other inputs 
from the world bean price.  This generates 
 
 [ ] SPP WBS λγεχ −−−= . (1.25) 
 
Note, however, that equation (1.25) represents demand for GM seeds only beyond the 
quantity sold in the pre-GM equilibrium.  Farmers can acquire NGM seeds for a price of 
µ  after the GM innovation is introduced and will therefore not pay more than µ  plus 
the cost saving introduced by the trait for GM seeds.  Therefore, the demand for GM 
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seeds is perfectly elastic at a price of µ  up to the pre-GM equilibrium output, as given 
in equation (1.21).  GM bean demand is discontinuous at that level of output and jumps 
to the level given by equation (1.25) thereafter.  The complete derived seed demand 
curve is then 
 
 PS =
µ for S ≤ PB
W −θ
λ
PB
W −εχ − γ[ ]− λS for S > PBW −θλ
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ 
⎩ 
⎪ ⎪ 
.17 (1.26) 
 
Equation (1.26) states that demand for GM seeds is perfectly elastic at µ  at output 
levels below the pre-GM competitive equilibrium, and downward sloping thereafter.   
 
The marginal revenue function facing the monopolist is also discontinuous and is 
represented as 
 
 MRS =
µ for S ≤ PB
W −θ
λ
PB
W −εχ − γ[ ]− 2λS for S > PBW −θλ
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ 
⎩ 
⎪ ⎪ 
. (1.27) 
 
                                                 
17 Note that the demand function remains flat at the pre-GM level of output.  If there exist no adjustment 
costs in switching from NGM to GM seeds, then the NGM seed price is exactly equal to the efficiency-
adjusted GM seed price at this level of output; farmers would be indifferent between NGM and GM 
seeds.  That the downward sloping portion of the GM seed demand curve begins after the pre-GM level 
of output is therefore dependent on there being no incentive for farmers to switch to GM seeds when the 
efficiency-adjusted seed prices are identical; a small adjustment cost requires that the efficiency-adjusted 
price for GM seeds must fall marginally for farmers to switch to GM seeds.   
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To acquire an analytical solution for the monopolist’s price and output combination, we 
initially ignore the prospect of competition from NGM seeds.  The innovating firm 
maximises profits by choosing quantity where marginal revenue (recall that competition 
from NGM seeds is initially ignored, so that we consider the downward sloping portion 
of the marginal revenue function of equation (1.27)) is equal to marginal cost.  The 
innovating firm’s marginal cost of producing GM seeds is assumed to remain constant 
at µ .  Setting marginal cost equal to marginal revenue and solving for seed output 
yields  
 
 λ
µγεχ
2
−−−=∗
W
BDC
GM
PS . (1.28) 
 
At this level of seed output, the monopolist charges a price of  
 
 PS = PB
W −εχ − γ + µ
2
.  (1.29) 
 
The price in equation (1.29) is determined using the unconstrained, downward sloping 
demand function from equation (1.25).  As such, the price and quantity combinations of 
equations (1.28) and (1.29) are relevant only in the case of a drastic innovation, in 
which competition from NGM seeds is not relevant.  The GM innovation introduces 
such a large cost saving that the monopolist is unconstrained in his pricing decision and 
can set price where marginal cost intersects the downward sloping section of the 
marginal revenue curve.  For this to be the case, the price in equation (1.29) must be 
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below the pre-innovation NGM seed price, adjusted for efficiency; otherwise farmers 
have no incentive to purchase GM seeds.  This requirement can be shown analytically 
as 
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Equation (1.30) states that for an innovation to be drastic, the monopolist’s profit-
maximising price must be less than the pre-innovation NGM seed price plus the cost 
saving that GM technology introduces into the bean supply chain.  Substituting equation 
(1.29) into (1.30) and solving for ε  generates an inequality restriction on the amount 
that GM technology must reduce production costs in order to be a drastic innovation.  If 
ε  satisfies 
 
 ε < µ + 2χ − PB
W + γ
χ  (1.31) 
 
then the innovation is drastic and the monopolist captures the entire seed market.   
 
A drastic innovation results in larger DC seed, and therefore bean, output and a lower 
DC seed price compared to the pre-innovation situation.  Bean output can be solved as  
 
 λ
µγεχ
2
−−−=∗
W
BDC
GM
PB  (1.32) 
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 through the fixed proportions characteristic of the model; equation (1.32) is larger than 
the pre-GM output of equation (1.21) if inequality (1.31) is satisfied.  Also, the seed 
price of equation (1.29) is lower than the efficiency-adjusted pre-innovation seed price 
of µ + χ −εχ  if the innovation is drastic.  Note that GM beans sell for the same world 
price as NGM beans, and farmers pay a lower price for seeds than in the pre-innovation 
equilibrium.  This results in rents accruing to owners of land and other services as 
revenue from bean sales is apportioned along the supply chain. 
 
The case of a drastic innovation is illustrated in figure 1.4.  Note that only the GM 
market is illustrated in figure 1.4; the analytical solution shows that GM adoption is 
complete, so that NGM bean production falls to zero.  The technological shift is 
represented by the supply curve for other inputs shifting down to , which is below 
supply curve from the NGM market (drawn as ).  Demand for land that is used to 
grow GM crops correspondingly shifts up to .  Demand for GM seeds and 
marginal revenue are discontinuous in the lower panel as described above.  The drastic 
innovation results in derived demand for seeds shifting out far enough that the 
monopolist can charge price where marginal cost is equal to the downward sloping 
portion of the marginal revenue curve.  Seed, and therefore bean, output is above the 
pre-innovation equilibrium but below the pirate equilibrium output of equation (1.24).  
Note that the demand price of inputs is above the marginal cost of supplying inputs in 
the middle two panels of the GM market (land and other inputs).  This results in 
economic profits to owners of land and other services that are used in the production of 
GMCS ,
CS
GMLD ,
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GM beans.  DC’s welfare is deduced from the top panel of figure 1.4.  Consumer 
surplus remains unchanged, equal to area  and producer surplus rises above the 
pre-GM level to .  The foreign IP innovator’s revenue must, however, be 
deducted from DC welfare in an amount equal to . 
W
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Before analysing a nondrastic innovation, we first consider the trivial case in which GM 
technology does not introduce any cost saving into the bean supply chain.18  If GM 
seeds introduce no (negative) cost savings into the bean supply chain, then derived 
demand for GM bean seed coincides with (lies below) derived demand for NGM seeds.  
That is,  
 
 PB
W −εχ − γ[ ]− λS ≤ PBW − χ − γ[ ]− λS . (1.33) 
 
The inequality in (1.33) can be rearranged to show that if ε ≥ 1 then demand for GM 
seeds is always at or below demand for NGM seeds and farmers have no incentive to 
adopt GM technology.  Recall, however, that ε  is restricted to be less than one in 
equation (1.22); otherwise the GM technology is not a cost-reducing innovation.  As 
such, the trivial case is of interest only because it provides the upper bound (i.e. less 
than one) on the cost saving introduced by GM technology.  We know that if inequality 
(1.31) is satisfied, then the innovation is drastic, GM adoption is complete, bean output 
                                                 
18 The trivial case is presented only to introduce boundary conditions on the technical innovation (i.e. the 
size of ε). 
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is equal to equation (1.32) in DC and the monopolist sells seeds for the price in equation 
(1.29).   
 
If ε  falls in the intermediate range (less than one but violating (1.31)) then the 
monopolist must consider competition from NGM seeds when setting price; the price of 
equation (1.29) is no longer the monopolist’s profit-maximising solution.  In the case of 
a nondrastic innovation, the price of equation (1.29) does not satisfy the efficiency 
adjustment of equation (1.30); price (1.29) is higher than the competitive NGM seed 
price, adjusted for efficiency.  Farmers have no incentive to purchase GM seeds.   
 
The GM innovator must therefore reduce the price of his seeds to induce farmers to 
adopt GM technology.  The monopolist can, however, still capture the entire seed 
market and earn profits.  Recall that as long as ε  is less than one, demand for GM seeds 
lies above demand for NGM seeds and farmers are willing to pay more for GM seeds.  
The monopolist can therefore capture the entire seed market by charging a price 
marginally below the competitive price plus the cost savings from GM technology.  
This can be shown analytically by noting that farmers have no incentive to switch to 
GM seeds at a price of µ + χ 1−ε( ), but if the monopolist charges marginally below the 
efficiency-adjusted equivalent price for NGM seeds then all farmers adopt GM 
technology.  A profit-maximising monopolist innovator of a nondrastic technology 
therefore charges a price of  
 
 ( ) ePS −−+= εχµ 1  (1.34) 
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 where  is a marginally small constant.  The price of GM seeds is above the constant 
marginal cost of producing GM seeds, so the monopolist earns profits.  GM seeds are 
sold according to the downward sloping portion of the demand curve in equation (1.26) 
in an amount marginally above the pre-GM equilibrium, equal to  
e
 
 SGM
DC∗ = PB
W −εχ − γ − µ
2λ + E  (1.35) 
 
where E  is an marginally small constant.  The price in (1.34) is below the price of 
equation (1.29), but the monopolist does earn profits in the case of a nondrastic 
innovation.  As long as the downward sloping portion of derived seed demand is above 
marginal cost, the average price that the monopolist receives is above the average 
production cost.  Note, however that the monopolist has incentive to undercut the 
competitive pre-GM seed price by just a marginal amount because the more price falls 
below equation (1.29) the larger is the difference between marginal cost and marginal 
revenue.  The equilibrium result in the case of a nondrastic innovation is that GM seeds 
are completely adopted by farmers at the price in equation (1.34) and output marginally 
above pre-GM output, as indicated in (1.35).  
 
The nondrastic innovation equilibrium is illustrated in figure 1.5.  The downward 
sloping portion of the monopolist’s marginal revenue curve does not intersect marginal 
cost to the right of the pre-innovation level of output.  The monopolist therefore charges 
a price marginally below ( )εχµ −+ 1  and sells a quantity of seeds marginally above the 
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pre-innovation level of output.  As in the case of a drastic innovation, GM adoption is 
complete and NGM bean production falls to zero in DC.  Total DC bean production is 
just marginally above pre-innovation NGM bean output.  DC’s welfare is measured as 
consumer surplus of area  and producer surplus of area .  As in the case of 
a drastic innovation, the IP innovator’s revenue of  must be deducted from DC’s 
welfare. 
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The monopoly scenario of case 2 arises only in situations when the innovator’s IP rights 
can be enforced through an effective monitoring and judicial system.  Ineffective IP 
enforcement is likely to result in a black market and lower prices for GM seeds.  
Producers will have no incentive to purchase higher-priced GM seeds from the IP 
innovator and the bean market will revert to case 1.  The ability of developing countries 
to maintain effective IP enforcement mechanisms is questionable, and is discussed 
further in chapter 1.4. 
 
Case 3 - DC purchases black market seeds and pays a levy to the IP innovator
When the conditions of the producing-country are not amenable to effective IP 
enforcement, then the IP innovator is faced with a dilemma.  The innovating firm can 
attempt to charge the monopoly price for its product, but will likely be unsuccessful and 
forced from the market by low-priced black market seeds.  This option is unappealing 
since the innovating firm incurs the costs of marketing seeds and implementing an IP 
enforcement mechanism, but likely generates no revenue over the long term.  A second 
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option is for the IP innovator to do nothing, so that no costs are incurred and DC is left 
to its black market equilibrium.   
 
A third option, one that has recently been adopted by Monsanto in its dealings with 
several South American countries, is to negotiate a levy on all beans produced in DC.  
Such a levy would have to be negotiated with the producing-country government, and 
enforced at one stage of the bean supply chain.  Brazil and Paraguay have recently 
agreed to a royalty agreement with Monsanto that imposes a levy on all GM products 
grown in their countries (The Western Producer).  Brazil’s agreement provides 
Monsanto with one percent of sales earned from the 2004-2005 crop and two percent of 
sales from the 2005-2006 crop.  Paraguayan farmers have agreed to pay a fixed levy per 
sack of soy seeds to Monsanto.  Brazil and Paraguay’s seed markets remain primarily 
black, but Monsanto now receives a share of proceeds from the use of its IP.  Other 
possible options include applying a check-off levy at elevators where beans are 
delivered post-harvest or enforcing an export levy on beans as they leave the producing 
country.   
 
An elevator levy may be the most comprehensive method for an IP innovator to collect 
royalties on GM technology.  If farmers save and replant a portion of their seeds, then a 
levy on seeds would apply only to those farmers purchasing new seeds.  Likewise, an 
export levy would only apply to beans destined for foreign markets.  A levy at elevators 
would apply to all producers who use elevator services.   
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The effects of a levy can be incorporated into the fixed proportions model of case 1. We 
begin from a starting point of pirated GM seeds, as in case 1.  A levy is imposed on 
bean producers in the form of a check-off at the elevator.  The levy is a fixed amount 
per tonne of bean, and therefore increases the marginal cost of other services per hectare 
by a fixed amount at all levels of output.  The inverse supply function of other services 
is then 
 
 0,10, ><<+= σεσεχCP  (1.36) 
 
where σ  represents the per tonne levy.  The new DC inverse supply function of beans 
is  
 
 ( BPB ) λµγσεχ ++++=  (1.37) 
  
and DC produces beans in the amount of  
 
 λ
µγσεχ −−−−=∗
W
BDC
GM
PB  (1.38) 
 
at the fixed world price. 
 
Bean output under the levy is necessarily less than in the black market situation of case 
1 because 0>σ .   
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 For there to be any NGM bean production in case 3, the levy on GM bean producers 
must be large enough to more than negate the cost-reducing benefits of the GM 
technology.  That is, ( )εχσ −> 1  must hold.  If that is the case, then there is no GM 
bean production in DC, only NGM production at the original pre-GM level.   
 
The size of the levy (σ ) depends on several factors, but is ultimately decided in 
negotiations between the IP innovator and DC’s government.  The levy must be large 
enough to avert trade action by the IP innovator and small enough that DC perceives a 
benefit in its implementation.  Traxler notes that only a fraction of an imposed levy is 
likely to accrue to the IP innovator; proceeds are likely to be split into at least four 
portions.  The negotiating government is likely to command a share of the levy, in part 
to offset the costs of negotiating and managing the levy.  Also, the stage of the supply 
chain that collects the levy will need to be compensated for the costs of collection.  For 
example elevator operators who collect a check-off are likely to receive a share of a 
levy.  Finally, the IP innovator may dedicate some portion of the proceeds to 
agricultural research and development in the adopting country (Traxler). 
 
Case 3 is represented graphically in figure 1.6.  Using case 1 as a starting point, DC 
utilises black market GM seeds and produces only GM beans.  The negotiated levy with 
the IP innovator is collected at the elevator, which is a component of other services per 
hectare.  The levy increases the marginal cost of other services, pushing up the inverse 
supply curve of other services per hectare from  to  (note that  GMCS , ',GMCS ',GMCS
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remains below ).  The inverse bean supply curve shifts up accordingly and the 
demand curves for land and seeds down.  A new GM bean equilibrium is achieved with 
lower output than in case 1.  Note that if the levy is large enough, then the inverse 
supply curve for other inputs shifts up far enough to negate the initial downward shift 
initiated by GM adoption.  This results in production costs that are higher than in the 
NGM market, and GM bean production falls to zero.
CS
19
 
DC’s welfare can be derived from the top panel of figure 1.6.  If ( )εχσ −< 1 , then GM 
adoption is complete and welfare is given by area acbd .  The amount of the levy paid 
to the GM innovator, area , must be subtracted, however, from DC domestic 
welfare.  If 
efgh
( )εχσ −> 1 , then all bean production is NGM, and welfare is unchanged 
from the pre-adoption equilibrium.  Note that DC welfare is always larger if 
( )εχσ −< 1 ; consumer welfare remains the same and bean output and producer surplus 
is larger. 
 
The success of this policy is dependent on successful collection of the levy at one stage 
of the supply chain.  Enforcing collection at the elevators or at the point of seed 
purchase is less costly for the IP innovator than is maintaining contracts with growers 
and monitoring enforcement of IP rights.  This point is taken up in more detail in 
chapter 1.4. 
 
                                                 
19 The same result can be shown in the case of a levy on seeds. 
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It would seem that the governments of developing countries have no incentive to 
negotiate such deals with foreign IP innovating firms.  Domestic welfare benefits 
appear to be larger when GM seeds are pirated, with no proceeds paid to the innovating 
firm.  However, as developed countries enter the WTO fold they are expected to fulfill 
their trade agreement obligations.  The TRIPS agreement requires that all contracting 
parties enforce the IP rights of other contracting parties within the boundaries of their 
country.  Failing to do so can lead to trade actions, as determined by the WTO’s DSB.  
It is just such a trade action that IP innovating firms have as leverage when negotiating 
levies with developing country governments.  By agreeing to implement a levy on black 
market IP, developing country governments hope to “buy off” IP innovators and avoid 
formal trade actions.20
 
1.3.5. Export Market Scenarios 
The adoption of GM seeds may impact DC’s export markets.  The response of bean-
importing nations to GM products may restrict GM imports or dictate the manner in 
which they are allowed to arrive.  The following section sets up the framework in which 
the welfare consequences of various importer policies can be analysed.  The black-
market adoption pattern of case 1 is used as a baseline in the following scenarios.  The 
effects of alternate adoption patterns combined with the following export market 
scenarios are explored in chapter 1.4.   
 
Case A - No Importer Response
                                                 
20 The effects of retaliatory measures are considered in chapter 1.4. 
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This situation arises when consumers in bean importing nations have no preference for 
NGM beans over GM beans.  The world price for GM beans remains the same as for 
NGM beans and there are no restrictions placed on DC’s bean exports.  The results of 
such a scenario are identical to those analysed in case 1.  DC produces only GM beans 
and exports an amount of beans equal to in figure 1.3 at the prevailing world price of 
.  DC’s welfare is equal to area acbd .   
ef
W
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Case B - Pooled Equilibrium
Gaisford, et al. identify a situation in which there exist two types of consumers.  Type A 
consumers prefer NGM to GM products and type B consumers are indifferent between 
products.  Type A consumers acquire a larger marginal benefit from consuming NGM 
products than from GM products and have a correspondingly lower willingness-to-pay 
for GM products.  If GM and NGM products are exported into the world market and 
sold together without separation or labelling, then the pooled product contains some 
GM and some NGM beans.  As long as there exist some type A consumers, then the 
pooled product of combined GM and NGM beans is perceived as being of lower quality 
than pure NGM beans.  The adverse effect on perceived quality reduces demand for the 
pooled product, and demand for beans shifts down.  This result is similar to Akerlof’s 
lemon analysis. 
 
The “lemon” situation is represented by a decrease in world demand for beans.  The 
downward shift in demand affects demand for both NGM and GM beans, since both are 
pooled together as a single product.  Consumers do not know whether they are buying 
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NGM or GM beans, so the pooled product is viewed as being of lower quality, on 
aggregate.  The size of the decrease in bean demand is a function of two factors.  First, 
the larger is the share of type B consumers (who are indifferent between GM and 
NGM), the smaller is the demand shift.  Second, the larger is the perceived proportion 
of the pooled product that is comprised of NGM beans, the smaller is the demand shift. 
 
To derive the welfare effects of a pooled equilibrium, inverse world bean demand in 
equation (1.14) is modified as 
 
 10,10, <<<<−Ω= δηαηδ BPB . (1.39) 
 
The parameter η  represents the portion of consumers that are made up by type Bs.  The 
larger is the share of type Bs, the closer η  is to one and the smaller is the demand shift.  
The parameter δ  represents the share of the pooled product that is perceived to be 
NGM.  The larger is the perceived share of NGM, the closer δ  is to one and the smaller 
is the demand shift.  The inequality constraints placed on η  and δ  are necessary for the 
existence of a pooled equilibrium.  If both 1=η  and 1=δ , then all consumers are type 
B and the final product is perceived to be made up entirely of NGM products - demand 
does not shift down.  If these parameters are to equal one, then we revert to case 1.  
 
Inverse world bean supply remains as in equation (1.15), and a new equilibrium level of 
bean consumption prevails at 
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θηδ
+
−Ω=∗WB  (1.40) 
 
which is necessarily less than pre-GM bean output because the interaction effect of ηδ  
is always less than one if there exist any type A consumers.   
 
The new world bean price is 
 
 ( )( )βα
θηδαηδ +
−Ω−Ω=WBP , (1.41) 
 
which is below the pre-GM world bean price because 1<ηδ .   
 
DC’s inverse GM bean supply function remains as in equation (1.23), which at the 
world price of equation (1.41) generates DC GM bean output of  
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. (1.42) 
 
GM bean output is larger than the level of NGM output that would result in DC at the 
world price of equation (1.41), and GM adoption is complete.  This result is intuitive 
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since GM bean production is less costly than NGM bean production and both products 
can be sold at the same world price; no rational producer selects NGM seeds. 
 
Figure 1.7 illustrates the effects of a pooled equilibrium on DC’s bean industry.  Only 
the GM market is included, since GM adoption is complete and NGM bean production 
falls to zero.  World inverse bean demand shifts down from  to , resulting in a 
lower world bean price.  DC produces GM beans in an amount equal to  at the new 
world price.  DC welfare is equal to area abcd .   
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Case C - Segregated Bean Markets
Case C considers situations in which GM and NGM beans are produced along two 
distinct supply chains21 and sold separately in the world market, each according to its 
own demand function.  The world bean market consists of type A and type B 
consumers, with type A consumers willing to pay more for NGM beans.  Type A 
consumers prefer NGM products, so NGM beans are perceived as higher-quality 
products than are GM beans.  The price of NGM beans therefore always includes a 
quality premium over GM beans.  As long as the price of NGM beans is higher than the 
price of GM beans, type B consumers buy only GM beans.  The present analysis 
assumes that DC consumers are all type B, though this assumption could be changed 
within the context of the model.   
 
i) Segregation without trade action 
                                                 
21 It is shown below that DC produces only GM or NGM beans, and not both.  Other countries, however, 
may produce either or both so that the world bean market contains both GM and NGM products. 
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We first consider the scenario wherein DC’s export markets do not limit imports of 
either GM or NGM beans.  Importing-country governments do not interfere in the bean 
market beyond imposing labelling requirements on GM and NGM producers.22  The 
acceptance of GM products in the market is dependent on consumer preferences.  A 
methodology similar to Gaisford, et al. is applied to the fixed proportions bean model in 
the forthcoming analysis23. 
 
The introduction of GM beans has two initial effects.  First, since there exist type B 
consumers who are willing to substitute GM beans, the demand for NGM beans shifts 
down.  World inverse demand for NGM beans is represented as  
 
 10, <<−Ω ψαψ B . (1.43) 
 
Equation (1.43) differs from world inverse bean demand in equation (1.14) by the 
parameter ψ , which shifts down the intercept of the inverse demand function.  The 
larger is the proportion of type A consumers, the larger is ψ .  Assuming that DC is the 
only producer of the GM product, the world supply of NGM beans remains as in 
equation (1.15).  A new NGM world equilibrium generates NGM bean output and price 
of 
 
                                                 
22 The ability of developing countries to implement segregation and labelling programs, are discussed in 
chapter 1.5. 
23 Gaisford, et al. analyse the comparative statics of the segmentation of a market for a single product into 
two distinct markets; one for GM and another for NGM.  
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 ( )βα
θψ
−
−Ω=∗WNGMB  (1.44) 
 
and 
 
 
( )
( )βα
θψαψ +
−Ω−Ω=∗WNGMBP , . (1.45) 
 
Note that NGM bean output and price are lower than pre-GM bean output and price 
because 1<ψ . 
 
The existence of type B consumers gives rise to an inverse demand function for GM 
beans, which is given by 
 
ψτατ <<−Ω= 0,, BP GMB . (1.46) 
  
DC’s supply of GM beans is given by equation (1.23).  Two important points must be 
made about the GM market.  First, the restriction that ψτ < .  This inequality states that 
the inverse demand function for GM beans must be below the inverse demand function 
for NGM beans; the GM product is a weakly inferior innovation in the preference 
ordering of consumers (Lapan and Moschini).  No consumers prefer GM to NGM 
beans, but type A consumers prefer NGM to GM beans.  Therefore, consumers never 
pay more for GM beans than for NGM beans.   
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Second, the inverse demand function for GM beans is perfectly elastic over some range 
of output because demand for GM beans is conditional on the equilibrium price for 
NGM beans (Gaisford, et al.).  Type B consumers are never willing to pay more for GM 
beans than for NGM beans, so demand for GM beans above the equilibrium price for 
NGM beans is zero.  Therefore, world demand for GM beans is kinked.  The level of 
output at which the kink occurs can be determined by evaluating the level of GM output 
where the NGM bean price intersects the GM bean demand curve.  This occurs at 
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To the left of , world inverse GM bean demand is perfectly elastic at .  To the 
right of , world inverse GM bean demand is as shown in equation (1.46).   
◊B ∗WNGMBP ,
◊B
 
The GM bean market equilibrium is given by the intersection of GM bean supply 
(equation (1.23)) and GM bean demand (equation (1.46)), and generates price and 
output of  
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and 
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The difference between the world NGM and GM bean prices dictates whether DC 
farmers adopt GM technology in the case of segmented markets; the price differential 
must be less than the GM cost savings for DC farmers to have any incentive to adopt.  
That is,  from equation (1.45) minus  from equation (1.48) must be less 
than 
∗W
NGMBP ,
∗W
GMBP ,
( )εχ −1 .  If the price differential is sufficiently small, then the cost savings of GM 
seed technology are sufficient to warrant adoption.  If not, then no farmer has an 
economic incentive to adopt GM technology.  
 
If the price differential is sufficiently small and DC farmers adopt GM technology, then 
DC produces beans (all of them GM) in an amount equal to  
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B , . (1.50) 
 
If the NGM-GM bean price differential is sufficiently large, then DC produces only 
NGM beans, in an amount equal to  
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B , . (1.51) 
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The price differential between GM and NGM beans depends on the ratio of type A to 
type B consumers.  If most consumers are type A, then demand for the substitute GM 
product is low.  The shift parameter in the NGM demand function, ψ , is close to one 
and NGM inverse demand may not shift far enough to induce DC farmers to adopt GM 
seeds.  The post-innovation price for NGM beans remains near its pre-GM level.  
Correspondingly, the demand for GM beans is low (τ  in equation (1.46) is small) and 
the price of GM beans is relatively low.  The price differential is large and DC produces 
only NGM beans.  If, however, the proportion of type B consumers is large, then the 
price differential is small and DC adopts GM bean technology.  Recall that the price 
differential can never be negative - as long as there exist some type A consumers, the 
price of NGM beans is always above the price of GM beans. 
 
The results of case C.i are dependent on there being type A consumers who do not 
switch to GM products regardless of the price differential between NGM and GM 
products.  As discussed above, a larger share of consumers that is willing to switch to 
GM products generates a smaller price differential between NGM and GM products.  
Contrarily, a smaller share that is willing to shift generates a larger price differential.  If 
type A consumers are willing to switch to GM products when the price differential is 
large enough, then an unstable equilibrium results.  However, as long as type A 
consumers do not switch to GM beans regardless of the price differential, a stable 
equilibrium can be attained.  Gaisford, et al. address the situation of inframarginal 
consumers in more detail. 
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ii) Segregation with an importer ban on GM beans 
The case in which some or all of DC’s export markets impose a ban on GM beans can 
be analysed using the framework of the previous scenario.  A government that bans GM 
imports overrides consumer preferences as represented by parameters ψ  and τ ; the 
nation becomes de facto exclusively type A.  If DC exports beans to only one country, 
and that country bans GM beans, then the world demand curve facing DC remains as in 
equation (1.14) and the world demand for DC’s GM beans falls to zero.  If DC adopted 
GM seeds prior to the import ban, then it loses its entire GM export market and has only 
domestic type B consumers to supply24  
 
The situation in which only some of DC’s export markets ban GM products can be 
understood through various relative values of ψ  and τ .  By banning GM imports, those 
nations that restrict GM imports become exclusively type A, thus bringing the global 
value of ψ  closer to one and the value of τ  nearer zero.  
 
1.4. Discussion 
The model in chapter 1.3 provides tools that can be used to analyse a range of policy 
scenarios.  This chapter combines adoption scenarios (cases one through three) with 
export market scenarios (cases A through C) and discusses the welfare effects and 
policy options.  Table 1.1 illustrates possible adoption policy and export market 
scenario combinations.  The outcomes in table 1.1 illustrate probable outcomes, but 
recall that results are dependent on model parameters (i.e. complete adoption in the case 
                                                 
24 The possibility that adoption of GM technology is irreversible is discussed in chapter 1.4. 
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of an IP levy is dependent on the size of the levy).  The remainder of this chapter 
discusses selected scenario combinations in detail.  Two combinations are selected for 
closer analysis because of their relevance to current developing country situations.  The 
adoption and export market combinations of (case 1 + case A) and (case 3 + case C.ii) 
are discussed below. 
 
Table 1.1 - Policy Combination Scenarios 
 Pirate GM 
seeds 
Monopoly, 
drastic 
Monopoly,  
nondrastic 
IP Levy 
No Export 
Market 
Response 
Scenario 1 
(cases 1 + A) 
Complete 
adoption 
(cases 2 + A) 
Complete adoption 
(cases 2 + A) 
Adoption 
dependent on 
levy 
(cases 3 + A) 
Pooled Market Complete 
adoption 
(cases 1 + B) 
Complete 
adoption 
(cases 2 + B) 
Complete adoption 
(cases 2 + B) 
Adoption 
dependent on 
levy 
(cases 3 + B) 
Segregated 
Market - No 
Import Ban 
Adoption 
dependent on 
NGM-GM 
price 
differential 
(cases 1 + C.i) 
Adoption 
dependent on 
NGM-GM price 
differential 
(cases 2 + C.i) 
Adoption dependent 
on NGM-GM price 
differential 
(cases 2 + C.i) 
Adoption 
dependent on 
levy 
(cases 3 + C.i) 
Segregated 
Market - Import 
Ban 
Adoption 
dependent on 
NGM-GM 
price 
differential 
(cases 1 + C.ii) 
Adoption 
dependent on 
NGM-GM price 
differential 
(cases 2 + C.ii) 
Adoption dependent 
on NGM-GM price 
differential 
(cases 2 + C.ii) 
Scenario 2 
(cases 3 + C.ii) 
 
 
A few important points are worthy of mention before proceeding.  First, there is no 
general ordinal ranking of policy alternatives.  The economic surplus methods of 
chapter 1.3 generate welfare results that are dependent on demand and supply 
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parameters.  Welfare measures could be compared between scenarios if empirical 
estimates of the relevant demand and supply parameters were available for a case study.  
The forthcoming discussion of various scenarios attempts to provide guidance on the 
possible size of welfare effects in developing countries. 
 
The model in chapter 1.3 is presented in an order that follows the soybean supply chain 
in chronological order.  The GM adoption decision and production patterns, and their 
resultant welfare effects, are presented first.  Welfare effects of various export market 
scenarios are presented second.  DC’s policy analysis should, however, begin in stage 
two.  DC should form an expectation of likely export market effects before deciding on 
an adoption policy that maximises domestic welfare.  For example, if DC is likely to 
face a devastating loss of export markets in the event of GM adoption, then the best 
method of GM adoption may be moot - DC should consider not adopting GM crops.  
Contrarily, if DC anticipates that its export markets will not express any adverse 
reaction to GM products, then the most appropriate policy may be to fully adopt GM 
technology so as to best take advantage of the production cost advantage.   
 
Scenario 1 - Pirate seeds, IP Innovator Retaliation and no Importer Response
Scenario one analyses the combination of case one and case A, with the added 
component of retaliatory trade measures by the host country of the IP innovator.  Recall 
that the TRIPS agreement allows for cross-retaliation under WTO agreements if a 
member country is found in violation of its TRIPS agreement obligations.  The efficacy 
of cross-retaliation as a means of inducing compliance with the TRIPS agreement has 
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been called into question (Yampoin and Kerr); the incentives to protect foreign IP rights 
have been shown to decline with the size of the pirate industry and the costs of 
enforcing IP rights.  Despite this uncertainty, it is the threat of retaliatory trade measures 
that forms the basis of case three, the levy on pirated GM technology.  Developing 
countries’ only incentive to agree to a levy is the avoidance of TRIPS cross retaliation.  
For this reason, the effects of retaliatory trade measures warrant attention. 
 
The starting point for analysing this scenario is case one, where GM technology is 
pirated and adoption is complete.  Welfare gains are initially as illustrated in figure 1.3; 
consumer surplus of  and producer surplus of .  If the host country of the IP 
innovator pursues its case with the WTO and wins a ruling from the DSB, then 
retaliatory trade measures are allowed in an amount equal to the innovator’s trade lost 
due to DC’s pirate industry (WTO).  Calculating the amount of lost trade, however, 
presents a practical problem.  To measure the amount of loss suffered by the IP 
innovator, a counter-factual calculation is required (Yampoin and Kerr).  If DC pirated 
GM technology, then the IP innovator was never provided the opportunity to sell its 
product at the monopoly price.  Estimated demand and marginal revenue functions are 
required to ascertain what the seed market equilibrium would have been in the case of a 
monopoly.  We turn to case two and figures 1.4 and 1.5 for this information.  The 
bottom panels in figures 1.4 and 1.5 illustrates the case in which the IP innovator 
monopolises the GM seed market for drastic and nondrastic innovations, respectively.  
The counter-factual lost trade to the IP innovator is area  in each case.  Note 
that this is not equal to a 0'ij  from figure 1.
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 The IP innovator’s host country can therefore initiate trade actions that penalise DC in 
an amount equal to .  The cross-retaliation nature of the TRIPS agreement 
suggests that this action will come in the form of tariffs on products imported from DC.  
The complainant country is authorised to choose the products upon which tariffs are 
placed.  While it is possible that such tariffs would be applied to DC beans, products 
selected for retaliation are typically chosen for their political sensitivity and could well 
be applied to other imports from DC.  Therefore, retaliatory trade actions may not affect 
DC’s soybean industry.  In making a policy decision on adoption, however, DC must be 
aware that the loss of area  must be subtracted from welfare gains accrued in the 
bean industry.   
0fgP MS
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Scenario 2 - IP Levy and an Import Ban 
The scenario warrants attention for two reasons.  First, if DC completely adopts GM 
crops (as the model in chapter 1.3 predicts for some circumstances) and its consumer 
nation(s) bans GM imports, then all of DC’s bean exports are banned.  Second, a levy 
on GM technology is a topical issue for several South American countries.  Brazil and 
Paraguay’s recent agreement to enforce a levy on soybean seeds (The Western 
Producer) indicates that the adopting countries believe there to be benefits of such a 
deal.  Brazil and Paraguay likely recognise the potential threat of trade action by the US 
in retaliation for not enforcing Monsanto’s IP rights.  At the same time, policy-makers 
are faced with the difficult reality of enforcing IP rights in their own countries.  
Gaisford, et al. point out that enforcement of IP rights involves two types of costs.  
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First, there are the costs of identifying and monitoring pirate firms.  Second are the 
costs of ensuring the efficacy of the IP rights protection system.  These costs include the 
maintenance of a legal system and of offsetting corruption in the monitoring system.  
The second type of cost is likely to be particularly high in developing countries.  The 
institutions that facilitate an effective legal system are underdeveloped in developing 
countries (Hobbs and Kerr) and rampant corruption increases the costs of bureaucratic 
oversight (Alam).  Brazil and Paraguay may believe that the potential costs of enforcing 
Monsanto’s IP rights exceed the benefits of GM adoption.  Negotiating a check-off style 
levy with Monsanto may prove to be a policy that avoids the transaction costs of 
enforcing IP rights while averting retaliatory trade action from the US. 
 
A levy is also an appealing policy from a developing country’s perspective because a 
portion of the proceeds is likely to be channelled into domestic public research projects 
(Traxler).  The negotiating government holds bargaining power because a levy is 
negotiated with, rather than imposed by, the IP innovator.  Traxler believes that some of 
this bargaining power will be used to retain a portion of levy proceeds in the developing 
country to increase research capacity.  The goal of such research would be to either 
decrease reliance on foreign biotechnology research or to develop breeding programs 
that produce GM crop varieties better suited to local agronomic conditions, as discussed 
in chapter 1.2.1.  
 
To analyse scenario two, we begin at the equilibrium result of case three, where DC 
fully adopts GM crops and produces beans according to equation (1.37).  If DC loses all 
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of its export market to a ban, then there are two possibilities.  If the adoption of GM 
crop technology is reversible, then DC abandons all GM production and reverts back to 
its pre-GM equilibrium.  Foreign demand for DC’s GM beans falls to zero, pushing the 
world price of GM beans to zero.  There is no incentive to produce GM beans so all 
bean production in DC reverts back to NGM.25  A comparison of static welfare 
measures from DC’s pre-GM situation to the post-adoption, post-ban situation reveals 
no change in domestic welfare; both are equal to area  in figure 1.2.  Such a 
comparison obviously overlooks sizable adjustment costs that would be incurred by 
adopting and then “un-adopting” GM crop technology.  The costs of a wholesale change 
in crop planting would likely be very large. 
acbd
 
Another, and perhaps more realistic, possibility in scenario three is that the “un-
adoption” of GM crops is prohibitively expensive, making the adoption decision 
irreversible.  Once GM seeds are released, a regulation that bans their use could be 
difficult, or even impossible, to enforce (Gray, McNaugton and Stovin).  The same 
factors that make protection of IP rights expensive in developing countries would make 
enforcement of a ban on an already-released GM product extremely difficult.  Also, 
developing country agriculture is characterised by a large number of farms who produce 
for consumption at home.  Even if the total loss of GM export markets reduced the price 
of GM beans to zero, subsistence farms would have no incentive to give up the more 
cost-efficient GM product.   
 
                                                 
25 The exception to this case is if the cost advantage provided by the GM trait is so large that it is still 
more profitable to produce GM beans for domestic consumption and then allocate remaining resources to 
NGM production for foreign markets. 
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If GM adoption is irreversible and DC faces a foreign ban on its products, then a sizable 
welfare loss occurs.  The top panel of figure 1.6 (pirate seeds with a levy) is reproduced 
in figure 1.8 with only the required curves for the current analysis.  After adopting GM 
seeds, and before a ban, DC’s welfare is equal to consumer surplus of area  plus 
producer surplus of area .  A foreign ban on DC’s bean exports reduces world 
GM bean demand to coincide with DC’s domestic demand for GM beans, and the 
equilibrium price for GM beans falls to .  DC’s consumer welfare increases 
(because of the lower price for GM beans) to area  but producer surplus falls to 
area .  This scenario highlights the importance of DC forming an expectation 
of probable export market responses to its adoption of GM technology.  If a ban is 
likely, then DC clearly benefits from not adopting GM technology at all. 
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The political economy of trade agreements plays an important role in the welfare 
analyses of these scenarios.  Scenario two involves trade actions that are governed by 
the TBT and SPS agreements.  If an import ban cannot be justified under these 
agreements, then importers are in violation of their WTO obligations.  Though the 
WTO is intended to provide protection from such violations, adopting countries should 
be prepared to face such violations.  Member countries appear ready and willing to 
violate their WTO obligations in response to political pressure (Kerr and Hobbs). 
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1.5. Conclusions 
The decision to adopt genetically-modified crop technology is complicated by potential 
trade effects, particularly in developing countries.  The benefits of lower production 
costs, higher nutritional value and hardier crops must be weighed against the possible 
negative welfare effects of trade actions by other countries. 
 
The majority of agricultural biotechnology is created in developed countries, so that the 
intellectual property rights embodied in genetically-modified crops are not held in 
developing countries.  Developing countries must be aware of the potential for 
retaliatory trade measures if foreign-owned intellectual property is pirated.  A promising 
method for dealing with the complications of enforcing intellectual property rights is the 
imposition of a levy on production of genetically-modified crops.  A levy could be 
particularly beneficial in developing countries for three reasons.  a levy could work to 
pacify innovating firms whose intellectual property is pirated, thereby avoiding 
retaliatory trade measures.  Second, a check-off style levy is likely to involve lower 
transaction costs than the type of contracts that seed companies generally utilise in 
developed countries.  Finally, some of the proceeds from a levy could be diverted into 
local agricultural research to promote the type of varietal improvements that are 
discussed by Evenson. 
 
Consumers and civil society groups in several nations have reacted adversely to 
genetically-modified products and have pressured their respective governments to 
impose restrictions on the use and trade of genetically-modified foods.  Developing 
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countries should be aware of the effects of such restrictions (which could include import 
bans and identity-preservation system requirements) and factor these effects into their 
policy decisions.  A lost export market could be devastating enough to more than negate 
any positive gains from cost-reducing genetically-modified technology.  Developing 
countries must be particularly aware of such potential losses if the decision to adopt 
genetically-modified crop technology is irreversible.  It is important to conduct a 
welfare analysis before adoption occurs. 
 
This essay demonstrates that a developing country will either entirely adopt GM 
technology, or will not adopt at all.26  As such, an identity preservation system, and a 
developing country’s (in)ability to introduce a system, is not important in maintaining 
export markets. 
 
The policy decision to adopt genetically-modified crops may be simpler for developing 
countries that produce food primarily for domestic consumption.  Such countries have 
less to lose in international markets, so the efficiency and nutritional benefits of 
genetically-modified technology might dominate potential losses.  However, those 
countries that rely heavily on international trade in agricultural products should be 
aware of the potential downside risks of adopting genetically-modified crop technology.   
 
                                                 
26 This result is dependent on all farmers being equally suited to the GM trait.  The prospect of 
heterogeneous farmers is addressed below. 
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A natural extension of this essay is a case study that uses empirical estimates of the 
relevant demand and supply functions.  Welfare effects could be calculated and used in 
a comparison of policy alternatives. 
 
Another interesting extension would be to model adopting-country farmers as being 
heterogeneously suited to the GM technology.27  Those farmers best-suited to GM 
technology would adopt first, and an equilibrium may emerge in which GM adoption is 
not complete.  Such a result would have interesting welfare implications, and would 
introduce the possible complication of DC’s (in)ability to institute an identity 
preservation system.  The estimated costs of identity-preservation systems are high, and 
developing countries likely do not have the required institutional mechanisms to 
facilitate such systems.  Even in scenarios which do not result in full adoption of 
genetically-modified crops, developing countries that cannot implement a successful 
identity-preservation system become de facto comprised entirely of genetically-
modified crops.  On a similar note, even if policy makers decide to not allow adoption 
of genetically-modified crops in a developing country, it is uncertain if the institutional 
and regulatory capacity exists to enforce such a decision.  Proving that one’s country 
does not use GM technology may be an onerous, if not impossible, task for some 
developing countries. 
 
                                                 
27 The issue of producer heterogeneity has been addressed in Fulton and Giannakas and in Malla and 
Gray. 
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Figure 1.2. Fixed Proportions with International Trade
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Figure 1.8. Scenario 2
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ESSAY 2: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON AID:  
OPTIMAL CONTROL OF EMERGENCY FOOD AID 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Food aid has the potential to provide many benefits to recipient countries, especially in 
emergency food shortage situations.  It has been argued that food aid also has the 
potential to do great harm to recipient-countries’ agricultural industries; there exists a 
considerable literature on the potential negative effects that food aid can have on 
domestic farm output.  The existence of this literature is a positive development, for it 
shows that there is interest in ensuring that food aid shipments do not just serve the 
interests of the donor country.  That aid be labelled self-serving may sound oxymoronic, 
since aid, by definition, is intended to help its recipient.  The experience with food aid, 
however, suggests otherwise; donor-country interests were the primary motivation 
behind the earliest country-to-country aid shipments.   
 
There has been extensive analysis of food aid’s effects on the production incentives of 
recipient-country farmers since Schultz’s seminal paper of 1960.  This research has 
been very constructive, as it has shed light on the possible negative effects of food aid.  
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However there are two key pieces that are missing from the current state of food aid 
analysis.  First, there has not been an attempt to define and identify the quantity of food 
aid that would be most beneficial for a recipient country.  There exists near-unanimous 
acknowledgement that food aid can impede agricultural production in a recipient 
country, but there has not been an attempt to identify an amount of food aid that would 
minimise this damage.  Second, the dynamics of existing models are unsatisfying.  
Those models that examine food aid in dynamic settings introduce food aid as an 
exogenous shock and trace impulse responses that result from that shock.  This 
technique overlooks the impact that the initial negative supply shock to domestic 
agriculture (that creates the need for food aid) may have on domestic food production.  
Also, the introduction of aid may create market conditions in later periods that 
perpetuate domestic food shortages, thereby creating sustained need for food aid.   
 
This paper formulates a concept of “needed aid” and incorporates this definition of need 
into a dynamic optimisation model.  The model is solved for the optimal path of food 
aid, and simulations that compare the production and price effects of various aid paths 
are developed.  The objective of this research can be summed up as follows:  to 
construct a model that identifies the most appropriate, or “needed”, quantity of food aid 
in an emergency situation, and to compare the effects of delivering various amounts of 
aid on the recipient country’s agricultural industry.  The paper proceeds as follows: 
chapter 2.2 provides a brief overview of food aid, and of the chief donors and recipients.  
Chapter 2.3 reviews the food aid literature that is relevant to the current analysis.  
Chapter 2.4 introduces a concept of “need” to the analysis and demonstrates how food 
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aid can be viewed from a new perspective.  Chapter 2.5 develops the formal theoretical 
model that incorporates a definition of need.  Chapter 2.6 solves the optimal control 
model that is developed in chapter 2.5 and simulates various aid paths using generated 
data.  This section also includes a discussion of some policy implications that can be 
drawn from the model and its simulations.  Chapter 2.7 concludes with a recap of the 
model and its results, and suggests some avenues for further research. 
 
It is worth emphasising that the goal of this research is to model the short-run 
microeconomic responses of farmers’ planting decisions to changes in current and 
expected market conditions.  The goal is not to model the economics of famines, a la 
Sen.  The forthcoming model assumes that food aid shipments reach those who 
experience a food shortage.  Though such an assumption abstracts from Sen’s 
“entitlement” concerns and from the institutional failures that may exacerbate a famine, 
it allows the model’s focus to remain on food producers’ behaviour. 
 
2.2. Primer on Food Aid 
This chapter introduces terminology that is common in food aid literature and outlines 
some of the major trends from recent years.  The information in this chapter serves to 
provide a background for the forthcoming model and to establish some motivation for 
its creation.  There exist several more thorough surveys of food aid trends and policies 
(see for example, Ruttan or Singer, Wood and Jennings) which should be consulted if a 
more detailed survey of food aid is required. 
 
 79
The introduction of US Public Law 480 (PL 480) in 1954 marked the beginning of 
large-scale government-funded food aid programmes.  The incentives for PL 480 were 
two-fold; first to dispose of US farm surpluses that grew out of agricultural support 
programmes, and second to develop export markets for US agricultural products.  PL 
480 aid was divided into three categories.  Title I aid consisted of US surplus sold to 
“friendly” recipient nation governments at concessional prices.  Title II aid was donated 
to countries experiencing emergencies, and served primarily humanitarian purposes.  
Title III aid was donated through non-profit agencies and bartered for strategic materials 
from recipient countries.  A large portion of PL 480 food aid was delivered primarily 
for the benefit of the donor, not the recipient country (a point which will be addressed in 
the proceeding literature review).  Political and domestic agricultural pressures were 
often the chief determinants of aid shipments (see the following chapter for a discussion 
of these motives). 
 
The US was the first nation to institute large-scale government funded aid programmes 
and remains the largest donor.  Ninety-four percent of world food aid programmes in 
1965 were comprised of US donations (Maxwell and Singer); this share has fallen over 
the past forty years, but the US remains the largest donor, currently accounting for 53 
percent (Food and Agriculture Organisation).  The EU is the second largest donor, 
accounting for nearly 5 percent and Canada currently accounts for less than 2 percent, 
down from a peak of 11 percent in 1985.  Figure 2.1 shows a brief history of food aid 
shipments by donor country. 
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Figure 2.1 - Aid Shipments by Donor (FAO)
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Africa and Asia account for the lion’s share of the market for food aid shipments, with 
Central and South America and Eastern Europe comprising most of the remainder.  
Ethiopia is the largest single recipient, accounting for nineteen percent of total 
shipments in 2003.  Other major recipients in 2003 included Iraq (comprised entirely of 
emergency food aid), Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Bangladesh (WFP). 
 
Figure 2.2 - Aid Shipments by Recipient (FAO)
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 Modern food aid is broadly categorised as one of three types. The World Food 
Programme (WFP) separates total donations into programme aid, project aid and 
emergency aid.  Programme aid is comprised primarily of nation-to-nation shipments 
that the donor provides as a means of easing recipient government budget constraints.  
A recipient government buys programme aid from a donor at a concessional price, and 
then sells the food in its domestic market.  Any margin that the recipient government 
receives from the sale becomes part of the government’s general revenues.  Project aid 
is provided in a similar manner, however the funds acquired from selling the food are 
earmarked for specific development projects.  Most project aid is channelled through 
multilateral organisations such as the WFP.  Emergency aid is provided in times of food 
crises, often in the event of negative supply shocks or refugee circumstances.  Most 
emergency aid is also channelled through the WFP. 
 
Figure 2.3 - Types of Food Aid (WFP)
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Figures 2.3 and 2.4 illustrate that emergency food aid has evolved to account for the 
largest share of food aid donations.  This increase is the result of rising levels of 
emergency aid and of falling levels of programme aid.  Project aid has remained steady, 
between twenty and thirty percent of food aid deliveries.   
 
Figure 2.4 - Emergency Aid's Rising Share (WFP)
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Most theoretical and empirical food aid studies have addressed the impacts of 
programme aid (see following literature review).  The surfacing of emergency aid as the 
primary category of assistance since 2000 provides strong incentive to analyse the 
effects of emergency aid on recipient countries.  This is the goal of the current research. 
 
2.3. Literature Review 
There exists a large literature on food aid, from case studies to theoretical expositions 
and empirical analyses.  A review of some of the key insights and results from this 
literature follows. 
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The first formal analysis of food aid was conducted from the perspective of donor 
countries.  Specifically, Schultz estimated the costs and benefits to the US of surplus 
disposal under PL 480 during the 1950s.  Such analysis was popular at the time because 
US policy makers wanted to make sure that they received maximum value in return for 
their food aid shipments.  Food aid was primarily a domestic policy tool; the benefits of 
food aid to recipient countries had not yet come to the fore in policy debate.  This 
attitude is exemplified in a quote from Harold D. Cooly, chairman of the Committee on 
Agriculture of the US House of Representatives, who stated “We are primarily 
interested in getting rid of these surpluses and we don’t care how you do it and under 
what authority.  We have told you we want the commodities sold for dollars first and 
then for foreign currencies or then donate them.”(Schultz)   
 
Several formal attempts have been made to determine the motivation for food aid 
deliveries.  Since a primary motivation for food aid deliveries has historically been to 
dispose of surplus agricultural production in developed countries, researchers have 
sought to establish this link empirically, as well as links with other motivations.   
 
Zahariadis, Travis and Ward conduct a two-stage analysis to investigate whether US 
food aid is a function of political motives or of philanthropic motives.  Their analysis 
uses a two-stage model; stage one is a probit model that estimates the probability of a 
state receiving aid, and stage two is a multivariate regression that estimates the level of 
assistance.  Zahariadis, Travis and Ward use variables such as domestic cereal 
production, number of refugees and a proxy for the recipient country’s financial 
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standing as measures of domestic need.  Political motivators are measured by reliance 
on the US for trade in goods and services and by military aid shipments.   
 
Zahariadis, Travis and Ward find that allocation of Title I aid is based on both political 
and philanthropic motives.  Title II (primarily emergency) aid is found to be less 
statistically dependent on political and philanthropic motives.  Title I aid appears to be 
more politically motivated than Title II, however the statistical relationship between 
recipient need and Title II aid is weak.  Zahariadis, Travis and Ward conclude that since 
Title II’s share of total US aid is rising, political motivators are becoming less important 
in determining aid flows. 
 
Diven analyses the relationship between donor-country agricultural interests and aid 
shipments.  US aid shipments are modeled as a function of donor stocks, donor exports, 
lagged aid shipments and recipient country grain production.  There are three key 
results in Diven’s analysis.  The first is that aid shipments are strongly positively 
correlated with donor stocks.  That is, US aid shipments rise in years of high carryover 
stocks.  Second, US aid shipments are incremental; a given period’s aid delivery is 
highly dependent on the previous period’s shipments. Finally, aid shipments are shown 
to be positively related to grain production in the recipient country.  Such a finding runs 
contrary to philanthropic motives.  Diven concludes that “US food aid flows have 
consistently served the interests of [donor-country] commodity producers.” 
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A second focus of food aid analysis is the effect of aid on recipient countries.  There are 
three primary channels through which aid can affect the agricultural industry of the 
recipient country.   
 
The first is through classical Schultzian disincentive effects.  Schultz first addressed this 
concern in his seminal article that assessed the implications of PL 480 aid shipments.  
Aid shipments into a recipient country act as an instantaneous supply shock, and have a 
negative impact on domestic price.  Domestic producers then lower production, 
according to their supply elasticities.  This argument can apply to aid that is freely 
donated or to aid that is sold at a discounted price (providing that arbitrage between 
recipients of free or discounted aid and consumers of domestic food cannot be avoided).   
 
One of the most contested points in this traditional line of analysis is the size of supply 
elasticities among agricultural producers in developing countries.  Schultz contends that 
elasticities are significantly different from zero (contrary to what Schultz describes as 
“the widely held belief that the price response of cultivators is zero”).  Likewise, Fisher 
argues that a supply elasticity of zero implies that agricultural inputs have no alternative 
use.  This seems implausible, especially as economies develop and achieve faster 
growth.  Rogers, Srivastava and Heady concur with this view, and suggest that “the 
proposition that production in developing countries is not price responsive has little 
basis.”  It seems rational that agricultural producers in developing countries are price 
responsive.   
 
 86
The analysis of food aid’s disincentive effects can also be extended to consider long-
term consequences.  Two long-term effects are particularly worthy of note.  First, if 
there is a short-term decline in agricultural production, then physical capital may 
depreciate and labour may relocate away from farms.  If this capital and labour is not 
replaced, then long-term production may not recover.  Also, food aid may take the 
pressure off of recipient-country governments to invest in, and pursue, policies to 
develop domestic agricultural production (Rothschild).  Politicians may feel that food 
aid provides an opportunity to focus policies on urban and industrial development at the 
expense of domestic agriculture.   
 
A second channel through which aid can affect recipient country agricultural markets is 
by displacing commercial food imports.  A recipient country that finds itself with free 
or discounted food shipments may consequently reduce its demand for imported food.  
Some donors impose Usual Marketing Requirements (UMRs), which stipulate that 
recipient countries cannot reduce commercial imports of agricultural products from 
donor countries during periods of aid shipments - food aid must be “additional” to 
current imports.  UMRs are often disobeyed, and even if they are observed, the recipient 
country may simply reduce demand from other exporting countries.   
 
A third possibility is for food aid to have a positive effect on the development of a 
recipient country’s agricultural markets.  Food aid, if additional consumption for 
recipient country workers, could have positive nutritional and health effects (Barrett, 
Mohapatra and Snyder).  Such effects could increase the productivity of labour, thereby 
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increasing agricultural output.  Similarly, if food aid displaces commercial imports and 
frees up foreign exchange, donor countries could spend this currency on imported 
capital to increase agricultural productivity.  Rogers, Srivastava and Heady suggest that 
food aid may trigger an income effect that pushes out aggregate demand for food and 
exerts upward pressure on local food prices.  Such an effect could help to offset the 
disincentive effects of increased supply.   
 
There have been several attempts, both theoretical and empirical, to formally analyse 
the effects of food aid on recipient-country agricultural markets.  These analyses can be 
broadly grouped into two categories.  The first category includes older models that 
employ comparative statics to trace the effects of aid on recipient-country food 
production.  The second, more contemporary, category includes time series econometric 
models that include aid shipments as an endogenous variable in a series of estimated 
equations.  A brief review of some important findings from each category follows. 
 
Fisher was one of the first to present a formal theoretical analysis of the impact of 
foreign surplus disposal on recipient-country agriculture.  Fisher’s model formulates a 
standard demand and supply comparative static framework that interprets the effects on 
domestic supply through a supply elasticity.  The effect is illustrated by a rightward 
shift of the supply curve in the recipient country and a resulting lower price offered to 
domestic producers.  The magnitude of the decrease in local production is determined 
by the price elasticity of supply.   
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Two important points can be drawn from Fisher’s work.  First is that there existed a 
need for empirical estimates of supply and demand elasticities in developing countries 
to implement Fisher’s model.  Demand elasticities were required because Fisher’s work 
suggests that lower food prices may increase consumers’ real income, thereby 
increasing demand for food.  This proposition is similar to that put forward by Rogers, 
Srivastava and Heady.   
 
Fisher also stresses the importance of estimating how large policy expenditure must be 
(in the form of subsidies to farmers) to offset negative price effects of imported food 
aid.  Such funding could come from government general funds or from the proceeds of 
selling Titles I and III aid. 
 
A second important theoretical analysis of the effects of food aid is Srinivasan’s 
production possibility frontier (PPF) model, within the context of food aid’s general 
equilibrium effects on Indian development.  Food aid unambiguously increases 
aggregate welfare in the two-good (food and non-food) world of PPF analysis, though 
the relative price of food falls.  Srinivasan suggests that since the economy is better off, 
the welfare gain can be redistributed to compensate food producers, whose terms of 
trade have fallen.  It seems that Srinivasan is suggesting that food aid passes a Hicks-
Kaldor compensation test.   
 
Several authors have attempted to quantify the effects of food aid by means of 
estimating elasticities.  Mann was one of the first to estimate a system of structural 
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equations that identifies a relationship between aid shipments, commercial imports, 
domestic food price and domestic food production.  Mann’s model utilises a static 
expectations formulation to describe producers’ response to price changes.  His results 
show that aid deliveries have a concurrent depressing effect on domestic price and a 
negative two-period lagged effect on domestic output.  The two period delay in supply 
response is the result of the lag structure in Mann’s supply equation; output in the 
current period is a function of planting in the previous period, which is a function of 
price two periods prior. 
 
Mann’s simulation results exhibit almost hysterisis-like patterns.  A one-time aid 
shipment shock causes price to fall in period zero, and planting to fall in period one.  
Production consequently declines in period two, resulting in a decline in market supply 
of food.  This pushes domestic price up and increases planting one period hence.  
Domestic production cycles around its original level every two periods, with decayed 
effects in each cycle.  Mann’s analysis identifies significant disincentive effects of food 
aid on domestic agricultural production. 
 
Rogers, Srivastava and Heady take a similar approach to Mann, but consider the effects 
of segmenting the domestic food market into two pieces; one for sales of domestic 
production and another for concessional sales of imported food aid.  Rogers, Srivastava 
and Heady arrive at similar conclusions to Mann, however they find that disincentive 
price effects can be reduced if food aid is sold at a discounted price in a concessional 
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market.  This conclusion is, however, contingent on no arbitrage between the two 
markets.   
 
The last few years have witnessed a change in the direction of food aid analysis.  
Modern time-series econometrics have provided researchers with new techniques for 
analysing the effects of food aid on recipient-country food production.  Vector 
autoregressions (VARs) have become the models of choice.  VARs are popular for 
several reasons.  First, the data requirements are less than for structural models.  Food 
production need not be modeled as a structural supply function in a VAR; rather it is 
modeled as an endogenous variable in a system with food aid shipments, price and 
commercial imports.  VARs are also popular because they can appropriately model 
nonstationary data, which would otherwise lead to spurious regression results (Granger 
and Newbold).    
 
Donovan, et al. use VAR estimation to simulate the effects of food aid on maize prices 
in Mozambique.  Their model estimates a system of VAR equations with food aid 
shipments and prices of white and yellow maize as endogenous variables.  Simulations 
show that maize prices would have been higher in Mozambique in the absence of food 
aid shipments.  Donovan, et al. conclude that aid shipments to Mozambique have 
benefited consumers by means of lower food prices.  However, the flip side to this 
benefit is that “a disincentive effect on domestic production and marketing cannot be 
ruled out in the longer run.” 
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Barrett, Mohapatra and Snyder follow a similar approach, but include domestic 
production, rather than domestic food price, as an endogenous variable in a VAR 
analysis.  Barrett, Mohapatra and Snyder’s goal is to determine if the data reveal a 
negative correlation between food aid shipments and commercial imports or a negative 
correlation between food aid shipments and domestic food production.  Barrett, 
Mohapatra and Snyder identify a short-run fall in domestic production in response to 
aid shipments, which they attribute to price disincentives.  Food aid also displaces 
commercial imports in the short run, thereby providing the recipient country with a de 
facto foreign exchange transfer.  Domestic food production recovers over the long term 
(which the authors define as twenty years); this recovery is attributed to the benefits of 
the recipient country’s ability to import new physical capital, using the foreign 
exchange that would otherwise have been spent on commercial food imports.  Barrett, 
Mohapatra and Snyder’s conclusion is that “the data support the Schultzian critique that 
food aid discourages recipient country production in the short run.” 
 
Note that most of the aforementioned studies analyse the effects of PL 480 Titles I and 
III (non-emergency) food aid.  Such aid is persistent (Barrett, Mohapatra and Snyder) 
and often motivated by factors other than recipient need (Diven), (Zahariadis, Travis 
and Ward).  One key exception is Donovan, et al.’s analysis.  Though Donovan, et al. 
do not detail the source and category of the aid shipments used in their estimation, it 
appears as though they focus on emergency aid.   
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Despite seemingly inconsistent results from the vast landscape of food aid analyses, a 
few broad conclusions permeate most studies.  First, the data support the theoretical 
notion of a Schultzian disincentive effect in the short run.  Dynamic time-series models 
tend to show that the disincentive effect decays over the long term, and domestic 
production recovers.  Second, most models demonstrate a negative relationship between 
food aid shipments and commercial food imports, thus violating the additionality 
principle28.  It seems that the debate is not whether food aid affects the recipient country 
agriculture market.  Rather, the debate is how large is the effect and how long it lasts. 
 
2.4. A New Perspective 
The idea for this research grew out of discussion about WTO trade rules governing 
export subsidies.  Specifically, how can the WTO institute a set of rule-based 
disciplines that prevents member countries from using food aid to skirt the spirit of the 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture, without jeopardising legitimately-required food aid?  
The WTO currently defers to the FAO for rules that determine the legality of food aid.  
These rules determine legitimacy of food aid from the donor’s perspective; a 
proposition that is wrought with difficulties.  Crafty lawyers in donor countries seem 
always able to invent channels through which food aid can be deemed “WTO legal”.  
For example, the FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations of 
Member Nations (FAO 1992) distinguishes food aid from commercial food trade by 
measuring the concessionality of the food transfer.  As Shaw and Singer point out, the 
meaning of “normal commercial practice”, which is key to the commercial food trade 
                                                 
28 The additionality principle states that food aid should be wholly additional to, rather than a substitute 
for, commercial food imports. 
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definition, is different among governments.  “Normal” is a vague and subjective term 
that makes the implementation of a consistent set of rules difficult.  It would seem that 
another method of determining the “legitimacy” of food aid would be beneficial.   
 
Since the primary goal of food aid should be to benefit recipient countries, it is logical 
that the legitimacy of food aid should be determined from the perspective of recipients.  
That is, food aid should be regarded as legitimate if it benefits the recipient, and 
illegitimate if it does not.  How does one determine if food aid benefits a recipient 
country?  For this we focus on the case of emergency food aid, and try to formulate a 
concept of “need”.   
 
 
 
2.4.1. Defining Need 
“Need” is a vague term that is difficult to define in the context of development 
economics.  On one hand, developing countries need a quantity of food to meet 
nutritional requirements.  Does a developing country, however, need to produce this 
food self sufficiently (as opposed to importing)?  Perhaps not, but few countries have 
achieved modern economic growth without developing a productive agricultural 
industry (FAO, 2001).  We proceed under the notion that domestic agricultural 
production is beneficial to developing countries.  Also, to limit the scope of a definition 
of need, we focus on emergency food aid.  How much food aid does a recipient agrarian 
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country need when faced with a negative supply shock?  There are several a priori 
responses to this dilemma: 
 
i. As much as possible.  As economists, we are taught that consumers are insatiable, and 
that disposal is free.  This line of reasoning would argue that there could be no such 
thing as too much aid. 
 
ii. No aid.  This policy states that the provision of any food aid only disrupts the 
development of market institutions that could help to alleviate the negative effects of a 
future supply shock.  Such institutions could include storage facilities and crop 
insurance programmes.  The “no aid” policy is appealing from a moral hazard 
perspective.  Moral hazard in the context of food aid suggests that by granting aid to 
developing countries, recipients are more likely to put themselves in situations that 
require further aid in the future.  Such a concern could be alleviated by providing no 
aid.   
 
iii. The exact amount of food lost to a negative supply shock.  It makes sense, a priori, 
that just replacing the amount of lost food would have the smallest effect on the 
recipient-country’s agricultural markets; as if the shock didn’t happen.   
 
I argue that none of the aforementioned approaches accurately identifies the recipient 
country’s need in times of emergency.  The first option is sure to produce Schultzian 
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disincentive effects.  Most authors agree that there exists a real risk of depressing local 
food prices with food aid, even if none can agree on the magnitude of this risk.   
 
The second response is unappealing for humanitarian reasons.  Acute food shortages 
must be addressed with food aid, lest people starve.  Non-interference may be an 
appealing policy in cases of chronic, mild shortages, but the need to keep people alive 
in emergencies must trump all other concerns.  Isenman and Singer extend a similar 
hands-off line of reasoning.  They argue that price signals that result from shocks, and 
potential disincentive effects that are created by aid policies, may not be such bad things 
if they encourage farmers to switch to different, perhaps more profitable, crops.   
However, emergencies are not the appropriate occasions to make such switches; long-
term price signals and incentives should determine resource allocation.  Also, the moral 
hazard dilemma is not addressed in the current research.  The large-scale 
macroeconomic and institutional developments required to prevent future food 
emergencies are outside the scope of this research.   
 
The third response is appealing in that it avoids nutritional shortfalls and should avoid 
Schultzian disincentive effects.  Market supply of food does not increase if food aid just 
replaces the amount lost to a shock, so there should be no downward pressure on food 
prices.  However, there may be factors other than current price that affect producers’ 
ability and desire to change production levels.  Such factors may dictate alternative aid 
levels, depending on the definition of need.  This point is addressed in detail in the 
forthcoming model and simulations. 
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 A working definition of need is required to proceed with a model.  The first requirement 
of this definition is that people do not starve; food aid shipments must at least make up 
for the effects of a supply shock.  This is referred to as the “nobody starves” condition.  
The second requirement is based on the assumption that agricultural development is a 
worthwhile endeavour in the recipient country, and that an emergency situation is not 
the ideal opportunity to apply pressure for structural or institutional change.  As such, 
aid shipments should be allocated in a manner so as to minimise negative effects on 
local agricultural markets.  Note that the “nobody starves” condition is not the same as a 
notion of long-term food security.  Food security is a difficult concept to measure 
(Gray); for example a food aid policy may seek to maximise growth subject to a 
minimum level of food security (Gray).  Emergency aid is not well-suited to such a 
policy objective.  The primary goal of emergency food aid should be to avert starvation 
and acute malnutrition, and to allow a recipient country’s agricultural industry to 
recover as quickly as possible from a supply shock.  Increasing the nourishment of 
residents beyond a pre-shock level and increasing productivity in a recipient country’s 
agricultural industry are goals that should be targeting by other policies (such as 
institutional reform and programme aid).  A working definition of need in the case of 
emergency food aid is then: 
 
Emergency food aid is needed in an amount that minimises potential 
damage to the recipient country’s domestic agricultural industry, subject 
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to at least making up for the nutritional shortfall imposed by an 
emergency.  
 
The “nobody starves” condition appears in the definition as a constraint, i.e. 
“subject to at least making up for the nutritional shortfall…”  It is important to 
note that meeting this restriction should be the fundamental goal of any food aid 
policy.  Including the “nobody starves” condition as a constraint rather than an 
objective is simply a matter modelling semantics.  This is point is addressed 
further in chapter 2.5, which outlines the technical model. 
 
2.4.2. Modelling Need 
The problem now is to apply this definition of need to a model that simulates the 
effects of different levels of aid on a recipient-country’s agricultural industry, 
and determine what level of aid produces the most beneficial (from the recipient 
country’s perspective) results.  A description of the elements required for a food 
aid model follows. 
 
A dynamic structure is important in a food aid model.  The agricultural 
production process, and its response to supply shocks and food aid shocks, is 
inherently dynamic.  As such, any model that seeks to characterise how food aid 
affects a local agricultural market must consider how decisions in the current 
period affect output, price and aid deliveries in the next period.  The size of a 
supply shock and subsequent aid deliveries both affect production decisions, 
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thereby impacting the need for aid one period hence.  Static models overlook 
these important inter-period linkages and are unsatisfying for two primary 
reasons.  First, they rely on price elasticities, which may not consider the effects 
of the initial supply shock on productive capacity.  Second, the lag between 
planting and harvest is not considered in static models. 
 
Dynamic time-series models are also inadequate for analysing such dynamics, 
especially from a recipient-country perspective.  Food aid is commonly analysed 
in VAR models by imposing an exogenous food aid shock and tracing impulse 
responses (Donovan, et al., Lowder).  Food aid may continue past its initial 
arrival, but not according to need, as evaluated in each period.  Rather, aid’s 
impulse response is a function of estimated VAR parameters. 
 
Since the objective of the current research is to identify the most appropriate, or needed, 
quantity of food aid, we require a policy variable.  The logical choice for this variable is 
food aid shipments.  Aid shipments are assumed to be determined by policy makers 
from the local government, the WFP or bilateral donors.  The model contains a 
mechanism by which aid shipments affect local price through its effect on domestic 
food supply. 
 
The food aid model also requires a market supply response.  Market supply is made up 
of food aid and domestic production.  The responses of domestic farmers to three 
factors must be considered.  First, the initial supply shock that initiates an emergency.  
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A supply shock in the form of a crop failure affects revenues, thereby decreasing 
farmers’ abilities to hire inputs, pay wages and finance other production costs.  This 
factor has heretofore been unaddressed in food aid models, but is as important a factor 
in supply responses as potential price disincentive effects.   
 
Price effects are the second factors to consider.  Price affects production through two 
avenues.  First, current price affects current revenue, which impacts production as 
previously described.  Second, farmers base current planting decisions on their 
expectations of price in the harvest period.  As such, expected future price affects 
current planting.   
 
Finally, the initial supply shock and subsequent production decisions may affect the 
speed at which a farmer can vary his level of output.  Specifically, a large farm with 
many inputs could decrease output more rapidly than a small farm with few inputs 
could increase output.  Decreasing output merely requires the disposal or idling of 
inputs, while increasing output may require the acquisition of physical capital, labour 
and skills; all of which may take several periods to obtain.  The specifics of these 
factors are addressed in chapter 2.5, where the technical model is fully explained. 
 
The pieces of the model just described fit well into a dynamic optimisation framework.  
There is a policy, or control, variable (food aid shipments), a behavioural or state 
equation and variable (supply response and food supply) and a relationship between the 
two (price determination).  Such a framework shares much in common with natural 
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resource models that identify optimal harvest rates of renewable resources.  A common 
natural resource corollary (Leonard and Van Long) is the fisheries example.  Fishing 
effort is the control variable, the natural growth rate of the fish stock is the state 
equation and the effect of harvest on fish stock is the relationship between the two.   
 
One more piece is required to model food aid in a dynamic optimisation framework; an 
objective function to optimise.  Based on the previously defined notion of need, we try 
to operationalise an objective function that embodies the need to replace the food lost to 
a supply shock and the desire to avoid damage to the recipient country’s agricultural 
development.  Prime candidates for defining this damage are food price volatility and 
the difference in domestic output from its pre-shock level.  
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2.5. Model 
The model follows dynamic optimisation conventions by defining a control variable, a 
state variable, a state equation and an objective function.  The goal is to identify the 
optimal control path of the policy variable that minimises the stated objective function.   
 
The control variable is food aid shipments.  Food aid deliveries are determined 
exogenously by a planner and are not subject to the exogenous supply shock that affects 
domestic harvest.  The planner can be a government agency in the recipient country, a 
foreign multinational organisation such as the WFP or a single-donor country.  The key 
to the control variable is that it is substitutable for domestically produced food, and is 
not purchased on the local market.  It is imported from abroad and is wholly additional 
to domestic food supply.  The manner in which food aid is distributed is discussed 
further in the following chapter that describes the price determination equation.   
 
Some models (Rogers, Srivastava and Heady) propose that food aid should be 
considered in a two market model; one market for domestic supply and a separate 
market for aid that is either freely distributed or sold at concessional prices.  Such 
models are applied to programme aid, and are less suited to emergency situations.  It 
seems unlikely that a planner could enforce non-arbitrage between two such markets in 
emergency situations.  Enforcement would be particularly difficult in emergency 
conditions because arbitrage opportunities are high and government and aid resources 
are in great demand.  The control variable, then, is defined as ; aid shipments in 
volume in period t  (for example, tonnes per year).   
ty
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 We now turn to the state variable and its equation of motion.  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the state variable is domestic crop planting.  Domestic food supply is 
modelled to respond to market conditions, and is characterised by a representative agent 
farmer.  All farmers are assumed to respond identically to a supply shock and to price 
signals.  Current period crop planting is .  Note that current planting, , represents 
the quantity of seeds planted in period t  (for example, tonnes of seed per year), not the 
area of seeded land. 
tx tx
 
Note that  does not represent current food supply.  Due to the production lag between 
planting and harvest, we represent current harvest independently of .  Current period 
harvest is ;  unless a supply shock disrupts harvest.  It is important to 
remember that , and not , is the state variable.  Current period harvest is 
predetermined in period t , and only differs from  by the amount that an exogenous 
supply shock decreases harvest.   
tx
tx
th tt hx =−1
tx th
1−tx
 
Before outlining the state equation, we must make some background assumptions about 
the recipient country’s agriculture industry.  First, the recipient country’s agriculture 
industry is in long-run equilibrium wherein production and prices are in a steady state.  
For this to be the case, we must make a second assumption - that demand for food is 
fixed.  This level of demand, hereafter referred to as A , could represent the minimum 
sufficient caloric intake, as determined by medical science.  For simplicity, we further 
assume that the recipient country’s steady-state output is equal to A , so that the country 
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is self-sufficient in food production without food aid.  This assumption is not essential 
to the model - the model could be specified so that the steady-state equilibrium output is 
equal to A  less food imports or aid - but doing so simplifies the algebra and clarifies 
solution insight. 
 
Autarky is another of the model’s assumptions.  This assumption allows the model’s 
focus to remain on recipient-country producer behaviour.  Also, an autarkic situation 
allows price to be determined locally, so that food prices are not fixed at the world 
level.  Though autarky is one end of the trade openness spectrum, it is not an 
unreasonable assumption to make in the case of several countries that are affected by 
emergency food supply conditions.  Ethiopia, for example, ranks low on measures of 
economic openness (Kandiero and Chitiga), and is a frequent recipient of emergency 
aid (WFP).   
 
The primary drawback of analysing food aid in the context of an autarkic nation is that 
we overlook the possible important effects that aid may have on commercial imports.  
Several studies (Barrett, Mohapatra and Snyder, and Bezuneh, Deaton and Zuhair) have 
analysed the possible displacement effects that food aid might have on commercial food 
imports, and these results are insightful.  However the primary goal of this paper is to 
focus on the recipient-country producer response, and as such we proceed with an 
autarkic model.   
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Given the assumption of autarky, we further assume that domestic food price is 
determined through an excess supply function (Varian).  Given fixed and constant 
domestic demand, market price fluctuates as domestic food supply changes relative to 
domestic food demand.  Food price begins in equilibrium, where supply equals demand.  
If food supply rises above food demand, then price falls below its pre-shock level.  Such 
a relationship can be represented by           
 
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+= ttt yh
AP δ  (2.1) 
 
Current period price is determined by the ratio of food demand to food supply, through 
a positive parameter δ .  Food aid is assumed to be freely distributed among residents of 
the recipient country and arbitrage between domestic food and imported aid cannot be 
avoided.  Arbitrage between free and purchased food will provide an average market 
food price that will be faced by local agricultural producers.   
 
The state equation is comprised of three parts, each of which impacts local farmer 
production decisions, thereby altering the state variable (current period planting).  The 
first component of the state equation embodies the immediate effect of the supply shock 
on the farmer’s ability to pay input costs.  We assume that a farmer forms an 
expectation of  in period tP ( )1−t , which is referred to as ( )tt PE 1− , and therefore 
expects to receive revenue equal to ( )ttt PEh 1−  in period t .  If the farmer’s price 
expectation is correct and there is no supply shock (so that 1−= tt xh ) then 
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( )ttttt PExPh 11 −−=  and the farmer receives his expected revenue.  Output remains at its 
pre-shock level and the state variable does not change.  To account for the possibility of 
an exogenous supply shock, the relationship between planting in period  and 
farmers’ expected harvest in period t  is represented as 
( 1−t )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Ω−=− ttt
hx
1
1
1 .   
represents the size of an exogenous supply shock in period ; for example, a 75 percent 
negative supply shock results in 
tΩ
t
75.0=Ωt .  In the case of no supply shock, 0=Ωt  and 
.  Farmers’ expected revenue in period t  is represented by tt hx =−1 ( )tt
t
t PEh 11
1
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Ω− .  
Returning to the case of a 75 percent negative supply shock in period t , a farmer who 
planted 10 units in period ( 1)−t  would harvest only 2.5 units in period t  and would 
receive revenue of .  This compares to expected revenue of ttt PPh 5.2=
( ) ( )tttt PEPE 11 1075.01
15.2 −− =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
− .  The expected revenue term can be simplified as 
( )tttt PEh 1−π , where ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Ω−= tt 1
1π .  Note that tπ  will equal 1 in all periods in which an 
exogenous supply shock does not occur.   
 
If, however, the farmer’s revenue expectations are not correct, then there is pressure for 
output to change.  Consider the case where a negative supply shock reduces harvest in 
period , so that  and price does not change.  If the farmer conducted forward 
contracts with his inputs in period 
t 1−< tt xh
( )1−t  with the expectation of paying these inputs out 
of revenue generated in period , then the farmer experiences a revenue shortfall;  t tt Ph
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is less than ( )tttt PEh 1−π .  Such contracts could include an indenture to pay labour out of 
subsequent harvest or contracts wherein the farmer borrowed to acquire capital with the 
intention of repayment one period hence.  If there is a revenue shortfall, then either 
these inputs must go unpaid or the payment must come from a source other than current 
period’s revenue.  If labour is unpaid, then workers may leave the farm, and if capital 
loans are not repaid, then the capital may be repossessed.  If the funds to pay these 
inputs are acquired from other sources, then there are two possible sources.  One is the 
stock of funds that was intended to pay for variable inputs in period  to plant  (for 
example, labour or fertilisers).  The second source is funds acquired from the sale of 
currently owned capital, land or other fixed inputs that would have otherwise been used 
in current period production.  Either of these scenarios leads to lower productive 
capacity and has a negative effect on output in the current period.   
t tx
 
This revenue effect is operationalised by 
 
 ( )( tttttt PEhPh 1−− )π  (2.2) 
 
which is negative if actual revenue is less than expected revenue.   
 
The second component in the state equation is the expected price effect.  This effect is 
straight forward in that the farmer wants to increase production if he expects the price 
of his crop to rise above the pre-shock price.  Stated explicitly, if , then the 
farmer seeks to increase planting in the current period ( ) in hopes of increasing next 
( ) 01 PPE tt >+
tx
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period’s harvest ( ) to take advantage of the higher price.  Note that 1+th ( ) 01 PPE tt =+  in 
the steady state, and planting is constant.  However if ( )1+tt PE  deviates from , then 
the state variable, current period planting, deviates from its pre-shock level.   
0P
 
The expected price effect is operationalised by 
 
 .  (2.3) ( )( 01 PPE tt −+ )
 
A brief side note is required at this point to explain the expected price terms utilised in 
the first two components of the state equation.  The model incorporates farmers’ price 
expectations as part of the production decision and these expectations require 
specification within the model.  There exists no consensus on how price expectations 
should be modeled in agricultural economics.  Empirical tests of various expectation 
hypotheses in agriculture (Kenyon, and Shideed and White) tend to favour expectations 
based on either current prices (naïve expectations) or on futures markets.  Futures 
markets do not exist in most emergency food aid recipient countries, and naïve 
expectations do not seem entirely appropriate to emergency food situations.  There is no 
reason to think that farmers should expect that the price of food in an emergency period 
should be the same as the price of food before or after an emergency situation.  Supply 
conditions are sure to change in the periods following a supply shock.  Fortunately, the 
structure of the control model and the steady-state conditions provide some direction on 
how to model price expectations. 
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The farmer forms his price expectation with the knowledge of fixed demand, A , and 
therefore bases his price expectation on his projection of food supply in period ( )1+t .  
This is akin to equation (2.1), wherein price is determined by an excess supply function.  
To formulate a belief about supply one period hence, the farmer must have a projection 
of the amount that he will plant in the current period.  This, however, creates a 
simultaneity problem; price expectation is part of the state equation that determines 
output, and projected change in output forms the basis of the farmer’s price expectation.  
To get around this problem, we require a proxy for the farmer’s output capacity.  For 
that proxy, we use variables that provide some insight into how much the farmer will 
produce, and that are determined prior to period t ’s planting decision.  A reasonable 
proxy for the farmer’s productive capacity in period  is the farmer’s crop revenue in 
period .  As crop earnings rise, the farmer plans to increase output and expects food 
supply to rise in period .  We therefore express the farmer’s price expectation as 
t
t
( 1+t )
 
 ( )
tt
tt Ph
PE γ=+1 .  (2.4) 
 
The denominator of this expression, , is a proxy for the farmer’s current productive 
capacity and the numerator is a positive parameter.  As the farmer’s current revenue 
increases, his productive capacity rises.  The farmer’s proxy for current period planting 
(current revenue) rises, and he therefore expects that harvest in period  will rise 
above current period harvest.  The farmer bases his price expectation on a pseudo-
excess supply function, and therefore expects that as supply rises relative to demand, 
tt Ph
( 1+t )
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price will fall.  Higher current period revenue results in a lower expected price in period 
.  Note that the parameters in equations (2.1) and (2.4) can be calibrated so that 
 in the pre-shock state. 
( 1+t )
( ) 11 ++ = ttt PPE
 
The state equation’s third element incorporates the speed at which a farmer can change 
his level of output.  The rationale for including such a factor is that a farmer should be 
able to decrease production from the initial steady-steady state level more quickly than 
he can increase production to return to that initial output level. 
 
Emergency situations can have marked effects on input allocation within a region.  If 
farm revenue falls short of expectations, wages to farm labourers may not be paid and 
labourers may relocate - often to urban areas.  Also, if current period planting falls, so 
too do labour requirements; some of this unhired labour may relocate away from farms.  
A similar effect can occur with non-labour inputs.  Capital or land that is not used in 
current period production can be idled or sold.  The result is a shift in input allocation 
away from farms.  As a means of incorporating this dynamic into the optimal control 
setting, a farm’s capacity to change its level of production is modeled as being 
proportional to its output one period earlier.  Including tthπ  (which is equal to previous 
period’s planting, ) in the state equation allows the model to respond so that a large 
farm can decrease output by a larger amount than a relatively small farm can increase 
output. 
1−tx
 
The state variable is defined as 
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  ( )( ) ( )( )[ 0111 PPEPEhPhhxx tttttttttttt ]−+−+= +−− βπαπρ . (2.5) 
 
Equation (2.5) states that current period planting is equal to previous period planting 
plus the change in production as defined above.  ρ , α  and β  are positive parameters.  
Moving  to the left-hand side of the discrete form of equation (2.5) and taking the 
limit as  provides the state equation, or equation of motion for crop planting: 
1−tx
0→∆t
 
 . (2.6) ( )( ) (([ 011 PPEPEhPhhx tttttttttt −+−= +−• βπαπρ ) )]
 
It is worth noting that the discussion about farmer supply responses does not include 
classic Schultzian disincentive effects.  Classic Schultzian disincentive effects entail an 
immediate negative supply response in reaction to falling current food prices; such a 
response is inappropriate for a dynamic model.  Planting decisions are made one period 
before output is realised in a dynamic model to account for the planting-harvest lag.  It 
seems logical, then, that rational farmers base their planting decisions on their 
expectation of next period’s price, rather than current price.  It is, after all, next period’s 
price that farmers receive for currently planted crops.  Current planting may decline in 
response to a fall in current price (which may fall as a result of excess aid), but this 
decline is attributable to revenue effects, not price disincentive effects.  Also, current 
period planting may decline in response to price disincentives, however the disincentive 
is next period’s price, not current price.   
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The final element of the optimal control model is the objective, or value, function.  The 
objective function is how the aforementioned definition of “need” is incorporated into 
the model.  The goal of the optimal control model is to determine the path of the control 
variable, food aid shipments, that minimises damage to the recipient-country’s 
agriculture industry.  To determine this path, we require an explicit formulation of 
damage.  Working under the proposition that agricultural production is a worthwhile 
endeavour in the recipient country, damage is defined in two ways.  The first is a 
measure of price instability, which is calculated using squared food price differences 
from one period to the next.  The second measure of damage is the difference between 
food requirements (the constant A , as defined above) and current period planting ( ).  
 is equal to 
tx
tx A  in the pre-shock state, so the larger is this difference, the more damage 
has been done to the recipient-country’s agricultural industry.  Per period damage, or 
loss, can then be stated as 
 
( ) ( )[ ]ttt xAPP −+− − 21 . (2.7) 
 
The second term in the per-period loss function is not squared because a production 
capacity constraint is imposed on local production.  Specifically, local planting is 
limited to the constant food requirement so that Axt ≤  and the term  cannot be 
negative.  This constraint corresponds to the initial self-sufficiency of the recipient-
country market, and is appropriate for the goals of this model.  This model seeks to 
identify the short-run micro responses to emergency food aid, and not the long-run 
growth issues that may be associated with programme food aid.   
( txA − )
 112
 The cumulative loss to the recipient country can be obtained by taking the summation of 
equation (2.7) over a fixed time period.  Total loss is represented as 
 
   (2.8) ( ) ([ ]∑ −+−= −T ttt xAPPL
0
2
1 )
 
where t  represents time from periods  to 0 T .   
 
Three comments are necessary about equation (2.8).  First, there is no mention of the 
“nobody starves” restriction in the control model’s objective function.  This restriction 
is introduced below, as equation (2.12).  Recall, however, that the way in which the 
“nobody starves” condition is modeled is simply a matter of semantics.  The primary 
goal for an emergency food aid policy should be to meet nutritional requirements; 
including this goal as a restriction instead of an objective is a matter of model 
technicalities, not an indication that it should be an afterthought. 
 
Second, there is no discount factor, as is often present in the value functions of natural 
resource models.  This loss function is not specified in dollars, so a discount factor is 
not included.  Third, it is the ordinal value of  that is of interest.  The units in equation 
(2.8) do not have intuitive meaning and there are no weighting parameters attached to 
the loss function’s two components; the cardinal value of  is unclear.  The 
comparison of  between different paths of food aid is the relevant focus of evaluation.  
The specification of the value function is discussed further in chapter 2.6.3. 
L
L
L
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 Now that all components of the optimal control model are defined, it is worthwhile to 
present all of the model’s pieces together: 
 
   (2.9) ( ) ([ ]∑ −+− −T ttty xAPPt 0 21min )
) )]
 
subject to  
 
  (2.6) ( )( ) (([ 011)( PPEPEhPhhtx tttttttttt −+−= +−• βπαπρ
 
   (2.10) Axt ≤
 
   (2.11) Ax =0
 
  (2.12) tt hAy −≥
 
  (2.13) 1<Ω
 
 0=Tλ  (2.14) 
 
where 
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  ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+= ttt yh
AP δ  (2.1) 
 
 ( )
tt
tt Ph
PE γ=+1 .  (2.4) 
 
The only new components to this model are constraints (2.12), (2.13) and (2.14).  
Inequality (2.12) constrains the control variable, food aid shipments, to be greater than 
or equal to the area’s subsistence requirements less the current period harvest.  Put 
another way, food aid shipments are required to at least make up for the harvest lost to 
the supply shock that precipitates the emergency.  This constraint is included for 
humanitarian reasons.  The preservation of life is not explicitly incorporated into the 
loss function, but it is assumed that the loss of life to starvation trumps any price and 
production disincentive effects of food aid.  Food aid shipments are therefore restricted 
to always provide at least as much food as is required in the recipient region (the 
“nobody starves” condition).  The goal of this model is to focus on the needs of the 
recipient country; a goal that would be grossly unattained if residents in the recipient 
country were to starve.  Inequality (2.13) constrains the size of the supply shock to be 
less than absolute.  This is a realistic constraint, in that a supply shock is not likely to 
ever wipe out every trace of planted crop.  Also, a total supply shock, or , renders 1=Ω
π  indefinable.  Inequality (2.14) is the transversality condition required in an optimal 
control model with fixed terminal time (Kamien and Schwartz).  This requirement states 
that the costate variable must equal zero in the final time period.  In other words, the 
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shadow value of current planting (the intuitive meaning of the costate variable) must not 
have any influence on the objective function in the terminal period.   
 
The control problem is specified from the perspective of the central aid authority.  The 
aid authority determines a quantity of aid to deliver in each period in an effort to 
minimise the cumulative loss function of equation (2.9).  The aid authority has complete 
knowledge of the model’s parameters, including the specification of farmers’ price 
expectations.  The aid authority therefore has perfect foresight of the consequences of 
its aid policy. 
 
The dynamics in the economy described in the optimal control model unfold as follows.  
The economy begins in a steady-state equilibrium with productive capacity equal to A .  
Prior to a supply shock, local farmers plant Axt =  and receive harvest of , 
which can be sold at the steady-state price of .  The economy remains in this steady 
state without a supply shock.  Now consider a supply shock that affects the harvest level 
in period 1; such a shock could be inclement weather, infestation of pests or violence 
that prevents harvest.  This shock breaks the direct link between planting and 
subsequent harvest, so that 
Aht =+1
0P
Axh =< 01 .  The relevant food aid authority observes this 
shortage and responds by delivering food aid in the amount .  The market price for 
food, , is then determined by equation (2.1) and recipient-country farmers form their 
expectation of  according to equation (2.4).  Farmers then make their planting 
1y
1P
2P
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decision, , according to equation (2.6).  The dynamic continues in period 2, with each 
variable (including ) determined in the same manner as in period 1. 
1x
ty
 
2.6. Solution and Simulations 
The optimal control model is specified and can now be solved for the optimal path of 
food aid deliveries.  The first step to solving the dynamic optimisation problem is to 
specify the Hamiltonian. 
 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]01121 PPEPEhPhhxAPPH ttttttttttttt −+−+−+−= +−− βπαπλρ (2.15) 
 
Recall that the objective function, equation (2.8), is a loss function that we seek to 
minimise.  The first order conditions are the same as in the case of maximising the 
objective function (a more common practice in optimal control models), but the second 
order conditions must be investigated.  We turn now to the first order conditions, as 
outlined by the maximum principle.   
 
2.6.1. Solution 
The maximum principle states that the optimal solution to the optimal control problem 
outline in equations above must satisfy the following conditions: 
 0=∂
∂
ty
H  (2.16) 
 
t
t
Hx λ∂
∂=•  (2.17) 
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t
t
x
H
∂
∂−=•λ . (2.18) 
 
Each of these conditions are addressed in turn.  By substituting equations (2.1) and (2.4) 
into equation (2.15), we produce the reduced-form Hamiltonian: 
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 . (2.19) 
 
The first order partial derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to the control variable, 
, is ty
 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++−++++
+−=∂
∂ −
ttt
t
ttt
tt
t
tt
tt
t Ahyh
Ahh
yh
AP
yh
yhA
y
H
δ
βγαδπρλδδ 2214
22 22 . (2.20) 
 
Equation (2.20) can be set equal to zero and simplified as  
 
 ( ) ( ) 0
22
3
22
2
2
1 =−+−+
−−
Ayh
A
yh
hAAP t
tttt
tttt
δ
βγπρλδλραδπδ . (2.21) 
 
The first order partial derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to the costate variable, 
λ , yields the state equation 
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  ( )( ) ( )( )[ )(011 txPPEPEhPhhH tttttttttt
t
•
+− =−+−=∂
∂ βπαπρλ ] . (2.22) 
 
Differentiating the negative of the Hamiltonian with respect to the state variable, , 
provides the costate equation 
x
 
 1)( ==∂
∂− •t
x
H λ . (2.23) 
 
The next step in solving for the optimal path is to integrate the costate equation and 
solve for λ .  Using equation (2.23) and the transversality condition in (2.14), we can 
solve for λ  by integrating 
 
 . (2.24) ∫ •= T dtt
0
)(λλ
 
Along the optimal path,  
 
 . (2.25) ktdtdt +=== ∫∫ • 1* λλ
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The constant of integration, , can be obtained using the transversality condition in 
(2.14).  We know that 
k
( ) 0=Tλ , so ( ) 0=+= kTTλ  and Tk −= .  Therefore, along the 
optimal path,  
 
 Ttt −=λ . (2.26) 
 
Equation (2.26) states that the costate variable is negative throughout the horizon, and is 
equal to zero at terminal time T .  This makes intuitive sense, as planting is beneficial to 
the aid-recipient country, and therefore the shadow value of planting has a negative 
impact on the optimised loss function, .   L
 
tλ  can now be substituted into the necessary condition (2.21): 
 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) 022 3
22
2
2
1 =−−+−+
−−−
A
Tt
yh
A
yh
hTtAAP t
tttt
ttt
δ
βγπρδραδπδ .  (2.27) 
 
Equation (2.27) satisfies the first order conditions of the dynamic optimal control 
problem, however we must ensure that the loss function, equation (2.8), is minimised.  
The second order conditions are established in Appendix A, and they demonstrate that 
the solution to equation (2.27) minimises the loss function of equation (2.8). 
 
Equation (2.27) can be reduced to a complex cubic polynomial in .  An explicit 
solution for  in terms of the parameters and variables (all of which are known values 
ty
ty
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at the time that  is decided by the central planner) is troublesome, however.  
Computation of an explicit solution through Maple mathematics software produces 
three solutions, all of which contain the square roots of a complicated expression (these 
solutions can be found in Appendix B).  The sign of this complicated expression under 
the root sign depends on the relative magnitude of the parameters defined in the model.  
While it is possible to generate positive values for this expression, the parameter values 
used in the following simulations (see section 2.6.2 for justification of the parameter 
values used in simulation) make the expression negative and result in polar roots.  This 
situation prevents the simulation of an optimal food aid path as defined by the optimal 
control model.  However simulations can proceed under various other aid paths, 
according to the behavioural equations of the control model.  If an estimated version of 
this model were to generate parameter values that generated polar root solutions, then 
an alternative form of the objective function in equation (2.8) could be investigated.
ty
29   
 
We now turn to comparing the effects of various aid paths on the recipient-country’s 
agricultural industry.  The effects of various aid delivery paths on recipient price and 
production are simulated using the optimal control model that is outlined above. 
 
2.6.2. Simulations 
The following simulations utilise generated data.  Production and price data from food 
aid recipient countries is scarce and unreliable.  This is especially true in emergency 
situations, when data collection is made more difficult.  Most empirical studies that use 
                                                 
29 The importance and consequences of the objective function specification are discussed in chapter 2.6.  
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time series production and price data are modelled in the context of programme and 
project food aid, for which data are more accessible.  Price expectation data is also 
unavailable.  Such data would have to be obtained through a specific survey of a 
country that receives emergency food aid.   
 
There is, though, only one value that needs to be generated to initiate a simulation of the 
optimal control system.  The level of required nutrition, A , must be stated and all other 
variables can be produced through the structure and parameters of the model.  The 
economy is presumed to begin in steady-state equilibrium prior to a supply shock, 
wherein local production equals requirements and there is no emergency food aid.  
Therefore,  and  can be obtained from equation (2.1).  Also, Ahx tt ==−1 tP ( ) ttt PPE =+1  
in the pre-shock state so that  prior to the supply shock.   0=•x
 
The values of these variables are determined through the model’s parameters, which are 
also generated.  As the data is generated through the system’s equations, the parameters 
are not estimated; rather they are assigned values.  These assigned values are not 
arbitrary, however.  Some of the parameters can be derived directly from the pre-shock 
conditions and the others are assigned values that fit logically into the system.  A brief 
description of how each parameter is chosen follows. 
 
ρ  
This parameter determines the effect of including tthπ  in the state equation.  That is, it 
affects the speed at which farms can make changes to their output levels.  An attempt 
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was made to calibrate this parameter such that a production path that is not degenerate 
can return so that  by the end of a long-run period (which is defined as twenty 
years
Axt →
30).   
 
δ  
The price adjustment coefficient determines the food price in the initial steady-state, 
since the term inside the brackets of equation (2.1) is equal to one before a supply 
shock.  This parameter is set equal to one for clarity of exposition.  A larger δ  would 
result in a higher initial price and higher subsequent prices; a smaller δ  would produce 
the opposite response.   
 
γ  
The expected price adjustment parameter is difficult to quantify, a priori.  However, we 
can use the information provided by the pre-shock condition to calibrate γ  such that 
 prior to a supply shock.  That is, the state equation’s expected price effect 
in the steady state is zero.  Equations (2.1) and (2.4) can be set equal to each other and 
solved for 
( ) ttt PPE =+1
tAPδγ = . 
 
α  and β  
These parameters are the most subjective in the system and the relative sizes of the two 
have the most significant impact on simulated production paths.  The size of revenue 
                                                 
30 Twenty years is chosen to comply with Barrett, Mohapatra and Snyder’s definition of a long-term 
period in food aid deliveries. 
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and expected price effects determine not only the size of production changes in each 
period, but also whether production in the recipient country recovers to its pre-shock 
level or degenerates towards zero.  Given the importance of the relative sizes of these 
two parameters, two separate cases are presented in the following simulations; one in 
which the revenue effect dominates and one in which the expected price effect 
dominates. 
 
Though the values of α  and β  are uncertain, they depend on a few key characteristics 
of the recipient country.  α  depends on factors such as the cost of borrowing and on the 
source of inputs used in planting.  As previously mentioned in the discussion regarding 
the revenue effect, emergency situations may affect a farmer’s ability to repay loans 
from previous periods.  The higher is the cost of borrowing, the larger is the amount to 
be repaid.  More funds have to be allocated away from production, hence a larger 
revenue effect.  A farm’s source of inputs also affects the size of α .  An economy 
whose farms rely primarily on family labour and do not borrow to acquire capital have a 
relatively small α .  Such farms will not have labour or creditors to repay out of current 
period’s harvest, and a revenue shortfall has a relatively small effect on planting 
decisions.  The opposite is true of farms that rely heavily on hired inputs and repayment 
of debts out of current period revenues.  
 
A negative supply shock equal to three-quarters of period one’s harvest is imposed to 
initiate the simulation experiment.  The result is that Axh t 4
1
4
1
11 == − .  Supply shocks 
of different magnitudes were also simulated, and the results are similar to the three-
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quarters supply shock.  The paths of all variables are comparable, but the initial fall in 
production is larger and the movement to a new steady state is slower.  Only the three-
quarters supply shock is illustrated below for reasons of brevity. 
 
Within this supply shock scenario, the price and production paths that result from four 
different aid delivery paths are generated; shortfall aid, excess aid, exogenously-
determined aid and exogenously determined aid with a randomised error.  A brief 
discussion of each of these paths is useful. 
 
Shortfall aid 
The shortfall aid path delivers aid in the exact amount lost to the exogenous supply 
shock.  The harvest shortfall ( )thA −  is determined and food aid is delivered in that 
amount.  This rule holds in periods following the exogenous supply shock, so that aid 
continues to be delivered in an amount equal to ( )thA − . 
 
Excess aid 
This aid path analyses the effects of the “more is better” philosophy in allocating food 
aid.  The harvest shortfall ( )thA −  in the current period is calculated and aid is 
delivered in an amount that exceeds that shortfall by ten percent.  This path satisfies the 
“nobody starves” condition, but may have depressing effects on local price and 
production. 
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Exogenous aid 
This path sets aid deliveries according to a rule unlike either of the above paths.  The 
rule for exogenous aid in the following simulations was arrived upon through a previous 
permutation of the control model.  An earlier version of the model yielded a more 
tractable formulation for the optimal aid path.  This rule, though not necessarily optimal 
in the context of the current control model, can however be simulated according to the 
current model’s behavioural equations.  The rule used in these simulations is 
 ( ) tttttt hhAhTAP
Ay −−+= − αβπρδ
δ
1
2
2
2 . (2.28) 
The rationale for including this aid path in the simulations is to demonstrate that the 
shortfall aid path is not necessarily optimal in either minimising  or in spurring a 
recovery of local production.  This is examined further in the following simulations.  
Note that in simulations that utilise equation (2.28), the “nobody starves” restriction of 
equation (2.12) and restriction (2.A.7)
L
31 are imposed. 
 
Exogenous aid with error 
Emergency situations make delivery of food aid logistically difficult.  Even if an 
optimal aid path can be identified, there are several factors that may prevent that 
optimal amount of aid from reaching its intended recipients.  Transportation 
bottlenecks, hoarding, gangsterism, corruption and weather can all impede aid 
deliveries.  Such complications can result in either too much or too little aid reaching its 
recipients.  The exogenous aid with error simulations include cases where aid is 
delivered in an amount as determined by equation (2.28), with a random error between 
                                                 
31 See Appendix A. 
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plus and minus twenty percent of .  Aid is overshot in some periods and undershot in 
others, depending on the random variable.  Note that there is no guarantee that the 
optimal path with error meets the restriction of equation (2.12); the error may create 
periods in which the “nobody starves” restriction is violated.  Despite this, the price and 
production paths of this scenario are of interest because of the inherent complications of 
delivering emergency food aid.  The policy implications of delivery errors are discussed 
in chapter 2.6.3. 
ty
 
All of the above aid paths are analysed under the effects of different relative revenue 
and expected price effects.  One case allows for a relatively large expected price effect 
and small revenue effect; the other allows for the opposite.  Case A  provides for a large 
expected price effect while case  imposes a relatively large revenue effect.  Each case 
is analysed along the four aforementioned aid delivery paths.  Each simulation can be 
categorised by number: scenario A.1 analyses the effects of a shortfall aid path with a 
relatively large expected price effect.  This pattern continues; for example scenario B.3 
analyses the effects of exogenously-determined aid with a relatively large revenue 
effect.  The various simulations are summarised in table 2.1. 
B
 
Table 2.1 - Simulation Scenarios 
 Shortfall Excess Exogenous Randomised 
Error 
Large expected 
price effect 
A.1 A.2 A.3 A.4 
Large revenue 
effect 
B.1 B.2 B.3 B.4 
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Case A.1 - large expected price effect, shortfall aid 
The initial supply shock in period one pushes  down.  Aid authorities respond 
according to the rule (  and price adjusts according to equation (2.1).  The 
substantial drop in harvest reduces farm revenue, placing downward pressure on the 
state equation via the parameter 
1h
)thA −
α .  However, lower perceived productive capacity 
results in a rise in price expectation via equation (2.4).  Farmers believe that  will rise 
above  and are motivated to increase production via the expected price effect and 
parameter 
2P
0P
β .  The net effect on the state equation depends on the relative magnitude of 
α  and β , which in this case favours β .  The state equation assumes a positive sign, 
however  remains at 1x A  due to the constraint in equation (2.10).  This is not the end of 
the story, however.  Recall that the farmer expects price in period two to rise; it is this 
expectation that pushes  above zero in period one.  The higher expected price is how 
the farmer expects to recoup the costs of having increased production in period one 
above what period one’s revenue would dictate.  , however, stays below  and 
produces a negative revenue effect in period two; the result is decreased planting in 
period two.  From this point on, the revenue effect remains negative, but is dominated 
by the expected price effect.  Production recovers towards its pre-shock level, 
•
x
2P ( )21 PE
A , and 
food aid shipments fall towards zero by the end of the 20 period simulation.  The 
cumulative loss function is 6.49.  Case A.1 is illustrated in figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5 - Case A.1, Shortfall Aid
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Case A.2 - large expected price effect, excess aid 
This scenario delivers food aid in an amount equal to the crop shortfall ( ) plus an 
additional ten percent in each period.  The production path in this scenario is similar to 
the shortfall aid path, but differs in two key ways.  First, the negative revenue effect is 
larger in period two, resulting in lower planting in period two.  The second difference is 
the speed at which local production recovers.   is further below 
thA −
tx A  at the end of the 
twenty-period simulation in the excess aid scenario than in the shortfall aid scenario.  
The cumulative loss function is 7.04.  Case A.2 is illustrated in figure 2.6. 
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Figure 2.6 - Case A.2, Excess Aid
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Case A.3 - large expected price effect, exogenous aid 
The motivation for including a simulation of this aid path (as outlined in equation 
(2.28)) is to demonstrate that the shortfall aid path is not necessarily optimal.  The 
planting and aid trajectories look similar to the shortfall aid case, and are identical in 
certain periods because the “nobody starves” constraint binds.  Local production 
recovers more quickly, however, in the exogenous aid case than in the shortfall aid case.  
It is interesting to note that there are several periods in which this aid path is above the 
shortfall path, indicating that just meeting the “nobody starves” condition is not 
necessarily optimal.   
 
It seems logical, a priori, that replacing just the amount of food lost to the shock should 
minimise damage to the recipient economy.  In the case of a large expected price effect, 
the exogenous amount of aid is equal to the lost harvest in the first two periods, and is 
above the lost harvest for the next eight periods.  It seems as though a higher level of 
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food aid keeps price below what would be the case in the ( )thA −  path.  This results in 
a larger expected price effect, and faster production recovery.  The cumulative loss 
function in the case of exogenous aid is 4.09.  Case A.3 is illustrated in figure 2.7. 
 
Figure 2.7 - Case A.3, Exogenous Aid
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Case A.4 - large expected price effect, exogenous aid with a randomised error 
The production path that results from exogenous aid with a randomised error closely 
resembles case A.3.  The initial revenue effect produces a larger decrease in period two 
planting, however, since a positive error in aid delivery reduces current price.  Also, 
local production recovers more slowly when aid is delivered with errors.   is nearer tx
A  after twenty periods in scenario A.3  than in scenario A.4.  The cumulative loss 
function is 4.70.  Case A.4 is illustrated in figure 2.8. 
 
Note that there are an unlimited number of potential paths that scenario A.4 could take, 
depending on the direction and magnitude of the random error.  Such paths could (and 
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likely would) include negative delivery errors, thus violating the “nobody starves” 
condition. 
 
Figure 2.8 - Case A.4, Exogenous-with-error Aid
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Case B.1 - large revenue effect, shortfall aid 
A relatively large revenue effect results in a markedly different production path in the 
case of a negative supply shock.  The initial supply shock in period one reduces current 
revenue, which dominates the positive expected price effect and pushes current planting 
down.  However unlike Case A.1, production does not recover in period three.  The 
negative revenue effect continues to dominate the positive price effects and the state 
equation is persistently negative.  Local planting degenerates towards zero, and aid 
shipments rise towards A .  The ultimate steady-state result (beyond the twenty-period 
simulation) would be complete dependence on food aid.  The cumulative loss function 
is 111.41.  Case B.1 is illustrated in figure 2.9. 
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Figure 2.9 - Case B.1, Shortfall Aid
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Case B.2 - large revenue effect, excess aid 
The trends in this simulation are similar to case B.1, but local planting degenerates at a 
faster rate.  The initial negative revenue effect is larger and the continued dominance of 
the negative revenue effect results in relatively sharp decreases in domestic planting and 
correspondingly fast increases in food aid deliveries.  The cumulative loss function is 
120.09.  Case B.2 is illustrated in figure 2.10. 
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Figure 2.10 - Case B.2, Excess Aid
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Case B.3 - large revenue effect, exogenous aid 
The production trajectory generated by the aid path outlined in equation (2.28) is similar 
to that of case B.1, however unlike the scenarios that include a large expected price 
effect, the exogenous aid path is not superior (in terms of generating a recovery path for 
local planting or minimising the objective function) to the shortfall aid path.  This 
indicates that the optimal path (as defined by the solution to equation (2.27)) depends 
on the relative magnitudes of α  and β .  The cumulative loss function is 112.12.  Case 
B.3 is illustrated in figure 2.11. 
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Figure 2.11 - Case B.3, Exogenous Aid
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Case B.4 - large revenue effect, exogenous aid with a randomised error 
The randomised delivery error creates a faster degenerative production path than does 
the exogenous aid path.  Domestic planting falls towards zero more rapidly than in case 
B.3; local planting is nearer zero at the end of the twenty-period simulation in case B.4 
than in case B.3.  Recall that there exist an unlimited number of potential paths that 
scenario B.4 could take, depending on the size and direction of the random error.  Also, 
some periods experience a negative delivery error, resulting in a violation of the 
“nobody starves” condition.  The cumulative loss function is 126.81.  Case B.4 is 
illustrated in figure 2.12. 
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Figure 2.12 - Case B.4, Exogenous-with-error Aid
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Table 2.2 summarises the simulation results.  All aid paths result in a production 
recovery in cases of a relatively large expected price effect.  The exogenous aid path 
generates the smallest cumulative loss function and the excess aid path generates the 
largest loss function.  In cases of a relatively large revenue effect, none of the simulated 
aid paths allow local production to recover.  Shortfall aid generates the smallest 
cumulative loss function and exogenous aid with error generates the largest cumulative 
loss function. 
 
Table 2.2 - Simulation Results 
 Shortfall Excess Exogenous Randomised 
Error 
Large expected 
price effect 
3.0,01.0 == βα  
Case A.1 
49.6=L  
recovery 
Case A.2 
04.7=L  
recovery 
Case A.3 
09.4=L  
recovery 
Case A.4 
70.4=L  
recovery 
Large revenue 
effect 
2.0,1.0 == βα  
Case B.1 
41.111=L  
degeneration 
Case B.2 
09.120=L  
degeneration 
Case B.3 
12.112=L  
degeneration 
Case B.4 
81.126=L  
degeneration 
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2.6.3. Discussion 
The simulations in this essay are based on generated data and parameters and, as such, 
cannot be directly applied to a specific case of emergency food aid.  There are, 
however, several important insights that can be gleaned from the model and its 
simulation results.   
 
First, accurate measures of the model’s relevant variables and constants must be 
obtained to successfully manage a food emergency.  Planners should know the size of 
an affected population, and how much food is required to sustain their health through 
the course of the emergency; that is, there should be an accurate estimate of A .  The 
scale of the supply shock must also be considered in any food aid response.  A 
comparison of harvest sizes before and after a supply shock ( ) would reveal this 
information.  Accurate price data are also necessary to measure the effects of aid on 
local markets.   
th
 
Another insight provided by this model is the importance of the initial supply shock’s 
impact on revenue and resulting production decisions.  This issue has been largely 
ignored in food aid analysis, but is key in determining the path that production takes in 
response to an emergency situation and subsequent aid deliveries.  The revenue effect 
demonstrates that even if there exists sufficient price incentives to increase production, 
farmers may be unable to do so because of insufficient revenue.   
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The importance of the revenue effect must be compared to the effects of expected price 
effects.  Planners must have an understanding of how farmers’ price expectations are 
formed, and how those expectations affect planting decisions.  As the previous 
simulations demonstrate, the relative sizes of these two effects can determine whether 
local production recovers or degenerates.   
 
If planners can obtain reliable estimates of the data and parameters described above, 
then some policy conclusions can be deduced.  If the expected price effect dominates 
the revenue effect, then the simulations show that local production is likely to recover 
after an emergency.  If an optimal aid path can be calculated, then this path will 
minimise damage to the recipient-country’s agricultural industry.  There may, however, 
be an important reason to stray from this optimal path.  The realities of delivery 
disruptions (as illustrated in cases A.4 and B.4) create the possibility of aid shortages in 
certain regions.  A prudent response would be to add a fixed amount of aid to the 
optimal delivery path in each period to compensate for negative delivery errors.  Doing 
so may slow the recovery, but save lives in the process.   
 
A larger policy problem emerges if the revenue effect dominates the expected price 
effect.  The simulations show that all constructed aid paths result in degenerative 
production paths32.  The problem is that the negative impact of the revenue effect on 
farmers’ planting decisions perpetually dominates any positive impact that the expected 
price effect might have.  Recall that the importance of the revenue effect (i.e. the size of 
                                                 
32 A scenario that included zero aid in every period was simulated in the context of a relatively large 
revenue effect.  Production recovered towards A  in this case, but the simulation was not included 
because of its obvious violation of the “nobody starves” requirement. 
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α ) will depend on the characteristics of the recipient country’s agricultural industry.  
For example, an agricultural region that relies relatively heavily on hired labour and 
inputs is likely to have a larger α  than a region that uses primarily family labour.   
 
One possible policy response in the case of a large revenue effect would be to directly 
subsidise farmers in emergency situations.  This could help to increase farmers’ current 
revenue to be either equal to or above expected revenue.  The positive impact of 
expected price effects can then be realised and even complimented.  Another option is 
to provide some aid in the form of variable inputs, such seeds or fertilisers.  Farmers 
that could have otherwise not afforded such inputs (due to revenue shortfalls) can use 
these inputs to increase current-period planting.  
 
It is important to remember that the model presented in this paper does not incorporate 
valuation of lives lost to starvation.  This is because such loss is assumed to trump any 
possible negative market effects that aid might have on a recipient country.  Emergency 
food aid should always be delivered in an amount sufficient to prevent starvation.  
Lower levels of aid delivery may result in faster recovery for the agricultural sector and 
a lower value of the model’s value function, but such paths do not meet humanitarian 
need requirements.  The primary goal of any emergency food aid plan should be to avert 
starvation, the secondary goal to minimise potential damage to the recipient-country’s 
agricultural industry. 
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As in any optimal control model, the conclusions and results of the solution and 
simulations are sensitive to the specification of the objective function.  The loss 
function of equation (2.8) does not weight the relative importance of price volatility 
versus the importance of deviations from capacity output.  Both terms enter into the loss 
function with no attached parameter.  Weighting one of the components of the objective 
function differently would produce a different optimal path.  Because the control model 
is simulated, and not estimated, a decision was made to leave the objective function 
unweighted for generality.  An empirical application of this model would warrant 
investigation of various forms of the objective function in equation (2.8) in order to 
generate alternative optimal aid paths. 
 
Also, the importance of the “nobody starves” condition cannot be overstated in the 
simulation results.  Violation of the “nobody starves” condition would cause a food 
shortage, and result in higher food prices.  This will turn revenue effects positive, 
placing upward pressure on current period planting.  However, this model is built on the 
principle that food aid should meet the needs of the recipient country.  Allowing for an 
acute food shortage does no such thing.  Also, an acute food shortage in which people 
starve will have negative effects on the affected region’s productive capacity.  
Labourers that do not receive enough food will either die or become less productive.  
The current model has no mechanism to account for reduced productive capacity as the 
result of dying farmers.  Note, however, that while violating the “nobody starves” 
condition may generate a faster recovery path for local planting, such a violation will 
not necessarily result in a lower cumulative loss function.  The price volatility that 
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results from an acute food shortage can push the objective function above that of the 
shortfall aid path value.  Again, this result is dependent on the specification and 
weighting of the objective function. 
 
Beyond the attempt to best meet the needs of the recipient country, this research 
provides an avenue for further consideration in the formulation of trade rules regarding 
food aid.  Current WTO trade negotiations could benefit from the identification of an 
amount of aid that a recipient country needs.  Surplus disposal of agricultural 
commodities is a contentious issue in WTO negotiations, and the current rules 
determine the legitimacy of food aid from the donor-country’s perspective.  Shifting the 
determination of aid’s legitimacy to the recipient country’s perspective would provide 
the WTO with more sensible guidelines by which to govern food aid.  If a needed, or 
optimal, amount of aid can be determined then the WTO should allow for aid shipments 
up to (and perhaps just beyond) that amount.  Any aid above that amount should raise 
concern for two reasons.  The first reason is that less aid will be able to meet the 
region’s nutritional requirements without imposing as large a hardship on local 
agriculture.  A second reason is that food aid shipments that exceed the needed quantity 
may be an attempt by donor countries to satisfy domestic concerns, specifically surplus 
disposal.  The WTO should be particularly interested in the second reason. 
 
2.7. Conclusions 
The primary goal of food aid deliveries should be to benefit the recipient country.  The 
experience over the fifty-odd years of government-funded food aid programmes has, 
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however, not always been so philanthropic.  US food aid programmes were initiated 
primarily as a means of surplus disposal, and this tradition has continued for more than 
fifty years.  Programme and project food aid have been shown to be linked more closely 
with donor motives than with recipient needs.   
 
The possibility that food aid shipments may have negative effects on recipient country 
agricultural industries, first analysed by Schultz, has generated a sizable stream of 
literature.  This literature has tried to qualify and quantify the effects that food aid might 
have on a recipient country.  A surprising omission from this literature is an attempt to 
identify an amount of food aid that would provide the most benefit to the recipient 
country.  The current research tries to make up for this omission by defining how much 
emergency food aid a recipient country needs, and building a control model to identify 
that need.   
 
Identifying the amount of food aid that most benefits a recipient country can provide the 
WTO with a framework by which to evaluate the legitimacy of food aid.  Food aid 
shipments that arrive in amounts large enough to depress local production beyond a 
minimum amount should be viewed with caution.   
 
This research provides a new perspective on food aid by formulating a definition of 
need in the context of emergency food aid and constructing an optimal control model 
around that definition.  The control model is solved for the optimal quantity of food aid 
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shipments.  Though the control solution is not simulated, several important conclusions 
can be drawn from the control model and its simulations. 
 
First, food aid planners must have accurate estimates of the model’s important variables 
and parameters.  Specifically, planners must know an affected region’s nutritional 
requirements and the size of the nutritional shortfall that is caused by a supply shock.  
Planners must also have an understanding of how farmers react to changes in current 
revenue and expected price effects.  The relative magnitude of these effects can 
determine whether local production recovers or degenerates.   
 
Second, any food aid delivery plan must consider the possibility of delivery obstacles.  
Food aid shipments, especially in emergency situations, are unlikely to reach recipients 
in the exact amount intended by donors.  One way to deal with such obstacles is to add 
a buffer stock to aid shipments to account for possible negative delivery errors.  A 
slower production recovery might be a reasonable price to pay for saved lives.   
 
Third, the model’s simulations show that less is not always more in the case of 
emergency food aid.  Specifically, the simulations demonstrate that an amount of aid 
that just makes up for a region’s nutritional shortfall will not necessarily result in the 
fastest recovery path for local production.  An exogenous aid path was shown to result 
in faster local production and to produce a smaller value for the objective loss function.   
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There are several avenues that further research could take.  One possible step is to 
include an expectation of future food aid in farmers’ price expectation formulation.  
There exists some evidence that programme food aid is persistent (Barrett, Mohapatra 
and Snyder).  Equation (2.4) could look something like 
 
 ( ) ( )t
tt
tt yfPh
PE +=+ γ1 . (2.29) 
 
Allowing farmers to expect food aid in the next period would have two primary effects.  
First, it will alter their expectation of future price, thereby affecting the expected price 
effect in the current planting decision.  Also, farmers’ expectation of aid will affect the 
size of the revenue effect; if more aid was delivered than was expected, then current 
price will be lower than expected price and a revenue shortfall will result.   
 
Another path that this research could take would be to allow for a measure of the 
number of people at risk of starvation during various sizes of supply shocks.  The model 
could then simulate the marginal effects of increasing food aid shipments on the number 
of at risk people.  A benefit-cost analysis could then be presented that weighs the costs 
of increasing emergency aid against the benefits of saving an additional life.  Such an 
analysis would make for an interesting policy discussion.  
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APPENDIX A - SUFFICIENCY CONDITIONS 
 
 
There exist several methods for establishing the sufficiency of the maximum principle, 
depending on the structure of the optimal control problem.  The method outlined on 
page 163 of Leonard and Van Long is used below. 
 
To establish that the path suggested by equation (2.27) minimises the cumulative loss in 
equation (2.8), the following proposition must be established: 
 
If  of equation (2.8) is convex in L ( )yx,  jointly, and 0≤λ  and  of 
equation (2.6) is convex in 
•
x
( )yx,  jointly, then the necessary conditions 
of the simplified maximum principle are sufficient for an optimal 
solution in minimising . L
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The Hessian matrix of  is L
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The Hessian is positive semidefinite if the term ( )( )( )41
232
tt
ttt
yh
yhPAA
+
+− −δδ  is greater than 
or equal to zero.  This inequality can be solved for  to provide a restriction on aid 
deliveries.   
ty
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Inequality (2.A.7) states that the value function, , is convex in  and  when this 
inequality is satisfied. 
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The term ( )( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
+
4
2
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t yh
yhAhh αδρπ  is positive, so the Hessian matrix of  is positive 
semidefinite and  is convex in 
•
x
•
x ( )yx, . 
 
 
3.  Sign of tλ  
Equation (2.26) shows that Ttt −=λ , so that tλ  is less than zero in all periods other 
than T , when 0=tλ .   
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Therefore,  of equation (2.8) is convex in L ( )yx,  jointly, and 0≤λ  and  of equation 
(2.6) is convex in (  jointly.  The necessary conditions of the simplified maximum 
principle are sufficient for an optimal solution in minimising . 
•
x
)yx,
L
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APPENDIX B - SOLUTIONS TO THE OPTIMAL CONTROL PROBLEM 
 
 
Three solutions to equation (2.27) are provided by computation in Maple.  They are: 
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ESSAY 3: THE IMPORTANCE OF DYNAMICS IN COMMODITY  
ADVERTISING DEMAND SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Measuring the effectiveness of advertising is one of the most active research areas in 
agricultural economics.  The large sums of money, both private and public, spent on 
agricultural promotion are testaments to the importance of accurately assessing its 
effectiveness.  Hayes estimates that for every US$500 million spent each year on US 
agricultural promotion programs, the average cost to farmers is US$1000.  Canada has 
similar compulsory producer-level programs.  Such programs are often mandatory, in 
that producers of a promoted good must contribute to the marketing programs through a 
“check-off” system.  The mandatory nature of such programs combined with the fact 
that public funds are also allocated to agricultural promotion programs, heightens the 
public interest in accurate appraisals of promotion programs. 
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The majority of attempts to assess advertising effectiveness do so by estimating demand 
equations or systems and testing the impact of advertising expenditures.  Results from 
such analyses are inconsistent and often counterintuitive.  Different functional forms 
yield different conclusions using similar data, and elasticity estimates are frequently 
counterintuitive.  Furthermore, static demand-based studies overlook dynamic market 
interactions that can influence the effectiveness of advertising over time.  Short-run 
elasticities are sure to be different from long-run elasticities, and basing policy 
decisions on short-run elasticities may be short sighted.   
 
Another potentially serious drawback of current advertising assessment methodologies 
is the neglect of the underlying data’s time-series properties.  Time-series data used in 
demand model estimation is likely to be nonstationary33; ignoring this information in 
estimation may lead to spurious regression and misleading model inference.   
 
A third shortcoming of current methodologies is that, if data are nonstationary, then 
modelling demand in anything other than error-correction form may omit some 
important information about long-run relationships between the model’s constituent 
variables.  This information is important for two reasons.  First, if variables are 
cointegrated then estimating a model without an error-correction term amounts to a 
misspecification error (Enders).  Second, it seems likely that the difference between 
short and long-run elasticities will be more significant in the case of products with close 
substitutes.  The prices of such closely substitutable products may share a long-run 
                                                 
33 See chapter 3.4.2 for an explanation of stationarity,. 
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relationship, so investigating cointegration within the context of a demand model for 
such products is important.   
 
This essay explores the consequences of failing to account for potential long-run and 
dynamic effects in a demand system and explains the importance of correctly modelling 
the time-series properties of the data used in demand models.  This explanation includes 
reasons that consideration of time-series properties is particularly important in 
advertising-demand models of closely substitutable products.  A demand system that 
correctly tests for and accommodates dynamic and time-series properties is developed 
and applied to US meat data.  The results of this model are compared to a traditional, 
static demand system.   
 
This introductory chapter is followed by seven chapters.  Chapter 3.2 provides 
background on commodity promotion and its importance in agriculture.  Chapter 3.3 
reviews the methods by which the effectiveness of advertising has been assessed in 
economic studies and includes comments on the shortcomings of current 
methodologies.  Chapter 3.4 explains the importance of considering the dynamic and 
time-series properties of the data used in demand models and explains why such 
properties might be particularly relevant in modelling demand for products that have 
close substitutes.  Chapter 3.5 builds an empirical model that accounts for dynamic and 
time-series properties, and chapter 3.6 estimates this model using US meat data.  A 
traditional, static model is also estimated and the results of the two models are 
compared.  Chapter 3.7 discusses the use of demand models and their elasticities in 
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policy decisions and chapter 3.8 closes with some concluding remarks and suggestions 
for further research. 
 
3.2. Commodity Promotion 
3.2.1. The Rationale for Advertising 
Advertising expenditures are made in hopes of generating higher profits.  A shift in 
consumer preferences is the mechanism by which advertisers hope to increase profits.  
The rationale is as follows: advertisers undertake campaigns to convey “new” 
information to consumers in hopes of altering their preferences.  New preferences are 
reflected by a new (shifted out) demand curve for the advertised product.  The resulting 
higher price translates into higher profits for producers.  A simplified static 
representation of this effect is illustrated in figure 3.1.  Consider a market with a 
representative firm whose advertising expenditures successfully alter consumer tastes so 
that short-run demand shifts from  to .  The new higher price provides higher 
profits to producers.  This representation is simplified by not considering the costs of 
the advertising campaign or the (perhaps rising) costs of increasing output. 
0
SRD
1
SRD
 
There exist two broad categories of advertising, reflecting the nature of the products; 
branded advertising and generic advertising.  Branded advertising generally refers to 
advertising programs in markets that feature non-homogenous products.  Products such 
as cars and clothing may be sufficiently differentiable so that an advertising campaign 
for one brand does not necessarily increase demand for all brands across the group of 
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products.  Most branded advertising is done at the firm level since individual firms have 
private incentives (higher profits) to shift out the demand curve for their products.     
 
Generic advertising describes promotional activity in markets that are comprised of 
homogenous, highly substitutable products.  Often, such products are not branded, so 
consumers are not inclined to choose one variety over another.  The benefits (measured 
in terms of higher prices) of generic advertising are therefore non-excludable to 
producers of substitutable commodities that have not invested in advertising (Alston, 
Freebairn and James).  As such, no individual producer has an incentive to advertise his 
product independently of other producers of close substitutes.  Generic advertising 
therefore has some characteristics of a public good.  Firms that have not invested in 
advertising campaigns may benefit as much from increased demand as those firms who 
do advertise; such is the typical free-rider problem.  The result can be an 
underinvestment in commodity advertising (Alston, Freebairn and James). 
 
3.2.2. Advertising Methods 
Generic advertising is rarely undertaken at the firm level because the benefits are non-
excludable.  Rather, generic and commodity advertising is usually undertaken by an 
association of commodity producers.  Examples of such associations are the 
International Wool Secretariat, the US Cattlemen’s Beef Board and the California Milk 
Advisory Board.  Producer associations in the US are administered by a board that is 
elected by producers, and operates under either the Federal Government’s Secretary of 
Agriculture or the State Secretary.  Similar programs exist in Canada.  For example, the 
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Canadian Cattle Industry Development Council requires a $2 check-off per head of 
cattle.   
 
Federal marketing orders originate from State Secretaries and compel all producers to 
contribute funds to their respective associations.  Contributions are often made 
mandatory in an effort to avoid the free-rider problem outlined above, and to correct for 
the perceived underinvestment in advertising.  Producer associations assert that by 
eliciting contributions from all producers, advertising campaigns can be undertaken that 
enhance the welfare of all producers. 
 
Producer contributions are based on output so that those who stand to benefit most from 
an advertising campaign contribute a larger share of the budget.  For example, beef 
producers contribute a fixed amount per head of cattle and milk producers contribute a 
fixed amount per volume of produced milk. 
 
Contributions are spent on a variety of advertising media, including television, print and 
radio.  A classic example of generic commodity advertising is “Pork, the other white 
meat.”  This type of advertising aims to increase pork demand at the expense of pork 
substitutes, usually other meats (Alston, Freebairn and James).   
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3.3. Measuring Advertising Effectiveness 
3.3.1. The Importance of Accurate Appraisal 
There are several policy and welfare reasons for accurate appraisal of the effectiveness 
of advertising expenditures.  An outline of the most important reasons follows.  First, 
like any private firm that would evaluate the return to advertising expenditures, grower 
associations should likewise be interested in the success of their marketing efforts 
relative to the amount invested.  Growers who contribute funds to association coffers 
should seek some assurance that their funds are being used effectively.  The US$1000 
(Hayes) that farmers contribute leads to higher total cost, and should be of interest to 
any profit-maximising producer.  If production costs are rising, then the producer 
should expect to be compensated by higher prices.  Furthermore, prices must rise 
sufficiently to more than offset the increase in production costs associated with the 
advertising program.  That is, total revenue less total costs before advertising must be 
less than total revenue less total cost (including the advertising cost) after advertising.  
Otherwise there exists no motivation for a producer to contribute to a promotional 
campaign.   
 
Producer associations have not been successful in convincing all of their members that 
check-off funds are in the best interest of all growers.  There have been numerous cases 
(see Crespi for an overview of several such cases) in which producers were pursued in 
court by their respective associations for non-payment of mandated contributions.  
Some of the legal cases in the US have rested on the argument that forced contribution 
is a violation of a grower’s First Constitutional Amendment right of free association - 
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that is, growers are being compelled to associate with their competitors via common 
advertising campaigns.  However, it is likely that a producer belief that check-off 
programs are just not worth the cost underlies many of these cases.  Another possibility 
is that non-compliant growers are simply trying to free-ride on their colleagues’ 
promotion efforts.  Either way, the effectiveness of advertising efforts is material to 
such cases. 
 
The government, who must initially approve federal marketing orders, shares a common 
interest in measuring the success of marketing programs.  However, the government’s 
interest in advertising effectiveness goes beyond the desire to know if promotional 
campaigns increase demand for advertised products.  Specifically, if increased demand 
for one product (beef) comes at the direct expense of decreased demand for a competing 
product (pork) then the government must be choosing one industry to support over 
another.  This phenomenon is what Alston, Freebairn and James refer to as “beggar-thy-
neighbour” advertising.  Such a choice is sure to be contentious among producers of 
competing products.   
 
Even if a government agency were able to justify supporting one group of producers at 
the expense of another, the potential for a negative or zero-sum result (if market growth 
due to advertising in one market just offsets market contraction in another) presents 
another problem.  If the impacts of advertising just offset each other, then the costs of 
the advertising campaign generate a negative-sum result.  Consider a meat industry with 
two products, beef and pork.  If beef successfully increases demand through advertising 
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and pork demand falls by a corresponding amount, then the net benefit to the meat 
industry is negative.  Total demand in the industry is unchanged, however beef 
producers have contributed to a marketing program, thus increasing their costs.  
Furthermore, the administration of, and response to, advertising campaigns is sure to 
involve adjustment and transaction costs.  If a campaign is successful in increasing 
demand, then the affected industry must increase production.  Contrarily, the industry 
that faces decreased demand must decrease production.  Non-zero adjustment costs 
result in negative net welfare effects for an otherwise zero-sum endeavour.  
Government involvement in a program that yields negative benefits is questionable in 
terms of net social welfare. 
 
3.3.2. Techniques of Estimating Advertising Effectiveness 
There exists a considerable literature that attempts to measure the effectiveness of 
commodity and generic advertising.  The literature ranges from theoretical and technical 
attempts to advance the state of the art (see, for example, Baye, Jansen and Lee) to 
applied studies that focus on the returns to advertising in specific industries (for 
examples see Boetel and Liu or Piggott, et al.).  This section outlines the most important 
and commonly used methods, and the following section critiques them in turn. 
 
Perhaps the oldest and simplest method of evaluating consumer responses to advertising 
is market research.  Producer groups survey consumers to assess the level of awareness 
for an existing advertising campaign.  Such surveys may ask if consumers are aware of 
a campaign and ask whether responses are positive or negative.  Market research is 
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qualitative and does not provide a quantitative estimate of the effects of advertising on 
demand or profits.   
 
One of the most common methods of estimating advertising effects is to estimate 
single-equation structural demand models.  Some measure of demand (revenue, volume 
sales or consumption expenditures) is the dependent variable and exogenous variables 
such as income, demographic information and price are independent variables.  To 
account for advertising, an independent variable that measures advertising expenditures 
is added to the equation.  Advertising elasticities can be derived to quantify the effects 
of advertising on demand.  Some examples of this methodology include Kinnucan, 
Chang and Venkateswaran and Lenz, Kaiser and Chung. 
 
Kinnucan proposes a method to evaluate the effects of advertising on interrelated 
markets.  Kinnucan develops a Muth-type disequilibrium model34 that includes 
advertising as an exogenous variable.  The model takes the form 
 
 1112121111 lnlnlnln AdBPdNPdNQd ++−=  (3.1) 
 
 1212221212 lnlnlnln AdBPdNPdNQd −−=   (3.2) 
 
                                                 
34 Muth disequilibrium models consist of differential equations, often in demand, that illustrate 
relationships between changing prices, or other exogenous variables, and demand.  See Muth (1965) for 
an exposition of the model. 
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ii PQ ,  and  represent quantities, prices and advertising expenditures for good , and 
 and  are elasticities.  The structural equations in (3.1) and (3.2) can be solved for 
reduced-form equations that provide estimates of how a change in advertising affects 
prices or quantities.  Kinnucan applies his model to the US beef market using 
elasticities that were estimated in another empirical study. 
iA i
iiN iiB
 
The Kinnucan model’s main insight is its recognition of the importance of product 
substitutability in determining the effectiveness of advertising.  Specifically, a positive 
own-advertising elasticity (ie: ) is no guarantee that advertising increases own price.  
If the differential equations in (3.1) and (3.2) are solved for , then the resulting sign 
is indeterminate and depends on the size of price, cross-advertising and supply 
elasticities.  If, for example,  is large enough then, a fall in  could be large enough 
to increase demand for good 2 and decrease demand for its substitute, good 1.  The 
increase in  initiated by increased advertising could be offset, or even reversed.  
Kinnucan describes this possibility as the result of spillover, or feedback, effects 
between substitutes. 
iiB
1ln P
21B 2P
1P
 
Demand systems have become academic economists’ favourite method for estimating 
the effects of advertising.  The Rotterdam model (Thiel) and Deaton and Muellbauer's 
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) are the most common.  System methods allow 
demand for a group of separable goods to be estimated together, while accounting for 
substitution effects that Kinnucan outlines in his disequilibrium model.  The specific 
properties and desirable attributes of system methods (specifically the AIDS) are 
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expounded in chapter 3.5, however system methods share a common approach.  
Demand is modeled as a function of price, income, advertising expenditure and other 
exogenous variables.  System estimation produces price and advertising elasticities to 
quantify the effects of advertising on all goods in the estimated system.   
 
Demand systems have evolved to allow for dynamic adjustment processes.  Anderson 
and Blundell's (1982) dynamic adjustment AIDS model includes, as an independent 
variable, a disequilibrium term that is measured by the difference between predicted 
demand and observed demand in the previous period.  This type of adjustment 
framework theorises that short-run changes in demand respond to deviations of 
observed demand from predicted demand.  The differences between dynamic 
adjustment AIDS models and the model developed in this essay are explained more 
fully in chapter 3.5. 
 
A more recent approach to evaluate the effects of advertising uses time-series 
econometrics.  Cavaliere and Tassinari test for long-run causality relationships between 
advertising and demand by means of a vector error correction (VEC) model.  This 
model tests for and establishes the nonstationarity of price, demand and advertising data 
and estimates vector auto regression relationships (in error-correction form) between 
them.  Variables are then tested for exogeneity as a means of determining each 
variable’s influence on other variables in the system.  The primary contribution of this 
technique is to recognise the important time-series properties of the data used in 
estimation. 
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 3.3.3. Problem with measurement methods 
This section evaluates the measurement methods discussed in section 3.3.2 and 
concludes with some general measurement problems that apply to all techniques. 
 
The primary benefit of market research is that investigators can formulate specific 
questions and pose them directly to consumers.  Market research does not rely on 
aggregate market-level data and can provide detailed information about how consumers 
respond to specific advertising campaigns.  Despite this advantage, market research is 
not a viable option for evaluating an advertising campaign on anything larger than a 
very local scale.  Polling and questionnaires are costly, and acquiring a large enough 
representative sample for anything more than a local campaign would be a daunting and 
expensive task.  However, if one assumes that consumers are rational, optimising 
agents, then market level data should suffice to explain consumer responses to 
advertising.  If (granted, a big “if”) comprehensive consumption, price and advertising 
data were available, then consumer responses to advertising could be estimated using a 
sound empirical model.   
 
A more fundamental problem with market research is that surveys and questionnaires 
do not provide information that is required for policy decisions.  Such research is 
qualitative in that it relates information about whether consumers respond to 
advertising.  Policy decisions are enhanced by quantitative information on how much an 
advertising campaign affects consumer responses.  Market research could be augmented 
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to include contingent valuation, but the problems of cost and inadequate scope remain.  
Furthermore, market research is unable to control for the effects of other factors that 
may change demand.  That is, ceteris paribus conditions cannot be enforced in a market 
research study.   
 
Single equation structural demand models are appealing for two reasons.  The first is 
that demand for each good can be modeled independently to include just those variables 
deemed necessary to determine demand for that good.  The same group of independent 
variables need not be used for estimating demand functions for different goods (as is the 
case in some system methods of estimation).  A second advantage is computational 
ease.   
 
The advantages of single equation models are outweighed by the disadvantages.  The 
primary disadvantage is that information is wasted which results in less efficient 
estimators (Greene).  If a group of goods are related through substitution, then the error 
terms in each goods’ demand function are likely to be related.  For example, exogenous 
shocks that affect demand for one good may affect demand for closely related products.  
System methods can use this information to improve estimation.  Furthermore, single-
equation models are not consistent with consumer theory.  Since single-equation 
demand models are not derived from an underlying utility or cost function, their 
specification is ad hoc and may be fragile (Piggott, et al.). 
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Kinnucan’s disequilibrium model has the advantage of being simple, but it relies on 
elasticity estimates from other models.  However, Kinnucan’s article seems more an 
exposition of the problems associated with ignoring substitution effects than it does an 
attempt to estimate the market effects of advertising.  Its primary contribution is to 
develop the analytical framework in which to recognise intra-market substitution 
effects. 
 
System models possess several advantages.  The first is that system methods allow the 
introduction of information variables without compromising the systems’ theoretical 
integrity (see chapter 3.5 for an outline of the AIDS’ theoretical properties).  For 
example advertising expenditure, used as a proxy for advertising information, can be 
added to a demand system without affecting the parameter restrictions required to 
ensure consistency with consumer theory.  Other variables such as health information 
(Boetel and Liu) or media information (Burton and Young) can be added in a similar 
fashion. 
 
A second reason for analysing advertising within the context of a system is that 
estimation is done using system techniques.  Such a setting is ideal for examining the 
cross-price and cross-advertising effects on substitutable goods within a weakly 
separable group.  Estimating advertising responses using single-equation methods may 
waste information that is common to all equations.  This information is more usefully 
applied in system estimation.  
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Hayes notes that estimating advertising effects in a system does impose a particularly 
strict constraint, however.  Specifically, if the budget constraint is binding, then a zero-
sum game is imposed.  An advertising-induced increase in demand for one good must 
be offset by a corresponding decrease in demand for another good(s) in the estimated 
separable group.  This restriction is illustrated in chapter 3.6.  Another possible 
drawback of system estimation is that a misspecification in one equation is imposed on 
all equations in the system.35  However, if one equation in a system is specified 
correctly, then it is likely that all are specified correctly.  The independent variables in a 
demand function for, say, beef are likely to be the same as those in a demand function 
for chicken.  This risk is likely outweighed by the statistical advantages of estimating 
demand equations in system form.   
 
The chief benefit of the VEC analysis of advertising is that it handles properly the time-
series characteristics of demand, price and advertising data.  Most of these economic 
time series are non-stationary, and must be modelled accordingly.  This issue is 
discussed in more detail in chapter 3.4.   
 
Data problems are common across empirical economic studies, but there a few that are 
specific to advertising studies.  First, MacDonald and Gould argue that by using 
advertising expenditures as an independent variable, the effectiveness of all advertising 
methods (i.e. print vs. television) are treated as homogeneous; such a treatment may 
generate biased estimates.  If advertising markets are efficient, however, then relatively 
effective advertising methods are priced higher than relatively ineffective methods.  
                                                 
35 System methods require that all equations contain the same exogenous variables. 
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Higher expenditure on advertising can be interpreted as either more purchases of less 
efficient methods, or fewer purchases of more efficient methods.  As such, the 
effectiveness of advertising is implicit in its price and aggregating different types of 
advertising expenditures should not pose too large a problem.   
 
Another data-related problem in advertising studies is the probable underreporting of 
advertising expenditure.  Most studies utilise expenditures by grower or commodity 
associations as an independent variable.  While such expenditure likely accounts for a 
large share of commodity advertising, it neglects all advertising that is funded by other 
sources.  For example, advertising by a local commodity retailer (e.g. a grocery store 
advertising meat) would be excluded from the independent advertising expenditure 
variable.  This amounts to a measurement error of the independent variable and results 
in biased parameter estimates.  Such is the nature of advertising data, and one can only 
hope that reported data provides a good approximation of the actual data so that the 
estimation bias is limited.   
 
Finally, all of the aforementioned methods (other than VEC analysis) neglect the time-
series properties of the relevant data36.  The consequences of ignoring the data’s time-
series properties are detailed in chapter 3.4.  The importance of accurately modelling 
the long-run properties of the estimated data is particularly important in advertising 
studies.  The time-series behaviour of prices in a demand system can provide important 
                                                 
36 Dynamic adjustment AIDS models accommodate possible nonstationarity of the underlying data, but 
do not correctly model possible long-run relationships between variables.  This point is addressed in 
greater detail in chapter 3.5. 
 168
insight into the effects of advertising in that market.  This point is discussed in detail in 
chapter 3.4. 
 
This essay develops a model that captures the beneficial aspects of the aforementioned 
methods, while attempting to minimise the drawbacks.  The model is a demand system, 
so as to take advantage of desirable econometric properties and remain consistent with 
consumer theory.  The model also considers the time-series properties of the data and 
models long-term relationships between variables.  Doing so improves estimation and, 
more importantly, provides insight into the long-term dynamics in the estimated market.   
 
3.4. The Importance of Dynamics and Time-Series Properties 
3.4.1. Short-Run and Long-Run Effects 
Static demand models provide parameter estimates that can be used to generate short-
run elasticities.  Such elasticities are frequently used to guide policy decisions on 
funding of commodity promotion programs.  When making a policy decision, however, 
it is important to consider that the long-run effects of an advertising campaign may 
differ significantly from the short-run effects.  Long-run demand and supply curves are 
generally flatter and more elastic than their short-run counterparts, and any 
comprehensive study of the effectiveness of an advertising campaign that involves long-
term financial commitments from producers should consider long-run effects.  A simple 
representation of the difference between short and long-run effects is illustrated in 
figure 3.2.  Static supply and demand graphs are not entirely adequate tools for 
analysing the relevant dynamics, but some key points can be gleaned from graphical 
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comparative statics.  The initial equilibrium is characterised by price  and the 
corresponding short and long-run demand and supply curves.  If a producer association 
initiates an advertising campaign for their product, new costs are imposed on producers, 
shifting supply curves to retail up to  and .  If the advertising campaign is 
successful in affecting consumer tastes, then demand curves shift up to  and .  
The new short-run equilibrium price is .  Over the long-term horizon, however, 
consumers have time to adjust their spending patterns and price competition from close 
substitutes pares away at demand for the promoted product.  This is represented by a 
more elastic long-run demand curve.  Long run price settles at 
0P
1
SRS
1
LRS
1
SRD
1
LRD
1P
2P , where long-run 
demand and supply intersect.   
 
The dynamics described above are a different phenomenon from advertising wearout.  
Advertising wearout (as described by Kinnucan, Chang and Venkateswaran) describes 
how advertising loses effectiveness over time because consumers become less 
responsive to promotional information.  The response is psychological in nature, and is 
not related to price competition from close substitutes.  Advertising wearout could 
affect a product with no substitutes.  Consider a theoretical product that undergoes an 
advertising campaign that is successful in altering consumer tastes and shifting up short-
run demand.  If this campaign varies over time and is able to prevent advertising 
wearout, then consumer tastes do not change back to their pre-advertising state.  Long-
run demand shifts up along with short-run demand.  If the promoted product has close 
substitutes, however, then price competition may pare away at demand.  This is 
analogous to comparing a downward shifting short-run demand curve due to changing 
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tastes to a downwards shifting short-run demand due to the fall in price of a substitute 
good.  Wearout theory corresponds with the former and the effects of close substitutes 
the latter.   
 
The effects of advertising wearout can be illustrated in figure 3.2.  The initial 
advertising campaign alters consumer tastes and shifts short-run demand from  to 
.  Short-run equilibrium price is 
0
SRD
1
SRD
1P .  Note that long-run demand does not shift in 
the case of advertising wearout because the initial change in consumer tastes “wears 
off” over the long-term horizon.  Long-run supply does, however, shift up to reflect the 
advertising levy imposed on producers.  Once the effects of advertising wearout have 
taken hold and consumers have had the opportunity to adjust their spending patterns to 
account for cheaper substitutes, the long-run equilibrium price of 3P  prevails at the 
intersection of  and . 0LRD
1
LRS
 
Supply-side market dynamics can also render advertising less effective over the long-
term horizon.  Refer again to figure 3.2, where the industry begins at price  and zero 
profits.  An advertising campaign successfully shifts short-run demand up and leads to 
higher prices (
0P
1P ).  Assuming low entry barriers, profit opportunity is a signal for firms 
to enter the industry.  Firms enter over the long-term horizon, which is reflected by the 
relatively elastic long-run supply curve.  Price falls back to 2P  over the long-run 
horizon (or back to 3P  if there is advertising wearout).    
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The important point to be drawn from this analysis is that the short-run effects of 
advertising may differ from the long-run effects; that is, short-run advertising 
elasticities may differ from long-run advertising elasticities.  Any promotional 
campaign that requires continued funding from producers, such as a per-year check off 
system, should consider that the short-run impacts of the campaign may change as 
market dynamics unfold.   
 
3.4.2. Time-Series Properties, Cointegration and Error Correction 
Static demand models do not properly test for, or accommodate, the time-series 
properties of the data used in demand system estimation.  The potential for 
nonstationary and cointegrated data series presents an additional challenge to the 
estimation of demand systems.  This section outlines the importance of overcoming this 
challenge. 
 
Most economic time-series data are non-stationary in levels.   That is, the data are not 
characterized by a constant mean or variance over time.  This is a violation of classical 
econometric assumptions, and modeling non-stationary data using classical econometric 
techniques can lead to spurious regression results (Granger and Newbold).  Structural 
demand models that utilise such data must accommodate the time-series properties in 
order to avoid problems with parameter inference.  Specifically, the t and F statistics 
obtained from a spurious regression tend to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship 
between variables too often, when in fact there is no meaningful relationship.  A 
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possible result of a spurious regression would be to attribute statistical significance to 
advertising, when there may exist no such significant relationship.   
 
If data used in a demand system are nonstationary, then cointegration theory provides a 
method by which to analyse several non-stationary variables taken together.  A group of 
variables may each be non-stationary, but they might share a non-stationary trend.  It is 
possible that a linear combination of these non-stationary variables is stationary.  This 
can be formally stated by the following:  if ( )nttt XXX ,...,1=  are non-stationary 
variables and integrated of order one, then there may exist up to   vectors )1( −n 1×n β  
such that ntnttt XXXX ββββ +++= ...2211  is stationary.  If so, then the variables in  
are cointegrated of order (1,1).  The cointegrating vectors 
tX
β  describe the variables’ 
long-run relationships with each other. 
 
A few important points are worth noting about cointegrated variables.  First, a group of 
cointegrated variables need not move in a predictable manner.  Rather, a linear 
combination of cointegrated variables should be stationary, even if each individual 
series is not.  Second, cointegrated variables need not be equal to each other.  One series 
can be permanently above (or below) all others, but such variables must be 
proportionally constant in the long run.  Finally, cointegration does not mean that 
variables cannot deviate from their long-run equilibrium relationships.  Just that when 
they do, market forces intervene in such a manner so as to return variables to their 
cointegrated equilibrium.  Deviations can occur, but are temporary.  This can be stated 
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more formally by noting that cointegration does not require that 0=tXβ  in every 
period, just that tt eX =β , and  is stationary. te
 
The establishment of cointegration between variables provides information that is 
valuable in estimating a structural relationship between variables.  In fact, if a group of 
variables are cointegrated, then estimating a structural relationship without accounting 
for long-run dynamics amounts to a serious specification error (Enders).  If a group of 
variables share a long-run equilibrium, then the variables’ short-term dynamics should 
be, in part, influenced by the variables’ relationships to their long-run equilibriums.  
Correcting for such a misspecification should improve model performance.  
Specifically, parameter estimates and elasticities may be more in line with theoretical 
expectations and will certainly be more econometrically sound.  This is particularly 
relevant to demand systems, where counterintuitive results (positive own-price and 
negative own-advertising elasticities) are common. 
 
Error-correction (EC) models allow structural and autoregressive models to 
accommodate the influence of a long-run equilibrium relationship on short-term 
dynamics.  Once a cointegrating relationship between variables is estimated, then each 
period’s deviation from the long-run equilibrium can be calculated.  This deviation, 
called the EC term, can then be introduced into a regression equation that explains a 
variable’s short-run dynamics.  Intuitively, if a system of cointegrated variables is out of 
equilibrium in period t, then the system should respond in period t+1 to move the 
system towards the long-run equilibrium.   
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 A general error-correction model (ECM) takes the form: 
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Y are dependent variables, X are contemporaneous independent and lagged dependent 
and independent variables.  Y and X are cointegrated with each other and Z are 
exogenous (independent variables that are not cointegrated with Y and X) variables.  r is 
the number of cointegrating vectors.  1−ktµ  are lagged cointegrating vectors (or 
cointegrating terms) and ikλ , ijδ  and ilγ  are parameters.  ∆  is the difference operator. 
 
Equation (3.3) is written so that both sides are stationary.  The variables in Y are 
presumed to be integrated of order one, or I(1), so that the first difference of Y is I(0), or 
stationary.  As such, the left-hand-side of (3.3) is stationary.  The 1−ktµ  terms are the 
residual errors from the cointegrating relationships between Y and X, and are therefore 
stationary.  The variables in X and Z are also presumed to be I(1), so that their first-
differences are stationary.   
 
The model in (3.3) contains all stationary variables, as well as an EC term that accounts 
for the long-run dynamics of cointegrated variables.  As such, (3.3) can be estimated 
using conventional techniques (least squares, seemingly unrelated regression, etc.) 
without concern of spurious regression.  Equation (3.3) states that short-run changes in 
 175
the dependent variable Y are functions of changes in other dependent variables, changes 
in independent variables and the size of the system’s deviation from its long-run 
equilibrium in the previous period.  If the system is out of equilibrium in period ( )1−t , 
then changes in the dependent variable, Y , respond through the parameter λ . 
 
3.4.3. Error-Correction and Agricultural Commodities 
Demand systems are dynamic in nature.  Advertising campaigns are unveiled over 
several periods, and consumers react with lagged responses.  Market dynamics such as 
changing prices and shifting demand and supply curves unfold over time, making the 
problem of analysing advertising effectiveness a dynamic one.  As such, the importance 
of investigating cointegrating relationships in advertising models goes beyond the 
econometric benefits of better statistical fits and corrections for misspecification errors.  
The existence of a long-run relationship between variables provides insight into the 
intra-market dynamics between substitutable products.  This section outlines the 
importance and identification of these dynamics.   
 
Advertising expenditures are made with the intention of providing consumers with 
information that changes their tastes, thereby shifting out the demand curve.  The goal is 
a higher price and higher profitability.  Shifting out the demand curve is contingent on 
the ability to differentiate one’s product from close substitutes.  Differentiating among a 
group of goods that includes, say, different brands of cars may be feasible.  Even though 
such goods are often treated as a weakly separable group in demand systems, their 
characteristics differ enough that price is not the only differentiating factor.  Certain 
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groups of close substitutes, however, may not be so differentiable.  Consumers may be 
readily willing to substitute one good for another based primarily on relative price 
changes.  For example, consumers may choose to purchase pork instead of beef based 
on relative prices.  Such nearly homogeneous goods are referred to as “closely 
substitutable commodities” (CSCs) through the remainder of this essay.  The 
presumption is that the relative demand for one CSC over another CSC depends chiefly 
on relative prices.  Beef and pork, for example, are likely to be CSCs. 
 
If products can be categorised as CSCs then one would believe, a priori, that marketing 
programs intended to shift out the demand curve would be difficult propositions.  Even 
if an advertising campaign were successful in increasing a single commodity’s price in 
the short run by changing tastes and shifting out the short-run demand curve, market 
forces would act to bring its price back in line with those of its close substitutes over the 
long term.  CSC prices, then, cannot diverge too far from a long-run equilibrium course 
before market forces intervene to return prices the equilibrated course of close 
substitutes.  A short run demand and price effect may be observable (as illustrated in the 
model of figure 3.2), but as consumers alter their consumption patterns and substitute 
away from the now relatively higher priced CSC, there is downward pressure on 
demand and price for the advertised product.   
 
The question facing policy makers is how to determine if a product can be categorised 
as a CSC.  If it can, then it stands to reason that increasing profits by means of a 
marketing program may be difficult over the long-run horizon.  As Gordon, Hannesson 
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and Kerr point out, a preliminary test of whether a product is a CSC37 may be 
worthwhile in evaluating an advertising campaign's probable success.  Gordon, 
Hannesson and Kerr argue that CSCs are generally thought to be homogeneous and 
interchangeable, however a simple assertion that a product fits these characteristics may 
not be sufficient to warrant a decision about a potentially large-scale marketing 
campaign involving producer, processor and government funds.  A testable definition of 
“CSC” is required.   
 
Gordon, Hannesson and Kerr provide an insightful solution.  If markets for multiple 
goods are related as CSCs, then there should exist a long-run equilibrium relationship 
between their prices.  That is, prices for CSCs should be cointegrated with each other.  
If the price of a cointegrated CSC deviates from its long-run equilibrium relationship 
with other CSC prices, then market forces act to return that price to its equilibrium 
course. 
 
It is possible that a promotional campaign successfully differentiates a promoted 
product from its substitutes, resulting in a permanent demand shift.  For example, a crop 
may be found to have beneficial health attributes over and above its substitutes.  Such 
information, if related to consumers, could render the product no longer a CSC - there 
are no close substitutes to pare away at the higher level of demand.  Likewise, if the 
relevant industry is characterised by significant entry barriers, then the long-run supply 
                                                 
37 Gordon, Hannesson and Kerr use the word “commodity” where this essay uses “CSC”.  Given the 
ambiguity about the definition of a commodity, CSC will be used throughout this essay. 
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may not be much more elastic than short-run supply.  Price does not fall back as much 
in the long run.   
 
It is also possible for a demand shock to break the cointegrated link between products 
that might have once been considered CSCs through, for example, discovery of a new 
use for an agricultural commodity (corn for ethanol production, for example).  A new 
source of demand may emerge and price will not follow its once-cointegrated path.  A 
preliminary test for cointegration among CSCs is, therefore, only useful from an 
historical perspective.  That is, a finding of cointegration between prices tells us that the 
analysed products have shared a long-run relationship in the past.   
 
There exists a natural synergy between the cointegration relationships described above 
and the type of advertising demand models that are frequently estimated for use in 
agricultural policy decisions.  Most advertising demand models collect a group of goods 
together in a system and treat them as a weakly separable set of products.  Though the 
assumption of separability is not sufficient to categorise a product as a CSC, testing for 
cointegration among prices for weakly separable goods (such as the groups of goods 
analysed in AIDS models) is particularly intuitive.  As Rickertsen, Chalfant and Steen 
point out, the demand for a good within a weakly separable group depends only on the 
prices of the goods within the group and total expenditure on the group.  It is reasonable 
to believe that if the price of one product in a separable group experiences a positive 
price shock, then consumers substitute away from that product and towards cheaper 
substitutes over the long-term horizon.  The closer is the degree of substitutability, the 
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larger is this effect.  The error-correction term from equation (3.3) accounts for this 
effect in an empirical model.  If prices are cointegrated and one price deviates from its 
cointegrated path, then the demand system’s variables respond to the deviation through 
the parameter on the error-correction term.   
 
An error-correction term is likely to play a particularly important role in estimating the 
differences between short-run and long-run elasticities.  The closer is the degree of 
substitutability between products, the more consumers adapt their spending patterns 
over the long run in response to relative price differences.  Short and long-run 
elasticities are therefore likely to differ more for CSCs than for products with no close 
substitutes.  For this reason it is important to observe both short and long-run elasticities 
from a demand model that incorporates error-correction techniques when making policy 
decisions about closely substitutable agricultural commodities.   
 
3.5. Model 
This chapter describes the derivation of the traditional AIDS model and introduces a 
range of methods to incorporate advertising as an explanatory variable.  The 
advertising-augmented AIDS model is then adapted to account for cointegrated 
variables by putting the model in error-correction form.   
 
3.5.1. AIDS Model Derivation 
Deaton and Muellbauer’s AIDS is a researcher favourite in applied economics.  The 
AIDS is used for all manner of applications, including computation of price and income 
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elasticities, as well as estimating consumer responses to information variables that are 
introduced into the AIDS’ underlying utility functions.  It is the ability to introduce 
exogenous information variables, as well as its consistency with consumer optimisation 
behavioural assumptions, that have made the AIDS such a popular research tool.  A 
brief outline of the AIDS derivation is presented below, and is from Deaton and 
Muellbauer’s source article.     
 
The AIDS model is derived from the PIGLOG class of cost functions38, which defines 
the minimum expenditure required to attain a given level of utility at fixed prices.  The 
cost function is defined as 
 
 )}(ln{)}(ln{)1(),(ln pbupaupuc +−= . (3.4) 
 
u  lies between 0 (implying that the consumer is just achieving subsistence) and 1 
(consumer is achieving bliss).  Functional forms are assigned to  and , with 
enough parameters to allow the AIDS to be flexible.  That is, enough parameters so that 
the cost function’s derivatives can be set equal to an arbitrary cost function. 
)( pa )( pb
 
 ∑∑∑ ++=
k j
jkkj
k
kk pppapa lnln2
1ln)}(ln{ *0 γα  (3.5) 
 
                                                 
38 The PIGLOG class of cost functions are derived from “price independent generalised linear” budget 
share equations.  Specific selection of the functional forms is required for practical application.  See 
Deaton and Muellbauer for a discussion of these forms and of the aggregation properties of the PIGLOG 
cost functions. 
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and  
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These functions are inserted into (3.4) to obtain the AIDS cost function 
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Corresponding AIDS demand equations are obtained by Shephard’s Lemma. 
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where  represents good i’s budget share.  The expenditure function in (3.7) can be 
solved for u and substituted into (3.8) to yield the AIDS budget share equations as 
functions of P and X (total expenditure).   
iw
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where P is a price index, defined by  
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Three groups of parameter restrictions are imposed when estimating (3.9) to ensure 
theoretical consistency.   
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These restrictions ensure that budget shares sum to one (i.e. ). ∑
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Equation (3.13) ensures that the demand functions are homogenous of degree 0 (i.e. cost 
function is homogenous of degree 1).   
 
 jiij γγ =  . (3.14) 
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Equation (3.14) guarantees Slutsky symmetry of cross partial price derivatives.   
 
The system in (3.9) can be estimated by either maximum likelihood or Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression method (Zellner).   
 
The AIDS assumes a two-stage budgeting process in which consumers allocate income 
to a specified group of goods (the X in equation (3.9)) and then decide expenditures 
within that group.  Demand for each good depends on the price of other goods in the 
group, and not prices of goods from other groups.  Goods ni ,,1K=  comprise a weakly 
separable group.   
 
It should be noted that the AIDS, as outlined above, is nonlinear in parameters.  The 
price coefficients in equation (3.10) interact with the real income coefficient ( iβ ) in 
equation (3.9), resulting in a nonlinear system.  It is common practice to replace (3.10) 
with a linear approximation, defined as  
 
  (3.10a) ∑=
k
kk pwP lnln
*
 
The linear, or Stone's, price index allows for linear estimation of the AIDS.   
 
3.5.2. Advertising in the AIDS 
Three methods of measuring advertising effectiveness in the AIDS are most popular 
among researchers.  However, a few points about all methods are worth noting.  All 
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three of these methods use advertising expenditure as the independent variable.  Also, 
each method can be linearised using Stone’s price index in place of equation (3.10).  
The restrictions in (3.12), (3.13) and (3.14) can be imposed on the advertising-
augmented systems to ensure theoretical integrity.  A further restriction must be 
imposed on advertising coefficients to guarantee that shares sum to one.  Also, lagged 
advertising variables can be inserted into all three of the forthcoming models.  Lagged 
advertising variables act as proxies for consumers’ accumulation of information over 
several periods. 
 
The application of AIDS models to advertising has taken three primary forms (see 
Kinnucan, Thompson and Chang for a more detailed presentation of the following 
methods).  In the first, advertising expenditures directly affect the share equation 
intercepts.  The second method allows advertising expenditures to “deflate” prices 
throughout the share equations and the last method augments the price index of (3.10) 
with an advertising term.  A brief outline of each methodology follows. 
 
Modifying the share intercept 
The first method allows advertising expenditures to affect a base level of consumption.  
Introducing advertising as an addition to the share equations’ intercepts does this, while 
maintaining the AIDS’ desirable properties.  As such, advertising is presumed to act 
directly on consumer demand, and not indirectly through prices.  This method of 
incorporating advertising is the most popular in applied studies - see Piggott, et al., 
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Rickertsen, Chalfant and Steen, and Boetel and Liu for examples.  The relevant 
consumer expenditure function is  
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Shephard’s lemma applied to (3.15) yields the estimable share equations 
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Advertising as a price deflator 
This method allows advertising expenditures to act directly on consumers’ perceptions 
of product prices.  That is, advertising “deflates” observed prices, acting directly 
(through price terms) and indirectly (through the real income term) on the consumer’s 
expenditure function.  Weighted (by the iδ term) advertising expenditures are subtracted 
from price terms in the cost function of equation (3.4) to give 
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where  represents advertising expenditure on good k.  Applying Shephard’s lemma 
to (3.17) yields share equation
kA
s 
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where the price index is now defined as  
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Advertising’s deflationary effect can be seen by rewriting the price terms as 
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An example of this method can be found in Green, Carman and McManus. 
 
Advertising-augmented price index 
A third alternative is to augment the AIDS price index with advertising terms.  The 
price index in (3.10) can include advertising terms so that  
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The specification in (3.21) seems counterintuitive (Green, Carman and McManus).  As 
advertising expenditure appears in the denominator of the real income term in the share 
equations, advertising can only have a positive effect on good i's budget share if Ai and 
lnP are inversely related (ie: 0<iδ ).  Furthermore, iβ  is expected to be negative for 
necessities.  So even if Ai and lnP are inversely related (so that real income rises as 
advertising expenditures rise), advertising only has a positive effect for luxuries.  See 
Green, Carman and McManus for an example of this methodology.  
 
3.5.3. The Error-Correction AIDS Model 
The prospect of a cointegrated equilibrium among prices begs the question of whether 
static demand-based studies of advertising effectiveness produce shortsighted 
conclusions.  Consider a static AIDS model that estimates significantly positive 
advertising elasticities for a given product in a given spatial market.  It seems possible 
that such studies are capturing the initial shift in demand that leads to a higher price (as 
illustrated in figure 3.2).  The policy conclusion from such a study would be that 
advertising increases price.  Policy makers in another spatial market considering a 
similar program for the same product would recommend pursuing a promotional 
campaign.  Producers could also choose to continue an existing program because it is 
deemed to be successful in affecting demand.   
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If the market dynamics are as illustrated in figure 3.2 (i.e. the advertised good is a 
CSC), however, then the effect may be transitory.  The price eventually returns to its 
cointegrated equilibrium course and profits are eroded.  Since most promotional 
programs involve a long-term financing commitment from participants, costs may 
overtake benefits as market dynamics unfold.  The speed at which these dynamics 
develop can be approximated by means of a VEC model that estimates speed-of-
adjustment parameters.  Speed of adjustment parameters provide an estimate of how 
much of a deviation from long-run equilibrium is corrected in each period.  If the 
adjustment in prices to their long-run equilibrium is fast, then the costs of an advertising 
campaign may quickly overtake the benefits.  
 
Industries that have undertaken promotional campaigns can be analysed using demand-
based models that incorporate advertising expenditure.  Estimated elasticities can 
quantify advertising's effect on consumption.  Any such demand models should, 
however, be sure to investigate the time-series properties of the data and proceed 
accordingly.  If the data are nonstationary, then an error-correction model should be 
pursued.  An ECM produces more econometrically sound results by correcting for a 
misspecification error.  Also, the long-run elasticities provide estimates of how 
consumption responds to an advertising shock after the long-run equilibrium is attained.  
This last point is key in the case of CSCs.  Only long-run advertising elasticities relate 
how demand responds to advertising after the ‘dust has settled’ from the dynamics 
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outlined in figure 3.2.39  The AIDS specifications from section 3.5.2 can be enhanced as 
EC models.  Each model from section 3.5.2 is expressed in error correction form below. 
 
Advertising modifying the share intercept 
 
 11 lnlnln −− +∆+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∆+∆+∆+=∆ ∑∑ tikt
k
iki
j
jtijitiiit AP
Xpww µλδβγπα  (3.22) 
 
All variables in equation (3.22) are as previously defined, and are stationary in the EC 
form.  There are a few key differences between the models in (3.22) and (3.16).  First, 
all variables are first-differenced to account for nonstationarity.  Second, a lagged 
dependent variable is included as an explanatory variable.  It is through the parameter 
on the lagged dependent variable ( iπ ) that long-run elasticities are recovered.  Third, 
the 1−tµ  term is the lagged EC term which represents size of the deviation from the 
cointegrated variables’ long-run equilibrium in period )1( −t .  If the products in the 
demand system are CSCs and their prices are cointegrated, then they share a long-run 
equilibrium.  If there exists a disequilibrium in period )1( −t , then the system’s 
variables respond in period t  to move back towards the long-run equilibrium.  The 
change in  responds to this deviation according to the parameter iw iλ .  Note that if the 
products in the demand system are not CSCs and their prices are not cointegrated, then 
an error-correction term is not included in the model specification.   
 
                                                 
39 Note that short-run elasticities are still useful in evaluating potential temporary benefits of advertising.  
This point is discussed further in chapter 3.8. 
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At this point, it is worth noting the difference between an EC-specified AIDS model 
and a dynamic adjustment AIDS model.  A dynamic adjustment AIDS model (see 
Anderson and Blundell (1984) or Burton and Young for applications of such a model) 
appear similar to equation (3.22) but instead of the error correction term 1−tµ , the 
Anderson and Blundell (1982) version of a dynamic demand system includes the 
adjustment term .  is the predicted value of demand share in period 
, which is formulated by a static demand system.  The current change in share, 
, is a function of current exogenous variables as well as the disequilibrium between 
the predicted share in period 
)( 11
^
−− − itit ww 1
^
−itw
)1( −t
iw∆
)1( −t  and the observed share in period .   )1( −t
 
Underlying the Anderson and Blundell (1982) model is the assumption that there exists 
a steady-state relationship that can be represented by the standard AIDS system of 
equation (3.9).  Any deviation from this steady-state influences the movement of shares 
in future periods.  Put another way, a long-run equilibrium relationship is presumed to 
exist between consumption shares and all right-hand-side variables (prices and real 
income).  This equilibrium relationship is characterised by the parameters in equation 
(3.9).   
 
There are several key difference between the Anderson and Blundell (1982) dynamic 
adjustment AIDS model and an EC-specified AIDS model.  First, most dynamic 
adjustment models are restricted so that the adjustment coefficients are equal for all 
equations in the system (see Burton and Young).  This is too restrictive an assumption, 
since each share may respond differently to a prior disequilibrium.  A second important 
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difference is that dynamic adjustment models do not test for and accommodate the time-
series properties of the underlying data.  Specifically, each variable must be tested for 
stationarity and treated accordingly.  If some of the variables are nonstationary, then 
they must be tested for cointegration and modelled in EC form.  A final difference 
between dynamic adjustment models and EC models is that dynamic adjustment models 
do not explicitly test for cointegrating relationships between nonstationary variables.  
The steady-state relationship of (3.9) is imposed and any deviation from that state is 
presumed to be a disequilibrium.  Modern econometric techniques (which are described 
in chapter 3.4) allow for the explicit testing and estimation of cointegrating 
relationships.  Those variables that are cointegrated should be included in a structural 
demand system as endogenous to the EC dynamic, and those that are not should be 
treated as exogenous. 
 
The two other methods of incorporating advertising into a demand system can be 
transformed into EC form in a similar fashion, and the aforementioned comments apply 
to both.   
 
Advertising as a price deflator 
 
 11 *
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Advertising-augmented price index 
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All of these models can, like their static counterparts, be estimated using Stone’s price 
index as in equation (3.10a).  The long and short-run elasticity derivations for these 
models are presented in the next chapter.   
 
3.6. Application 
This chapter applies the EC advertising-augmented AIDS model of the previous chapter 
to US meat (beef, poultry, pork and fish) data40.  The meat industry is a logical choice 
for this type of study for several reasons.  First, a large share of meat advertising is 
generic, and is initiated at the producer level.  The Beef Industry Council and National 
Pork Producers Council in the US are responsible for promoting the interests of their 
member farmers and account for a large share of meat advertising.  Since most meat 
marketing is done at the producer level, it would seem that producers view their 
products as homogenous.  Such products might be categorised as CSCs.   
                                                 
40 Other markets where the degree of product substitutability is even higher would be better suited to an 
EC AIDS model, however data is scarce.  I had initially hoped to apply this model to the market for 
edible oils, in which there exists a very high degree of substitutability (i.e. corn oil vs. canola oil).  The 
majority of advertising in the edible oils market is done at the firm level, however, and acquiring and 
aggregating such data is beyond the scope of this essay.  
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 Another reason to analyse meats using this model is that supply is flexible.  Several 
models that investigate the effectiveness of advertising are applied to supply-managed 
agricultural industries.  Two common examples are eggs (Reberte, Schmit and Kaiser) 
and dairy (Lenz, Kaiser and Chung).  There is a time lag for supply responses in meat as 
new stock grows, but output is not regulated.  Profit opportunities can be followed by 
firm entry and increased supply over the long run. 
 
The meat data for this study were graciously provided by Professor Brenda Boetel of 
The University of Wisconsin, River Falls.  It comprises quarterly data, from 1976 to 
1993.  Price and consumption data are from Puttman and Allshouse and USDA’s 
Livestock and Poultry Situation and Outlook Report (1976-2002).  Fish consumption 
data are from the USDA’s Economic Research Service, Food Consumption Data 
System.  Advertising expenditure data were obtained from AD $ Summary, published by 
the Leading National Advertisers.  Beef and pork advertising expenditures are those 
reported by the Beef Industry Council and the National Pork Producers Council.   
 
3.6.1. Time-Series Properties of the Data 
The first step in estimation is to establish the time series properties of the data.  
Specifically, all series must be tested for unit roots.  If a unit root is found in any of the 
series, then the demand estimation strategy must reflect the data’s nonstationarity.   
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The system variables are those outlined in equation (3.22): price, advertising 
expenditure, total group expenditure, consumption shares and real group expenditure.  
Advertising expenditures are deflated using the US Bureau of Labour Statistics 
Consumer Price Index.  To account for the development of a stock of advertising 
knowledge and awareness, advertising expenditure is a three-quarter weighted average, 
with weights of 30-40-30 (Boetel and Liu).  Consumption shares are calculated by 
multiplying price times quantity and dividing by group expenditure.  This generates  
variables for the demand equations.  Real income is computed using Stone’s price index 
from equation (3.10a) with share lagged one period.  Note that all preliminary time-
series testing (with the exception of consumption shares) is done in log form since the 
AIDS models are estimated in log form. 
itw
 
i) Unit Root Tests 
The stationarity of the data is evaluated using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.  
A preliminary step to unit root tests is to determine the optimal number of lags to 
include in subsequent ADF tests.  The autocorrelation augmentation factor in the test is 
determined by estimating the equation 
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where ρ  is selected by t-stat significance (i.e. the last lag with a significant t-stat is 
included in subsequent ADF testing).  An alternative is to choose ρ  based on minimum 
Schwarz Information Criterion. 
 
The stepwise methodology developed in Enders is followed in performing ADF tests on 
the data.  The non-standard Dickey-Fuller test statistic is needed only when 
deterministic regressors that are not in the actual data-generating process are included in 
the test equation (3.26).  To ensure that the appropriate test statistic is used, Enders 
recommends the following procedure when the true data-generating process is 
unknown.     
 
1. Test the null hypothesis of 0=γ  (i.e. series contains a unit root) in equation 
(3.26).  The appropriate test statistic is ττ , from table A on page 439 of Enders.  The 
least restrictive model includes a trend ( t ) and drift ( ), and the test has a low power to 
reject the null hypothesis.  If the null is rejected, then one can conclude that the series 
does not contain a unit root and testing is finished here. 
a
 
2. If the null from step 1 is not rejected, then equation (3.26) must be evaluated to 
determine if it contains too many deterministic regressors (since too many regressors 
may have reduced the power of the test in step 1).  To do this, the significance of the 
trend term is tested under the joint hypothesis 02 == γa  using the 3φ  statistic from 
table B on page 440 of Enders.  If the trend is not significant, then proceed to step 3.  If 
the trend is significant, then the presence of a unit root can be tested using the standard 
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normal distribution.  If the null hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected, then one can 
conclude that the series does contain a unit root.  If the null is rejected, then the series 
does not contain a unit root. 
 
3. Estimate equation (3.26) without the trend and test for a unit root using the µτ  
statistic from table A on p. 439 of Enders.  If the null of a unit root is rejected, then the 
series does not have a unit root.  If the null is not rejected, then test the significance of 
the drift term in equation (3.26) using the joint test 00 == γa  and the 1φ  test statistic 
from table B on page 440 of Enders.  If the drift is not significant, then proceed to step 
4.  If the drift is significant, then test for a unit root using the standard normal 
distribution.  If the null of a unit root is rejected, then the series does not have a unit 
root.  If the null is not rejected, then one can conclude that the series contains a unit 
root.   
 
4. Estimate equation (3.26) without the trend and without the drift and test for a 
unit root using the τ  statistic from table A on page 339 of Enders.  If the null of a unit 
root is rejected, then the series has no unit root.  If the null is not rejected, conclude that 
the series contains a unit root.   
 
The aforementioned procedure is first applied to the data in levels.  The stepwise 
procedure on all variables results in the conclusion that all series contain unit roots.  The 
results are quite robust to selection of lag length in equation (3.26) and to significance 
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level in null hypotheses testing.  All modeled variables are, as expected, non-stationary 
in levels.   
 
The next step is to confirm that all series are integrated of the same order.  To do this, 
the same stepwise procedure described above is applied to all series in first-difference 
form.  Testing on all series produces the conclusion that all series are stationary in first-
differences.  That is, all series are integrated of the first order.  It should be noted that 
the testing of two of the series in first difference form is sensitive to the selection of lag 
length ( ρ ).  Specifically, pork advertising expenditure and fish price unit root tests 
depend on lag length.  However visual inspection of the series in first differences 
substantiates the conclusion that the data are stationary in first differences.  The 
empirical investigation proceeds under the assumption that all data are integrated of 
order one. 
 
Now that all series have been identified as being integrated of the same (first) order, 
long-run relationships between the series are investigated and estimated.   
 
ii) Cointegration Tests 
Cointegration between the nonstationary variables in the model is investigated using the 
Johansen procedure.  The Johansen procedure is a multivariate generalisation of the 
Engle-Granger (Engle and Granger) test, which tests for stationary linear combinations 
of nonstationary variables.  The methodology is briefly outlined below.   
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Consider the process 
 
 . (3.27) ttt uYaY += −11
 
Subtracting  from both sides yields 1−tY
 
 .  (3.28) ttt uYaY +−=∆ −11 )1(
 
If , then the process  contains a unit root.  This can be generalised to the 
multivariate case as 
0)1( 1 =−a tY
 
  (3.29) ttt UXAX += −11
 
where  and  are vectors and  is an tX tU )1( ×n 1A )( nn×  matrix of parameters.  As is 
done in equation (3.28), subtract  from both sides to yield 1−tX
 
  (3.30) ttt UXIAX +−=∆ −11 )(
 
 where I is an  identity matrix, or  )( nn×
 
 ttt UXX +=∆ −1π  (3.31) 
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where )( 1 IA −=π .  If the rank of π  is zero, then tt UX =∆ , or  and no 
linear combination of the variables in  is stationary.  That is, the variables in  are 
not cointegrated.  If, however, the rank of 
ttt UXX += −1
X X
π  is positive then there exists at least one 
linear combination of the variables in  that is stationary.  So the rank of X π  is equal to 
the number of independent cointegrating vectors for the variables . X
 
This process can be generalised further to account for an autoregressive process.   
 
 ttttt UXAXAXAX ++++= −−− ρρ...2211 . (3.32) 
 
Adding and subtracting  to (3.32) yields 1+−ρρ tXA
 
 tttttt UXAXAAXAXAX +∆−++++= +−−−−−− 1112211 )(... ρρρρρ . (3.33) 
 
Successively continuing this process results in  
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is the number of independent cointegrating vectors.  The Johansen procedure uses the 
fact that the rank of a matrix is equal to the number of characteristic roots that are not 
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equal to zero.  Characteristic roots are estimated, and then tested to evaluate how many 
are significantly different from zero.  This provides the number of cointegrating vectors 
for the variables . X
 
The Johansen procedure is followed as outlined in Enders.  Like the earlier ADF 
stepwise procedure, the Johansen methodology is followed in a manner than ascertains 
the best functional form for the estimation of equation (3.34).   
 
The first step is to determine the optimal lag length of the vector autoregression (VAR) 
in equation (3.34).  Optimal lag length is determined by minimising SIC criterion 
among VARs estimated from six lags to one lag.  The SIC is minimised at one lag, and 
values are reported in table 3.1. 
 
Determining the correct form of the deterministic regressors in equation (3.34) is the 
next step.  Specifically, we test for the presence of an intercept in the cointegrating 
vector versus the alternative of an unrestricted drift term.  This is done by estimating 
equation (3.34) with and without an intercept and ordering the set of characteristic roots 
of each equation (  and  respectively).  If the unrestricted form 
(i.e. with no intercept) has  cointegrating vectors, then the statistic  
n
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has a chi-square distribution with )( rn −  degrees of freedom.  The null hypothesis is 
the presence of an intercept in the cointegrating vector, and is rejected.  The calculated 
test statistic is 41.33, which is greater than the chi-square statistic with 5 degrees of 
freedom at all levels of significance.   
 
Now that the optimal number of lags in equation (3.34) and the form of deterministic 
regressors is determined, the cointegrating relationship is estimated.  It should be noted 
that cointegration is investigated between price and consumption shares.  Advertising 
expenditures are treated as exogenous.41
 
Equation (3.34) is estimated using the Johansen test procedure in Eviews.  As 
determined in the previous testing, one lag is included and no intercept is included in 
the cointegrating equation.  The Johansen estimation procedure produces characteristic 
roots, which are reported in table 3.2 along with the resulting trace and max test 
statistics. 
 
The trace test statistic is calculated as  
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41 Degree of freedom restrictions prevent applying the Johansen procedure to all variables.  Pair-wise 
Engle-Granger (Engle and Granger) tests show that advertising expenditures are not cointegrated with 
shares and prices. 
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and the null hypothesis is that there exist less than or equal to r  cointegrating vectors 
versus a general alternative.  If all  are zero, then all iλˆ traceλ  are zero.  As  get further 
from zero, 
iλˆ
traceλ  get larger and the null hypothesis is rejected more often.   
 
The max statistic is calculated as  
 
 ( )1max ˆ1ln)1,( +−−=+ rTrr λλ . (3.37) 
 
The null hypothesis for the max test is that there exist  cointegrating vectors versus 
the specific alternative 1
r
of +r  cointegrating vectors.  Like the trace test, the max t
statistic grows larger as the characteristic roots diverge further from zero. 
est 
 
Both the trace and max tests concur that there exist three cointegrating vectors between 
the eight variables in the estimated system (four prices and four consumption shares).  
That is, there exist three different linear combinations of shares and prices that are 
stationary.  These cointegrating vectors are used to calculate the EC terms in equation 
(3.3) for subsequent estimation of the EC AIDS model.  The EC terms are 
operationalised by calculating a deviation from long-run equilibrium for each period 
using the coefficients from the estimated cointegrating vectors.  Each period has three 
different EC terms, each having the form 
 
 ptftctbtptftctbtt wawawawaPaPaPaPa 87654321 lnlnlnln +++++++=µ  (3.38) 
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where  and  are prices and shares for beef, poultry, fish and pork.  One of the three 
cointegrating vectors, or error-correction terms, is selected for estimation in the EC 
AIDS model outlined below. 
iP iw
 
3.6.2. The Static and EC AIDS Models 
The crux of this investigation is the estimation of the AIDS models outlined in chapter 
3.5.  The strategy is to estimate the model in static form, and to derive short-run 
advertising and price elasticities.  The dynamic, EC counterpart is then estimated and its 
long-run elasticities are contrasted with short-run elasticities.  It is difficult to form ex 
ante expectations about the relative sizes of the short versus long-run elasticities.  Note 
that the derived elasticities are of quantity, not of price.  Examination of the graphical 
model in figure 3.2 indicates that quantity changes could be ambiguous.  This point is 
discussed further in chapter 3.7.  Also regarding elasticities, it should be noted that there 
are several reasons to be cautious about using estimated elasticities in policy decisions.  
These reasons are discussed further in chapter 3.7.   
 
Of the three techniques to include advertising in AIDS models that are discussed in 
chapter 3.5, only the first is presented in this essay.  The second specification 
(advertising expenditure having a deflationary effect on prices) was estimated, but 
produced less appealing results.  The third method of extending an AIDS model 
(advertising-augmented price index) is not pursued for the reasons discussed in chapter 
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3.5.  All estimated models use Stone’s price index as presented in equation (3.10a), but 
with share lagged one period.42   
 
The model specification includes advertising as an addition to the share equations’ 
intercepts.  The estimated static form, which is referred to as model I, is 
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 for i = beef, poultry, fish and pork; k = beef and pork 
 
where all variable are as defined in chapter 3.5.  The system is estimated in Eviews by 
means of Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) systems approach.  One 
equation is dropped from estimation to avoid singularity of the covariance matrix since 
the equations sum to one by construction.  The system is estimated by iterative SUR to 
ensure that parameter estimates are asymptotically invariant to the choice of the 
excluded equation.  The equation for pork demand is dropped in all estimation 
hereafter.  Pork equation parameters are recovered using cross-equation restrictions 
outlined in (3.12) through (3.14).  There is an additional adding-up cross-equation 
restriction in advertising-augmented AIDS models.  To ensure that consumption shares 
add up to one, the restriction 
 
                                                 
42 Endogeneity of prices and advertising expenditure is not investigated in the current model.  The focus 
of this research is how modeling demand in dynamic, error-correction form affects estimation results.  
Were this data set used for policy purposes, endogeneity tests may be worthwhile.   
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is imposed.  It should be noted that imposing this restriction on advertising coefficients 
necessarily imposes the zero-sum game suggested by Hayes.  An increase in demand for 
one good as the result of advertising must be met by a commensurate decrease in 
demand for another (or a combination of the others).   
 
The EC counterpart to (3.39), which is referred to as model IEC, is 
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and is also estimated by iterative SUR.  Parameter estimates, t-stats and  are reported 
in table 3.3. 
2R
 
A few results from specifications I and IEC are worthy of note.  First, most own-price 
coefficients ( iiγ ) are the expected (negative) sign.  The exception is fish price in the 
static representation of model I’s fish share equation.  However it should be noted that 
the estimated coefficients are not direct reflections of computed elasticities.  In fact, the 
sign of a coefficient may not match the sign of its respective elasticity.  Cross-price 
coefficient estimates ( ijγ ) show mixed results.  Some are the expected positive sign, 
while some are negative.  AIDS models are replete with mixed results on the signs and 
significance of price parameter estimates; these results are not unusual.   
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 Another interesting point is the change in the significance of advertising coefficients 
( ijδ ) between model I and model IEC.  The t-stats for all advertising coefficients fall 
substantially in the EC model.  This result suggests that the statistical significance of 
advertising expenditure’s effect on consumption shares is smaller when modelled in 
dynamic EC form than in static form.  Correcting for the misspecification error in the 
static model results in less significance being attributed to advertising as a determinant 
of demand.   
 
A third interesting result is that all coefficients of adjustment ( iλ ) are negative in the 
EC form of model IEC (with the exception of fish).  This concurs with expectations, and 
implies that a deviation from the cointegrated long-run equilibrium in period t is 
partially corrected in period (t+1).  A positive (negative) error reflected in the 1−tµ  
variable has a negative (positive) effect on the relevant consumption share in the next 
period.  This dynamic works to move the system back towards its long-run equilibrium.   
 
3.6.3. Elasticities 
This section derives advertising elasticities for the estimated models.  Note that the 
Green and Alston methodology is not necessary in this case because lagged shares are 
used in the formulation of Stone’s price index.  However, as an additional resource, the 
derivation of advertising elasticities in the case of Stone’s price index with 
contemporaneous share is included in the appendix. 
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Short-run price elasticities are derived using the following method.  Define 
j
i
ij pd
qd
ln
ln=η  as the elasticity of demand for good i with respect to price of good j.  To 
derive the formula for this elasticity, first note that  
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or 
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so that 
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where  is the Kronecker delta.∂ 43  Short-run advertising elasticities are derived using 
the same technique and are calculated as  
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Long-run elasticities for model IEC are calculated by dividing the computed short-run 
elasticities by ( ii )π−1 .  The long-run advertising elasticity is defined as  
 
  ( )ii
ijLR
ij π
εε −= 1 . (3.46) 
                                                 
43 The Kronecker delta equals one if ji =  and zero otherwise. 
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 Elasticities are reported in table 3.4 and all are uncompensated.  Before discussing the 
estimated elasticities, a discussion of how to interpret each elasticity is warranted.  
Model I generates only short-run elasticities.  These elasticities reflect the effect on 
quantity demanded of advertising-induced short-run demand and short-run supply 
shifts.  This initial movement is characterised in figure 3.2 by the movement of the 
point at  to that at .  The elasticities from model I are estimated without including 
the error-correction term, however.  The existence of a long-run relationship between 
variables in the estimated system tells us that the error-correction term is an important 
factor in determining short-run changes in dependent variables.  Omission of this factor 
results in specification error.   
0P 1P
 
Specification IEC also generates short-run elasticities, but after correcting for the 
specification error.  As such, the elasticity estimates from the error-correction 
specification should be more econometrically and theoretically sound.   
 
Long-run elasticities are derived from model IEC.  The iiπ  parameter is used to derive 
the long-term effects through equation (3.46).  Long-run elasticities reflect how quantity 
demanded responds to advertising expenditure once the long-run equilibrium has been 
attained.  This is at the intersection of the long-run demand and long-run supply curves 
in figure 3.2. 
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The task now is to compare the short-run elasticities from model I to model IEC and to 
compare short-run elasticities to long-run elasticities.  A comparison of short-run 
elasticities from model I to model IEC illustrates how correcting for the static model’s 
misspecification error affects model results.  A comparison of short-run to long-run 
elasticities is important to differentiate short-run from long-run advertising effects.   
 
The own-price elasticities from model I are all negative, thereby concurring with a 
priori expectations.  Some cross-price elasticities are negative, implying 
complimentarity between meats.  The magnitudes are reasonable within the context of 
other meat demand studies (including Boetel and Liu, Piggott, et al., Burton and Young) 
but it should be noted that making such comparisons is a questionable endeavour. 44   
 
There are a few noteworthy differences between the short-run elasticities from model I 
and those from model IEC.  First, most own-price elasticities are smaller in the EC 
model (with the exception of fish).  The inclusion of the EC term in model IEC gives the 
impression of less price elastic meat demand.  Also, most cross-price elasticities are 
smaller in model IEC than in model I.  The exception remains fish.  Smaller elasticities 
are a result of correcting for the static model’s misspecification error.  The inclusion of 
the error-correction term reduces the influence that prices have on the movement in 
shares.  The system’s short-run movements towards its long-run equilibrium, as 
reflected in the error-correction term, controls for some of the shares’ short-run 
deviations, thus resulting in smaller price elasticities.   
                                                 
44 Different functional forms, model specification and data sets frequently provide markedly different 
estimates.  It is hoped that the model proposed in this essay is one step towards a methodology that 
provides more robust elasticity estimates. 
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 Long-run price elasticities from model IEC do not provide support for the proposition 
that demand is more price elastic in the long-run than in the short-run.  Pork is the only 
meat that has a larger own-price elasticity in the long-run than in the short-run.  This 
result is counterintuitive and highlights the caution that must be exercised in 
interpreting elasticity estimates from demand systems.  Unfortunately, the static model 
does not provide long-run elasticities which could be compared to the long-run 
elasticities from the error-correction model.  As such, it cannot be determined if 
modeling in EC form provides an improvement in the estimation of long-run price 
elasticities.  The use of elasticity estimates in policy decisions is discussed further in 
chapter 3.7. 
 
Advertising elasticity estimates from models I and IEC make for an interesting 
comparison.  The short-run own-advertising elasticity for beef in model I is negative, 
implying that beef advertising has a negative impact on beef demand.  This is an 
intuitively unappealing result.  Note, however that short-run own-advertising elasticity 
for beef is positive in model IEC; this is more in line with theoretical expectations.  
Another key difference between short-run advertising elasticities in model I and model 
IEC is that most cross-advertising elasticities become negative when modelled in EC 
form.  Correcting for the misspecification error by including an EC term generates the 
more intuitively appealing result that advertising for one type of meat has a negative 
impact on demand for other meats.   
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Long-run advertising elasticities are similar to their short-run counterparts, however 
most are smaller in magnitude.  This result suggests that consumer demand is less 
responsive to advertising over the long-term horizon.  The exception is pork, for which 
long-run advertising elasticity is larger than short-run advertising elasticity.  The larger 
long-run pork advertising elasticity suggests that pork producers have been successful 
in attempts to sustain, and even magnify, the effects of their advertising messages.  This 
could be attributable to an accumulation of information, as discussed in chapter 3.5.2. 
 
The broad conclusions from elasticity estimates are two-fold.  The first is that the EC 
model of IEC generates elasticity estimates that are more in line with theoretical 
expectations, especially in the case of advertising.  All own-advertising elasticities are 
positive and most cross-advertising elasticities are negative.  The second conclusion is 
that there are differences between short and long-run elasticities.  Whether elasticities 
become smaller or larger depends on the meat type, but producers should be aware that 
the instantaneous effects of an advertising campaign may not be long lasting. 
 
3.7. Demand Models and Elasticities in Policy Decisions 
Elasticities are the common yardstick for determining if advertising “works”.  Demand 
systems are estimated, elasticities computed and policy decisions made according to 
those elasticities.  There are several reasons, however, to exercise caution when 
evaluating elasticities (see Alston and Chalfant for a thorough examination of the 
sensitivity of estimation results to model specification). 
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First, as in any empirical economic study, the ceteris paribus conditions are difficult to 
enforce.  One would hope that a properly specified demand equation controls for all 
relevant variables that affect demand.  This is never the case.  Misspecification affects 
parameter estimates and attributes either too much or too little influence to some or all 
of the independent variables in the system.  For example, an exogenous shock that 
increases beef demand and coincides with an advertising campaign for beef attributes 
too much credit to advertising if the exogenous shock is not in the demand system.  
Demand systems already contain several variables, and the benefits of including more 
exogenous variables must be balanced with the benefits of econometric parsimony.   
 
Elasticities are based on these imperfect parameter estimates and must be understood in 
this context.  Elasticities can be considered, at best, crude estimates of the direction and 
magnitude of an independent variable’s effect on a dependent variable.  As such, one 
must avoid deriving overly-fervent conclusions.  For example, Chang and Green 
estimate negative own-advertising elasticities for dairy products.  Based on these 
elasticities, they state that “consumers respond...negatively to advertising for dairy 
products...”.  This statement implies that consumers view dairy advertisements and 
consciously decide to decrease their consumption of dairy products in response.  This 
seems implausible.  It is much more likely that their model is not picking up the effects 
of some other factor that determines demand for dairy products.  That is, the presumed 
ceteris paribus is not so paribus.  Chang and Green likely understand this problem, 
however such statements must be interpreted cautiously. 
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A second consideration is that the elasticities derived in AIDS models are elasticities of 
quantity, not of price or of expenditure.  That is, if advertising elasticity is positive and 
significant, then one can conclude that advertising increases quantity demanded of the 
advertised product.  That is,  increases.  The supply-side dynamics described in figure 
3.2 demonstrate that advertising could lead to increased market consumption, with no 
significant effect on price.  All that advertising accomplishes in this case is a larger 
industry.  Profits do not rise if the industry faces constant or rising costs.  An 
intermediate case where both price and quantity increase is also a possibility, but the 
profit increase is not as large as if only price increases.   
iq
 
Furthermore, even if price does increase as a result of advertising, at least some portion 
of that price increase must be attributed to higher producer costs.  Figure 3.2 illustrates 
how supply shifts left when producers are faced with new advertising costs, often in the 
form of a per-unit check off.  A price increase of this sort does not increase profits. 
 
Finally, the size of advertising elasticities must not be equated with the size of potential 
returns for producers (Green, Carman and McManus).  Even if the actual advertising 
elasticity is positive and significant, producer returns depend on factors such as the cost 
of expanding production to meet higher demand and the cost of the advertising 
campaign. 
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3.8. Conclusions 
The debate about the effectiveness of agricultural advertising campaigns is likely to 
remain active.  Policy makers and producers have vested interests in knowing the 
usefulness of programs to which they are compelled to contribute funds.  The job of 
analysing the effectiveness falls on the shoulders of economist, who must use 
aggregated data to estimate the effects of advertising on demand.  Such estimation 
usually takes the form of demand systems.   
 
Demand systems are useful in that they provide quantitative estimates of how 
advertising expenditure changes demand.  The agricultural economics literature is 
replete with such studies.  Results from these studies are often unsatisfying, and are 
frequently sensitive to model specification.  Also, the majority of demand system 
studies are static and therefore consider only short-run effects.  Producers who are 
compelled to contribute to a marketing program over a long-run horizon should be 
interested in the long-term prospects of success in promoting their product.   
 
This essay attempts to improve the state of assessing advertising effectiveness in two 
primary ways.  The first is to outline the importance of long-run versus short-run effects 
in analysing advertising effectiveness.  The second is to stress the importance of 
correctly modelling the time-series properties of the data used in demand system 
estimation.  Correctly accounting for these properties should produce a more 
econometrically sound, and hopefully robust, method of assessing advertising.  This 
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essay also explains the particular relevance of correctly modelling time-series properties 
and accounting for long-run effects in the context of agricultural commodities.   
 
An empirical model is developed that accounts for the time-series properties of the data 
and provides long-run elasticity estimates.  The error-correction AIDS model is applied 
to US meat data and results are compared to a traditional static AIDS model.  There are 
important differences between the traditional static demand model and the EC model 
that is developed in this essay; the estimated parameters and elasticities show that 
accounting for time-series properties and including an error-correction term does 
produce different results than traditional static models.  Analysis of the data reveals a 
long-run relationship between meat prices in the US, indicating that these products may 
fit into the closely-substitutable commodity categorisation.  This long-run relationship 
is estimated in a vector error-correction model and incorporated into a demand system 
by means of error correction.   
 
The error-correction model corrects for the misspecification in the static demand model, 
and produces markedly different empirical results.  Short-run elasticities from the error-
correction model differ from elasticities derived from the static model.  Also, long-run 
elasticities are different from short-run elasticities.  This suggests that the long-run 
effects of an advertising campaign may be different than the short-run effects.  The 
error-correction model also produces some more intuitively appealing results. 
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A comprehensive appraisal of a commodity advertising program would require more 
information that can be gleaned from a demand system.  Specifically, the estimation of 
a vector error correction model could provide information about how quickly, and for 
how long, prices are likely to respond to an advertising-induced price shock.  Short-run 
elasticities would quantify this response.  Also, the costs an advertising program and the 
costs of increasing output to meet higher demand would have to included in any benefit-
cost study. 
 
It is important to remember that the tools used by economists to estimate policy effects 
have limitations and are far from perfect.  With that proviso in mind, it is likely that 
demand models will continue to be used in policy decisions about agricultural 
commodity promotion.  Economists should strive to make these demand models as 
reliable and comprehensive as possible. 
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Figure 3.1. Advertising-Induced Demand Shift
P 
S0SR
P1
P0
D1SR
D0SR
Q
 
 219
Figure 3.2.  Market Force Dynamics 
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Table 3.1. VAR Tests
Lags SIC
1 -47.96279
2 -45.93485
3 -44.10836
4 -43.54338
5 -42.92391
6 -43.24723  
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2. Johansen Tests
Max test
Eigenvalue Test Statistic 5% Critical Value Conclusion
Hypothesis
r=0 0.6623 75.9827 47.99 Reject
r=1 0.5726 59.4977 41.51 Reject
r=2 0.4456 41.2884 36.36 Reject
r=3 0.2956 24.5298 30.04 Not Reject
r=4 0.1670 12.7940 23.80 Not Reject
r=5 0.1002 7.3894 17.89 Not Reject
r=6 0.0482 3.4552 11.44 Not Reject
r=7 0.0026 0.1833 3.84 Not Reject
Trace test
Hypothesis
r=0 0.6623 225.1206 141.21 Reject
r < or = 1 0.5726 149.1379 109.99 Reject
r < or = 2 0.4456 89.6402 82.49 Reject
r < or = 3 0.2956 48.3518 59.46 Not Reject
r < or = 4 0.1670 23.8220 39.89 Not Reject
r < or = 5 0.1002 11.0279 24.31 Not Reject
r < or = 6 0.0482 3.6385 12.53 Not Reject
r < or = 7 0.0026 0.1833 3.84 Not Reject
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Table 3.3. Parameter Estimates
I IEC I IEC
αb 0.7036 -0.0014 αf 0.0708 -0.0017
32.7525 -1.0865 7.8904 -1.2074
πb -0.1886 πf -0.4084
-1.7227 -3.5192
γbb -0.1566 -0.0276 γfb -0.0054 0.0364
γbc 0.0739 0.0034 γfc -0.0001 0.0164
3.2349 0.3308
γbf -0.0054 0.0364 γff 0.0094 -0.0843
-0.4407 1.8499
γbp 0.0881 -0.0123 γfp -0.0039 0.0315
7.9826 -0.8516 -0.4658 1.8983
βb 0.0083 -0.0177 βf 0.0177 0.0753
0.2491 -0.8179 1.2727 2.5932
λb -0.0039 λf 0.0072
-1.3370 2.1974
δbb -0.0068 0.0033 δfb 0.0022 0.0015
-3.1602 1.8789 2.0594 0.8091
δbp -0.0222 -0.0018 δfp 0.0025 -0.0023
-5.5181 -0.9089 1.3426 -1.0692
R2 0.9238 0.1495 R2 0.6087 0.3620
αc 0.0488 0.0023 αp 0.1769 0.0008
2.3502 2.5492
πc -0.0097 πp 0.6068
-0.0767
γcb 0.0739 0.0034 γpb 0.0881 -0.0123
γcc -0.0662 -0.0124 γpc -0.0076 -0.0075
γcf -0.0001 0.0164 γpf -0.0039 0.0315
-0.0098 1.4296
γcp -0.0076 -0.0075 γpp -0.0767 -0.0117
-0.7234 -0.7649
βc 0.0253 -0.0277 βp -0.0512 -0.0299
0.8200 -1.8995
λc -0.0019 λp -0.0015
-0.9439
δcb 0.0098 0.0005 δpb -0.0052 -0.0054
4.9518 0.4614
δcp 0.0161 -0.0002 δpp 0.0036 0.0043
4.1955 -0.1377
R2 0.8911 0.0803  
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Table 3.4. Elasticities
Uncompensated Price Elasticities
Short-run elasticities for Model I
Beef Poultry Fish Pork
Beef -1.3989 0.1789 -0.0151 0.2145
Poultry 0.2452 -1.2801 -0.0081 -0.0543
Fish -0.1570 -0.0589 -0.8995 -0.1067
Pork 0.4188 0.0222 0.0007 -1.2443
Short-run elasticities for IEC
Beef Poultry Fish Pork
Beef -1.0511 0.0201 0.0944 -0.0192
Poultry 0.0560 -1.0200 0.0717 -0.0011
Fish 0.0784 -0.0395 -2.1359 0.1500
Pork -0.0474 0.0011 0.1305 -1.0151
Long-run elasticities for IEC
Beef Poultry Fish Pork
Beef -0.8843 0.0169 0.0794 -0.0162
Poultry 0.0555 -1.0102 0.0710 -0.0011
Fish 0.0557 -0.0281 -1.5165 0.1065
Pork -0.1206 0.0029 0.3318 -2.5816
Advertising Elasticities
Short-run elasticities for Model I
Beef Pork
Beef -0.0171 -0.0553
Poultry 0.0378 0.0619
Fish 0.0273 0.0320
Pork -0.0199 0.0137
Short-run elasticities for IEC
Beef Pork
Beef 0.0083 -0.0045
Poultry 0.0021 -0.0007
Fish 0.0195 -0.0293
Pork -0.0208 0.0166
Long-run elasticities for IEC
Beef Pork
Beef 0.0070 -0.0038
Poultry 0.0021 -0.0007
Fish 0.0138 -0.0208
Pork -0.0530 0.0423  
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APPENDIX - DERIVATION OF ADVERTISING ELASTICITIES  
WHEN USING STONE’S PRICE INDEX 
 
 
If an AIDS model is estimated using Stone’s price index and share is not lagged in 
equation (3.10a), then the elasticity derivations are not as shown in chapter 3.6.  Using 
standard AIDS elasticity formulae is a common error in empirical demand analysis that 
utilises Stone’s price index (Green and Alston).  Green and Alston’s article outlines 
how to solve for price elasticities, and this appendix illustrates how to derive the correct 
advertising elasticity formulas. 
 
Stone’s price index allows for the linearization of the standard AIDS model, however 
elasticity derivations are made considerably more complicated by the inclusion of 
lagged consumption shares on the right-hand-side of the estimated equation.  
Specifically, when taking the derivative of the price index, the partial derivatives of all 
consumption shares (see equation (3.10a)) must be computed.  Each elasticity is a 
function of itself and all other elasticities.  This problem is outlined and then solved 
below. 
 
Define 
j
i
ij Ad
qd
ln
ln=ε  as the elasticity of demand for good i with respect to advertising 
expenditure on good j.  To derive the formula for this elasticity, first note that  
 
 
),( puc
qpw iii =  (3.A.1) 
 
or 
 
 i
i
i wp
pucq ),(=   (3.A.2) 
 
so that 
 
 
j
i
j
i
i
j
i
ii
ij
i
ij
Ad
wd
Ad
dw
w
Ad
dw
p
puc
q
qAd
dq
ln
ln
ln
1
ln
),(1
1
ln
=
=
=
=ε
 (3.A.3) 
 
 224
In the case of specification I, this is 
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The derivative of the price index in the standard AIDS model is a linear function of 
parameters.  The derivative of Stone’s price index is more complicated. 
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To solve for the 
j
k
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wd
ln
ln  term, relationship (3.A.3) shows that 
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Substituting this last result into (3.A.5) yields 
 
 ∑=
k
kjkk
j
pw
Ad
Pd εln
ln
ln *  (3.A.7) 
 
Plugging this into (3.A.4) gives 
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Each elasticity ijε  is a function of itself and all other elasticities.  Equation (3.A.8) can 
be expressed in matrix form and solved for elasticities using linear algebra. 
 
 BCEAE −=   (3.A.9) 
 
where E is a (4 X 2) matrix containing elements ijije ε= , A is a (4 X 2) matrix with 
elements 
i
ij
ij w
a
δ= , B is a (4 X 1) matrix with elements 
i
i
i w
b β=  and C is a (1 X 4) matrix 
with elements . jjj pwc ln=
 
Equation (3.A.9) can be solved for E with the following steps: 
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Advertising elasticities for models with advertising expenditure as a price deflator (as in 
chapter 3.5.3) can be derived in a similar fashion.  The final elasticity formula is 
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which can be represented as 
 
  (3.A.12) CDEBAE −+−=
 
E is a (4 X 2) matrix containing elements ijije ε= , A is a (4 X 2) matrix with elements 
i
jij
ij w
a
δγ= , B is a (4 X 2) matrix with elements 
i
jji
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w
b
δβ= , C is a (4 X 1) matrix 
containing elements 
i
i
i w
c β=  and D is a (1 X 4) matrix with elements 
( )jjjjj Apwd lnln δ−= .  Note that the jj Alnδ  portion of the elements in D are zero for 
meats without advertising expenditure data (i.e. poultry and fish).   
 
The solution to (A.12) is  
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